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Abstract
As distributed collaborative applications and architectures are adopting policy
based management for tasks such as access control, network security and data
privacy, the management and consolidation of a large number of policies is be-
coming a crucial component of such policy based systems. In large-scale dis-
tributed collaborative applications like web services, there is the need of analyz-
ing policy interactions and integrating policies. In this thesis, we propose and
implement EXAM-S, a comprehensive environment for policy analysis and man-
agement, which can be used to perform a variety of functions such as policy prop-
erty analyses, policy similarity analysis, policy integration etc. As part of this en-
vironment, we have proposed and implemented new techniques for the analysis
of policies that rely on a deep study of state of the art techniques. Moreover, we
propose an approach for solving heterogeneity problems that usually arise when
considering the analysis of policies belonging to different domains. Our work fo-
cuses on analysis of access control policies written in the dialect of XACML (Ex-
tensible Access Control Markup Language) [71]. We consider XACML policies
because XACML is a rich language which can represent many policies of interest
to real world applications and is gaining widespread adoption in the industry.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the last decades, Internet has become the de facto standard in communication.
On top of Web technologies, collaborative applications such as distributed sys-
tems and complex SOA architectures, have been developed for resource provi-
sioning and data sharing. Such systems introduce however several security is-
sues. Grids, federations aswell as simple service providers and intra-organization
systems, need to find the best trade-off between flexibility in data providing and
reliability of the access control model.
Security in these scenarios is usually managed by exploiting policies-based
access control models. This approach is widespread adopted nowadays since al-
low users and system administrators to decouple the access control management
from the application logic. Particularly important class of such security policies is
represented by access control policies which determine whether requests to pro-
tected resources are permitted or denied. Various types of access control mod-
els and mechanisms have emerged, such as PolicyMaker [12], the ISO 10181-3
model [1] and the eXtensible Access Control Mark-up Language (XACML) [72].
However, even for simple scenarios, the maintenance of consistent policy sets
is not a trivial task. Moreover, due to the dynamism and complexity of those col-
laborative systems, tools that support the analysis of security policies are crucial.
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
Finally, the scenario under consideration becomes even more complicated when
taking into account set of policies belonging to different domains.
For these reasons, analysis tools need to support powerful analysis services
able to be executed over multi-domain policy sets. In the remaining part of this
chapter we discuss the motivations underlying our work and a sketch of the pro-
posed solutions along with an outline of the following chapters.
1.1. Policy Analysis: Requirements
Security policies can be considered as rules stating whether some subjects have
the privileges to access some resources. By this perspective, a policy-based access
control model is a set of rules defined over an application domain. Usually, it is a
good practice to decouple the security policies from the application logic in order
to enhance modularity and simplify management. Policy languages fulfill such
requirement by offering formalisms and related tools supporting the specification
and analysis of such rule sets.
In this thesis we focus our attention on XACML-based policies. XACML (eX-
tensible Access Control Mark-up Language) [72] is the OASIS standard language
for the specification of access control policies. As suggested by the name, XACML
is an XML language able to express a policy in terms of rules over different kind
of entity attributes. Rules are then collected into policies and combined with rule
combining algorithms. Such algorithms are used to define precedence in the ap-
plication of rules if more than one of them applies for a single request. Table 1.1
shows a simplified example of a XACML rule1. XACML has gained widespread
adoption as an industry standard and a detailed description of its features will be
presented in Chapter 2.
However, even if the creation of XACML policies is well supported2, the anal-
ysis and verification of properties that a policyset has to satisfy is still an ongoing
1Some syntactical details have been omitted.
2http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/javadoc/index.html
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<Rule RuleId="examplerule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<DisjunctiveMatch>
<ConjunctiveMatch>
<Match MatchId="function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue>PhDStudent</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator
AttributeId="action-type"
Category="...attribute-category:subject"
DataType="...#string"/>
</Match>
<Match MatchId="function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue>Read</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator
AttributeId="action-type"
Category="...attribute-category:action"
DataType="...#string"/>
</Match>
<Match MatchId="function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue>Tech_Paper</AttributeValue>
<AttributeDesignator
AttributeId="action-type"
Category="...attribute-category:resource"
DataType="...#string"/>
</Match>
</ConjunctiveMatch>
</DisjunctiveMatch>
</Target>
</Rule>
Table 1.1: A XACML rule.
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Figure 1.1: Simple policy example
work and no standard approaches have been widely accepted. The reason is
related to the fact that the specification of XACML is not based on a formal se-
mantics. This problem is crucial since the properties that security administrators
should verify are strongly related to the semantics of the involved policies. In
the following, some of the most interesting properties that a policy analysis tool
should support will be described and discussed in detail.
1.1.1 Policy Comparison
Consider a collaborative scenario in which system partners need to compare their
access control policies in order to understand if similar kind of users have similar
capabilities. This kind of requests are of particular interest in federated systems
where users belonging to partners organizations may have the rights to access
shared resources. Consider the policies shown in Figure 1.1 where policy P is
composed by the rules R1, R2 and R3 and P
′ is composed by the rules R′1 and R
′
2.
Policy comparison is the problem of verifying whether two (sets of) policies yield
to similar results.
Policy comparison represents an important issue in real case scenarios. For
example, as policies are increasingly being deployed at various levels within a
distributed system - network devices, firewalls, hosts, applications - an impor-
tant issue is to determine whether all the deployed policies authorize the same
set of requests. Hence a strong requirement in the development of an analysis
environment is devising techniques and tools for assessing policy similarity.
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1.1.2 Heterogeneous Policy Analysis
The comparison of policies rely on a fine-grained inspection of attribute names
and values within the rules. However, we cannot expect that policies belonging
to different organizations are based on the same vocabulary. Such heterogeneity
in names and values may result in considering as incomparable two policies even
when their effects are semantically equivalent. We classify these heterogeneities
in two different categories:
• Terminological heterogeneity: there is terminological heterogeneity when the
same concept is expressed used different terms;
• Domain heterogeneity: there is domain heterogeneity when similar applica-
tion domains are modeled by taking into account different perspectives;
When considering the policy analysis in a relaxed scenario with multi-domain
policies, additional issues arise. The most challenging problems are related to
the development of a common understanding between the vocabularies under
considerations and extracting and formalizing an application domain based on
a (possibly partial) knowledge of the domain itself. As an example, consider the
policy introduced in Table 1.1. The policy specifies a permit rule allowing student
to read technical papers. We have used the term Tech Paper as a representation
of the concept Technical Paper. However, Tech Paper is just a shortcut, a list of
characters used for convenience. In order to effectively compare policies belong-
ing to different organizations a string-based match is not enough.
In the last decade, due to the introduction of the Semantic Web paradigm [9],
ontologies have been adopted for the formal representation of application do-
mains. On top of ontologies several techniques have been developed for the
alignment and the integration of heterogeneous data. These approaches can be
adopted also in our context improving and optimizing state of the art strategies
taking advantage of the specific features of XACML policies.
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1.1.3 Reasoning on Application Domains
XACML is essentially based on Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) in which
access control is enforced depending by the values of certain resource and subject
attributes. However, it is often important to take into account also the seman-
tic relationships among the attributes characterizing the resources and subjects.
XACML, natively, is not able to exploit this kind of information and even its spe-
cialized profiles give support to just a small portion of all the possible scenarios3.
Moreover, due to the rigid structure and features of the underlying data model,
XACML is not able to represent important security constraints such as dynamic
separation of duty (SoD) constraints.
In order to address such shortcomings XACML needs to be improved and this
improvement requires extensions to both the XACML language, namely the in-
troduction of specialized functions, and the XACML reference architecture and
engine. Therefore, the main issue is to identify a specialized data structure to
couple with the reference XACML architecture and engine able to support both
the maintenance of past records and the reasoning capabilities. For the same mo-
tivations introduced in the above section, ontologies4 represent the most suitable
tool to be coupled with XACML to address its limitations. However, enhancing
XACML with such specialized features raises policy analysis to a higher level.
This means that the analysis techniques developed for the standard language are
not enough and new methodologies needs to be devised.
1.2. EXAM-S: Motivations
So far, we have described some of the issues arising from the management of
a policy-based access control model. To date, no comprehensive environments
exist supporting the management of heterogeneity issues arising by considering
multi domain policy datasets and a large variety of query analysis. Specialized
3List of profiles currently available in XACML: http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/2.0/
4From now on the term ontology is used to represent a Semantic Web ontology.
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techniques and tools have been proposed, addressing only limited forms of anal-
ysis (detailed discussion is presented in Chapter 3). Common limitations concern:
• policy conditions: only policies with simple conditions can be analyzed [35];
• relationship characterization: in that for example one can only determinewhether
two policies authorize some common request, but no characterization of
such request is provided.
• policy comparison: in Section 1.1.1 we defined policy comparison as: the prob-
lem of verifying whether two (sets of) policies yield to similar results. It is im-
portant to outline the use of the word similar with respect to same. Some
approaches (as for example [56]) consider policy comparison as a boolean
problem. In contrast, we think that even if two policies are different, it is
important to have a solution that gives a measure of that difference. Maybe
two policy sets could be evaluated as different but they may be very sim-
ilar and this is an information that a system administrator could take into
account;
• reasoning services: the definition of analysis services based on application
domain reasoning is a new approach never taken into account in existing
approaches. A sketch of the problem along with some possible analysis
proposals is introduced in [55];
• heterogeneous domain: at the best of our knowledge no tools have been de-
veloped for the management of multi-domain policy sets.
1.2.1 Lack of Semantics
The fact that no one of the tools proposed so far have been widely accepted is due
to the fact that XACML lacks formal semantics. In the last years, several propos-
als have been made to fill such gap [35, 47, 56] each of them taking into account
different subsets of the XACML features, translating the language into different
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logics5 and providing reasoning services with different complexity. Each of them
has both strong and weak points. For example services in [56] are defined on a
subset of XACML bigger than the one considered in [35]. However, considering
less expressivity yield to the implementation of systems with better performance
when reasoning on large policy data sets.
1.2.2 Ontologies and Interoperability
The Semantic Web [9] has been proposed in 2001 as an extension of the current
Web in which resources are enriched with a well-defined, machine-processable
meaning. One of the main features of the Semantic Web paradigm is the use of
domain ontologies in order to describe the semantics of the data. The actual W3C
Recommendation for the development of Web ontologies is OWL an XML-based
language modeled on top of the Description Logic (DL) family of representation
languages.
In the last years, a number of different ontology-based techniques have been
proposed for addressing interoperability issues. The most interesting one is On-
tology Matching, that is, the process whereby two ontologies are semantically
related at conceptual level; source ontology entities are mapped onto the target
ontology entities according to those semantic relations. When two heterogeneous
systems define their terminology according to the knowledge modeled within an
ontology, an ontology mapping procedures allows one to find relations between
the semantic schemas and thus between the data managed by those systems. We
can take advantage of Ontology Mapping and semantic technologies for solving
the problem of policy heterogeneity.
1.3. Aims of the Thesis
The aims of this thesis are twofold.
5The approaches proposed in [35,47,56] provide mapping respectively with First Order Logic,
MTBDD (Propositional Logic) and Description Logic.
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On the one hand, we introduce XACML+OWL a framework in which the
XACML language, architecture and engine are extended with ontology reason-
ing. The approach proposed in XACML+OWL allows to decouple the definition
of the main actors and constraints of the access control model from the defini-
tion of the permissions that can be associated with them. This solution improve
the flexibility of XACML in realizing complex security systems and it also over-
comes the XACML limitations outlined in Section 1.1.3. In Chapter 5 we shows
the feasibility of our approach modeling the Role Based Access Control (RBAC).
Specifically, we give support to a particular version of RBAC named constrained
hierarchical RBAC in which roles are organized in a hierarchy and several con-
straints such as static and dynamic separation of duties can be defined over such
roles.
On th other hand, we design EXAM-S (Environment for XACML policy Anal-
ysis and Management with Semantic technologies), a new analysis tool, com-
bining state of the art technologies and offering new solutions based on the in-
troduction of novel analysis services. We also compare EXAM-S with existing
approaches in order to evaluate both correctness and efficiency of the model. We
provide a prototype implementation of the EXAM-S architecture along with ex-
perimental evaluations and a detailed discussion of the results. Finally, we dis-
cuss the applicability of the ideas developed in EXAM-S in other contexts such as
privacy policies and digital identity management.
The realization of EXAM-S is the main contribution of the thesis. The major
issues we have addressed in EXAM-S can be categorized as follows:
Figure 1.2 depicts a conceptual representation of the aims of this dissertation.
The starting point of our work is state of the art policy analysis services (Red
Box). Then, this thesis has three different purposes:
1. Heterogeneity between policies: to deal with the problem of policy heterogene-
ity we propose a stack of semantic integration techniques. Usually, reason-
ing systems adopt the unique name assumption, that is, that different names
have different meanings. In our scenario such assumption cannot be made
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Figure 1.2: Thesis purposes
since we are working considering policies belonging to different domains.
For this reason, we create an ontology-based process that solves the hetero-
geneity problems by creating a knowledge base of unique names exploited
by the upper-level procedures.
2. Trade-off between Complexity and Expressiveness: to analyze the trade-off be-
tween complexity and expressiveness about the approaches presented so
far. This is a crucial point in the development of EXAM-S. An extensive
analysis of the formalisms currently adopted is necessary in ensuring a flex-
ible design of the system. According to such analysis we then develop an
hybrid set of services that represent a trade-off between expressivity and
complexity.
3. Reasoning Services: to define new services that take into consideration the
policy terminology enriched with semantic data. We add new, original ser-
vices that exploit semantic techniques supporting powerful analysis ser-
vices. We designed such technologies as an alternative solution to stan-
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dard state of the art approaches. At the best of our knowledge no existing
tools support analysis services based on reasoning over domain knowledge
bases.
The work of this thesis can be logically grouped in four different steps:
• Preliminaries: policy analysis is a complex task and there are several issues
that must be taken into consideration before the design of EXAM-S. For this
reason we discuss related work and provides theoretical background along
with preliminary definitions that are exploited in the following parts of the
thesis.
• The Model: this part concerns the design of the EXAM-S system. The mod-
ules related to the policy analysis are the main contributions of this work
and for this reason they have been treated in more details.
• The Implementation: the EXAM-S architecture, implementation and experi-
mental evaluations are provided in this part. Firstly, we provide the archi-
tecture of EXAM-S considering how the analysis services described in the
previous part can be organized together. Secondly, we describe the details
about the system implementation and discuss the experimental results pro-
viding comparisons with related works.
• Appendix: interoperability is an important issue not only regarding secu-
rity. In this section we provide detailed descriptions on how the solutions
developed for EXAM-S can be exploited in other fields of research.
1.4. Outline
This thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2: in this chapter we introduce background information and neces-
sary preliminaries needed to understand the technical contributions of the
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dissertation. Specifically, we provide a detailed description of XACML, De-
scription Logics and Ontology Mapping.
• Chapter 3: in this chapter we surveywork related to this dissertation. Specif-
ically, we describe existing access control policy models and related lan-
guages, and we review policy analysis and verification approaches.
• Chapter 4: in this chapter we develop the theory behind EXAM-S.We present
the problem of policy heterogeneity providing the definitions that are used
in Chapter 6 in the development of the algorithms. We provide the de-
tails of the most relevant approaches in the field, discussing the differences
between them and pointing out which of the proposed methodologies are
suitable to be combined in our model. Finally, we introduce the theory be-
hind the definition of reasoning services over domain ontologies.
• Chapter 5: in this chapter we present an approach for extending XACML
with new functions for the management of ontology driven access control
models. We introduce both the theory behind the new functions and the so-
lutions to the issues arising from the application of our approach in practice.
Even if the development of this framework is not directly associated with
EXAM-S, the functionalities introduced in this Chapter are taken into con-
sideration in Chapter 7 when we define the core EXAM-S analysis services.
Our services are able to deal with both standard and semantic functions.
• Chapter 6: in this chapter we present the technologies adopted for solving
the heterogeneity problem. These technologies are organized in a compre-
hensive process that can be applied to a large set of real case scenarios. In
this section we propose both definitions and the algorithms that we have
developed.
• Chapter 7: in this chapter we describe the policy analysis services. We pro-
vide the details of two different modules namely: policy filtering and policy
similarity analyzer (PSA). Whereas the PSA provides a precise framework for
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the analysis of policies, the filtering module has been developed as a sup-
port tool for computing quickly the similarity between two policies. When
the set of policies involved into the analysis process is very large, the com-
bination of the filtering module and PSA provide a good balance between
performance and precision in the results.
• Chapter 8: P3P Policy Similarity. P3P [23] is aW3C Recommendation for the
development of privacy policy. Since many websites nowadays implement
P3P policies [28], P3P policies represents another domain that is suitable
for applying our similarity measure. We describe briefly the P3P language
and the formalization of a similarity function. Experimental evaluations are
reported and described.
• Chapter 9: in this chapter we present the architecture of EXAM-S. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to analyze how the services previously introduced
can be combined together. We address this requirement by providing a de-
tailed description of the relationship between the main services along with
the design of the dedicated modules.
• Chapter 10: we provide the experimental evaluations and a comparative
evaluation between the obtained results and related approaches.
• Chapter 11: we present concluding remarks as well as possible areas of fu-
ture work.
• Appendix A: Interoperability in Digital Identity Management. Interoper-
ability is an important issue associated with several research topics. In this
section we details the results of the application of an ontology-based ap-
proach for dealing with heterogeneities in a Digital Identity Management
scenario.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we provide the background which is necessary to understand the
remainder of the thesis. First of all, we recall the basis of the XACML standard.
Furthermore, we introduce notions about Description Logics, ontologies and re-
lated techniques such as ontology mapping.
2.1. XACML
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Mark-up Language) [Moses, 2003] is the OA-
SIS standard language for the specification of access control policies. It is an XML
language able to express a large variety of policies, taking into account proper-
ties of subjects and protected objects as well as context information. In general, a
subject can request an action to be executed on a resource and the policy decides
whether to deny or allow the execution of that action. Several profiles such as
a role profile, a privacy profile etc. have been defined for XACML. An XACML
policy consists of three major components, namely a Target, a Rule set, and a rule
combining algorithm for conflict resolution.
• The Target identifies the set of requests that the policy is applicable to. It con-
tains attribute constraints characterizing subjects, resources, actions, and
environments.
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• Each Rule in turn consists of another optional Target, a Condition and an Ef-
fect element. The rule Target has the same structure as the policy Target.
It specifies the set of requests that the rule is applicable to. The Condition
specifies restrictions on the attribute values in a request that must hold in
order for the request to be permitted or denied as specified by the Effect.
The Effect specifies whether the requested actions should be allowed (Per-
mit) or denied (Deny). The restrictions specified by the target and condition
elements correspond to the notion of attribute-based access control, under
which access control policies are expressed as conditions against the prop-
erties of subjects and protected objects. In XACML such restrictions are rep-
resented as Boolean functions taking the request attribute values as input,
and returning true or false depending on whether the request attributes sat-
isfy certain conditions. If a request satisfies the policy target, then the policy
is applicable to that request. Then, it is checked to see if the request satisfies
the targets of any rules in the policy. If the request satisfies a rule target, the
rule is applicable to that request and will yield a decision as specified by the
Effect element if the request further satisfies the rule condition predicates.
If the request does not satisfy the policy(rule) target, the policy(rule) is ”Not
Applicable” and the effect will be ignored.
• The Rule combining algorithm is used to resolve conflicts among applicable
rules with different effects.
Figure 2.1 gives an overview of a policy structure. Whereas Table 2.1 gives the
syntax of the simplified format that will be used in Chapter 7 in the definition of
our similarity measure.
2.1.1 Rule Combining Algorithm
Because a Policy or PolicySetmay contain multiple policies or Rules, each of
which may evaluate to different access control decisions, XACML a mechanism
to combine access decisions. This is accomplished using a collection of combining
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POLICY: <policy policy-id = ”policy-id combining-algorithm = ”combining-algorithm >
(TARGET ELEMENT)?
< permitrules >
(RULE ELEMENT)*
</permitrules>
<denyrules>
(RULE ELEMENT)*
</permitrules>
</policy>
RULE ELEMENT:
<rule rule-id=”rule-id effect=”rule-effect>
(TARGET ELEMENT)?
<condition>PREDICATE</condition>
</rule>
TARGET ELEMENT:
<target>
<subject>PREDICATE</subject>
<resource>PREDICATE</resource>
<action>PREDICATE</action>
</target>
PREDICATE:
(attr name ⊕ (attr value)+)*
attr name denotes attribute name, attr value denotes attribute value and
⊕ denotes any operator supported by the XACML standard.
Table 2.1: A XACML simplified policy structure.
18 Chapter 2. Background
Figure 2.1: A XACML Policy Structure
algorithms, where each algorithm represents a different way of combining mul-
tiple access decisions into a single one. Following is a list of the most common
combining algorithms:
• Permit-overrides. If any rule evaluates to Permit, then the combined
decision is also Permit.
• Deny-overrides. If any rule evaluates to Deny, then the combined deci-
sion is also Deny.
• First-applicable. The effect of the first rule that applies is the decision
of the policy. The rules must be evaluated in the order that they are listed.
• Only-one-applicable. If more than one rule is applicable, return Inde-
terminate. Otherwise return the access decision of the applicable rule.
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In this dissertation, we use the following notation: for a XACML policy el-
ement P, we refer to its Target, Effect (in cases of Rules), its ordered list of
children policy elements, its parent policy element and combining algorithm us-
ing P:target, P:effect, P:children, P:parent, P:comb respectively. P:pos is used to refer
to the position of Pw.r.t its sibling policy elements.
2.1.2 Hierarchical and Multiple Resource Profile
The policy evaluation performed by a XACML PDP is defined in terms of a single
requested resource, with the authorization decision contained in a single Result
element in the response. However, A Policy Enforcement Point, or PEP, maywish
to submit a single request context for access to multiple resources, and may wish
to obtain a single response context that contains a separate authorization deci-
sion (Result) for each requested resource. Such a request context might be used
to avoid sending multiple decision request messages between a PEP and PDP,
for example. Alternatively, a PEP may wish to submit a single request context
for all the nodes in a hierarchy, and may wish to obtain a single authorization
decision that indicates whether access is permitted to all of the requested nodes.
The Multiple Resource Profile provides a mechanism such that a PEP can request
authorization decisions for multiple resources in a single request context. It is
important to note that the Multiple Resource Profile does not affect the policy it-
self. It deals with the XACML Access Requests, introducing syntactic shorthand
so that multiple requests contexts can be merged into one. The Hierarchical Re-
source Profile allows users to specify one policy that applies to an entire subtree
of a hierarchy, rather than having to specify a separate policy for each node of the
subtree. In this Profile, a resource organized as a hierarchy may be a with a single
root (tree) or multiple roots (forest), however cycles are not allowed. The nodes
in a hierarchical resource are treated as individual resources. An authorization
decision that permits (or denies) access to an interior node does not imply that
access to its descendant nodes is permitted (or denied).
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Figure 2.2: The XACML Data Flow
2.1.3 The XACML architecture
The XACML architecture (Figure 2.2) consists of four main components: (i) the
Policy Administration Point (PAP); (ii) the Policy Decision Point (PDP); (iii) the
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP); (iv) the Policy Information Point (PIP). The PAP
creates the policies evaluated by the PDP. The PDP evaluates applicable poli-
cies against the incoming requests and sends the resulting authorization decision
back to the PEP. The PEP performs access control, making decision requests, and
enforcing the authorization decision provided by the PDP. Finally, the PIP is the
component that provides the attribute values required by the PDP during the
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evaluation phase. There is another important component in XACML architec-
ture: the context handler. This component acts as a mediator between the PEP,
the PDP, and the PIP by receiving and dispatching information to the appropriate
component.
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2.2. Description Logics
Description Logics (DL) is a family of knowledge representation languageswhich
can be used to represent the terminological knowledge of an application domain
in a structured and formally well-understood manner [6]. The name comes from
the facts that, on the one hand, the application domains are described using con-
cept descriptions and, on the other hand, they possess formal, logic-based seman-
tics which can be given by a translation into first-order logic (FOL). The rest of
this Section is organized as follows: in Subsection 2.2.1 we give an overview of
Description Logics. DL syntax and semantics are introduced in Subsection 2.2.2
whereas the reasoning services that come with a DL formalism are proposed in
Subsection 2.2.3.
2.2.1 DL Overview
Each DL consists of the following building blocks: atomic concepts, atomic roles
and individuals. Atomic concepts correspond to unary predicates in FOL (e.g.,
Student(x)), atomic roles correspond to binary predicates in FOL (e.g., enrolledIn(x;y))
and individuals represent constant terms in FOL. Atomic concepts and roles are
elementary descriptions of objects; complex concepts and roles can be built on
top of them using DL constructors. For example, applying a concept disjunction
constructor (⊔) on the atomic concepts Male and Female, we retrieve the set of all
individuals who are eitherMale or Female: Male ⊔ Female. In addition to dis-
junction, DL typically provides the standard boolean operators as constructors:
concept conjunction (⊓) and concept negation (¬). Most DL languages also pro-
vide a restricted quantification, in terms of universal and existential restrictions
on roles. In addition to constructors that allow one to form complex concepts and
roles, DL also provides means for expressing axioms (logical relations) involving
concepts and roles. For example, we can specify concept inclusion of the form
Student ⊑ Person stating that every student is a person, and role inclusion such
as isBrother ⊑ isRelated stating that if two individuals are brothers, then they
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are related.
A DL knowledge base (KB) typically consists of the following components:
• A TBox containing intensional knowledge (axioms and concepts) that form
the basic terminology of the KB. The axioms in the TBox are concept inclu-
sions of the form C1 ⊑ C2 where C1 and C2 are concepts (not necessarily
atomic).
• An RBox containing role inclusion axioms of the form R1 ⊆ R2where R1 and
R2 are DL Roles.
• An ABox containing extensional knowledge about the individuals in the
domain. Axioms in the ABox are of the form C(a), called concept (or type)
assertions, and R(a,b), called role assertions, where a,b are individual
names, R is a role, and C is a concept.
There are different types of TBoxes depending on the nature of the concepts
occurring in their axioms. The simplest TBox type consists of a restricted form of
concept inclusion axioms called concept definitions: sentences of the form A ⊑ C
or A ≡ C, where A is atomic. Restricting a TBox to concept definitions which
are both unique (each atomic concept occurs only once on the LHS of an inclusion
axiom) and acyclic (the RHS of an axiom cannot refer, directly or indirectly, to the
concept in the LHS) yields a definitorial TBox. On the other hand, if a TBox con-
tains axioms of the form C ⊑ Dwhere C is non-atomic, then the axiom is called a
general concept inclusion axiom (GCI) and the TBox is called a general TBox. The dis-
tinction between definitorial and general TBoxes is important since a definitorial
TBox greatly reduces reasoning complexity. A common example of DL concept
constructors is represented by DL number restrictions. The most expressive form
is qualified number restrictions, which allow one to build the concepts> nR.C and
6 nR.C from a role R, a natural number n and a conceptC. For example, qualified
number restrictions can be used to represent a father of exactly two sons:
Male ⊓ 6 2 hasChild.Male ⊓ > 2 hasChild.Male
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More restricted forms are unqualified number restrictions that do not allow
one to specify what kind of concept is used as role filler in the restriction. For
example, unqualified number restrictions can be used to denote a father of exactly
two children:
Male ⊓ 6 2 hasChild ⊓ > 2 hasChild
Finally, an important feature of DL is the support for datatype, i.e., support for de-
scribing concepts using numbers, strings, regular expressions, IP addresses, etc.
The main approach is to equip DLwith an interface to concrete domains, together
with a set of built-in predicates which are associated with that interface. The in-
terface is created by using a new type of roles, called datatype (or concrete) roles,
which links abstract objects from the DL domain with datatype predicates from
the concrete domain. Also, new concept constructors related to these datatype
roles is added. For example, we can denote the set of all people who are more
than 18 years old using a datatype role: ∃age. > 18. Since concrete domains are
important for the purposes of this thesis, in the next section we formally present
their definition and properties.
2.2.2 Syntax and Semantics
In the following the syntax and the semantics of the ALC description logics is
proposed [6].
C,D ::= A | ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬C | C ⊓D | C ⊔D | ∀R.C | ∃R.C
The Description Logics ALC is based upon a set CN of concept names A (in-
cluding ⊤ and ⊥), a set RN of role names R, and a set IN of individual names
a. The concepts of the language are constructed by concept names A, role names
R, the connectives ⊓, ⊔ and ¬, and the quantifiers ∀ and ∃. Every concept name
A ∈ CN is an ALC-concept. If R is a role name and C, D are ALC-concepts, then
¬C,C ⊓D,C ⊔D,∀R.C,∃R.C are ALC-concepts.
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In order to define a formal semantics ofALC-concepts, we consider interpreta-
tions I = (∆I , ·I) that consist of a non-empty set ∆I (the domain of the interpre-
tation) and the interpretation function ·I which assigns to every atomic concept
A a set AI ⊆ ∆I , to every atomic role R a binary relation RI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I and to
every individual a an element aI ∈ ∆I . The interpretation function is extended to
concept descriptions by the following inductive definitions:
⊤I = ∆I
⊥I = ∅
(¬C)I = ∆I\ AI
(C ⊓D)I = CI ∩DI
(C ⊔D)I = CI ∪DI
(∀R.C)I = {a ∈ ∆I | ∀b.(a, b) ∈ RI → b ∈ CI}
(∃R.C)I = {a ∈ ∆I | ∃b.(a, b) ∈ RI}
Table 2.2: ALC semantics.
2.2.3 Reasoning Services
When a knowledge engineer models a domain, she constructs a terminology, say
T , by defining new concepts, possibly in terms of others that have been defined
before. During this process, it is important to determine whether a newly defined
concept makes sense or whether it is contradictory. From a logical point of view,
a concept makes sense if there is some interpretation that satisfies the axioms of
T (that is, a model of T ) such that the concept denotes a nonempty set in that
interpretation. A concept with this property is said to be satisfiable with respect
to T and unsatisfiable otherwise. Checking satisfiability of concepts is a key infer-
ence. As we shall see, a number of other important inferences for concepts can be
reduced to the (un)satisfiability. For instance, in order to check whether a domain
model is correct, or to optimize queries that are formulated as concepts, we may
want to know whether some concept is more general than another one: this is
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the subsumption problem. A concept C is subsumed by a concept D if in every
model of T the set denoted by C is a subset of the set denoted by D. Algorithms
that check subsumption are also employed to organize the concepts of a TBox in a
taxonomy according to their generality. Further interesting relationships between
concepts are equivalence and disjointness. These properties are formally defined as
follows. Let T be a TBox.
• Satisfiability: A concept C is satisfiable with respect to T if there exists a
model I of T such that CI is nonempty. In this case we say also that I is a
model of C.
• Subsumption: A concept C is subsumed by a concept D with respect to T if
CI ⊆ DI for every model I of T . In this case we write C ⊑T D or T |= C ⊑
D.
• Equivalence: Two concepts C and D are equivalent with respect to T if CI =
DI for every model I of T . In this case we write C ≡T D or T |= C ≡ D.
• Disjointness: Two concepts C and D are disjoint with respect to T if CI ∩
DI = ∅ for every model I of T .
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2.3. The Semantic Web and OWL
The current Web is built on HTML, which describes how information is to be
displayed. While computers are able to parse Web pages for layout and routine
processing, they are unable to process the meaning of their content. The Seman-
tic Web [9] can be defined as an extension of the current Web in which meaning
is added to resources so that machines are allowed to understand them better.
This new architecture is based on the annotation of web documents with addi-
tional semantic data. In these last years a number of new languages have been
proposed in order to carry out this task. XML is the basic language on which
the Semantic Web is based. The most important Recommendations proposed by
W3C specifically designed for the next generation of the Web are the Resource
Description Framework (RDF) [62] and the Web Ontology Language (OWL) [25]
which are build respectively on top of XML and RDF itself. Briefly:
• RDF is the W3C recommendation for the creation of metadata about re-
sources. With RDF one can make statements about a resource in the form of
a subject-predicate-object expression. The described resource is the subject
of the statement, the predicate is a specified relation that links the subject
and the object that is the value assigned to the subject through the predicate.
• OWL is the W3C recommendation for the creation of new ontology op-
timized for the web. The Web Ontology Language OWL is a semantic
markup language for publishing and sharing ontologies on the Web. OWL
is developed as a vocabulary extension of RDF and it is derived from the
DAML+OIL Web Ontology Language. Essentially, with OWL one can de-
scribe a specific domain in terms of class, properties and individuals. It has
three increasingly-expressive sublanguages: OWL Lite, OWL DL and OWL
Full. An overview of the OWL language is presented in Section 2.3.1.
A number of other different languages have been developed around RDF and
OWL such as SPARQL for asking and answering queries against RDF graphs,
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Figure 2.3: Semantic Web Layer Cake.
SKOS that provides a model for expressing the basic structure and content of
concept schemes (such as taxonomies and controlled vocabularies) and SWRL a
proposal for a semantic web rules language combining sublanguages of OWL
(specifically OWL DL and OWL Lite) with the rule markup language RuleML.
The technologies specifically developed for Semantic Web have been applied in
many different contexts, as e-learning. The architecture of the Semantic Web is
depicted in 2.3 and is usually referred to as Semantic Web Layer Cake.
2.3.1 The Ontology Web Language
The Web Ontology Language (OWL) [25] is a set of eXtensible Markup Language
(XML) elements and attributes, with well defined semantics, that are used to
define a vocabulary in terms of classes and their relationships. There are three
species of OWL:
• OWL-Lite has limited expressiveness and is suitable for simple class hierar-
chies and constraints. Cardinality is restricted to values of 0 or 1.
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• OWL-DL supports description logics [Baa03] and automated reasoning and
is the OWL species used throughout this thesis. OWL-DL has maximum
expressiveness while maintaining computational completeness (i.e., all con-
clusions are guaranteed) and decidability (i.e., all conclusions finish in a fi-
nite time). OWL-DL includes all language constructs but certain constructs
can only be used under certain restrictions (e.g., a class cannot be an in-
stance of another class).
• OWL-Full has the most expressiveness and syntactic freedom (e.g., a class
may be treated simultaneously as a collection of individuals and as an in-
dividual itself), but offers no computational guarantees and therefore, does
not support automated reasoning.
2.3.2 OWL-DL Ontologies
In this section we provide an overview of the OWL-DL ontology language since
it is the one that is currently considered standard language in the development of
Ontologies. All the images provided in this Section have been presented in [42].
Components of OWL-DL Ontologies
An OWL ontology consists of three main components: (i) Individuals, (ii) Prop-
erties and (iii) Classes
An Individual (i.e., Instance) is a constant in Description Logic and represents
an object in the domain of discourse in OWL. OWL-DL, being based on Descrip-
tion Logics, does imposed the Unique Name Assumption. This means that just
because two names are different in OWL-DL does not mean they refer to differ-
ent individuals. Two different OWL-DL class names, for example, may refer to
the same individual. Therefore, it must be explicitly stated in OWL-DL whether
individuals are the same as each other or different from each other. An example
of some individuals is shown in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Individuals in OWL.
A Property is role or binary predicate in Description Logic and represents a
binary relation in OWL that links two individuals together. Every OWL property
has a specified domain and a range, where a property links an individual from
its domain to an individual in its range.In Figure 2.5, the property hasSibling
links the individual Matthew to the individual Gemma. Properties can have an
inverse. For example, the inverse of hasOwner is IsOwnerOf. Functional prop-
erties are limited to having a single value. Properties can also be symmetrical or
transitive. There are three types of properties in OWL:
1. Object properties link an individual to an individual. For example, Figure
2.6(a) shows an object property hasSister linking the individual Bob to
the individual Alice.
2. Datatype properties link an individual to an XMLS datatype value or an
RDF literal. For example, Figure 2.6(b) shows a datatype property hasAge
linking the individual Bob to the data literal ’28’ which has type xsd:Integer.
3. Annotation properties meta-data on the model which may be added to
classes, individuals or properties and are not instantiated with individu-
als. For example, Figure 2.6(c) shows an annotation property dc:creator
linking the individual Thesis to the data literal (string) “Bob”.
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Figure 2.5: Properties in OWL.
(a) Object Property (b) Datatype Property (c) Annotation Property
Figure 2.6: Properties in OWL.
A Class is a concept or unary predicate in Description Logic and represent a set
of individuals in OWL that are defined using formal descriptions that state pre-
cisely the requirements for membership in the class. For example, in Figure 2.7,
the class Person contains the individuals Matthew and Gemma, the class Pet
contains Fluffy and Fido, and the class Country contains Italy, England
and USA. Classes are concrete representations of concepts and may be organized
in a superclass, subclass hierarchy called taxonomy. Subclasses special-
ize, or are subsumed by, their superclasses. Consider, for example, the classes
Animal and Cat where Catmay be a subclass of Animal so that Animal is the
superclass of Cat. This says that: (1) all cats are animals, (2) all members of the
class Cat are also members of the class Animal, and (3) being a Cat implies being
an Animal. One of the key features of OWL-DL is that this subsumption relation-
ship can be automatically computed by a reasoner. OWL classes are essentially
descriptions that specify the conditions that must be satisfied by an individual
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Figure 2.7: Properties in OWL.
for that individual to be a member of a particular defined or primitive class.
Reasoning in OWL-DL
Reasoning in OWL-DL is based on the Open World Assumption (OWA), and is
often referred to as Open World Reasoning (OWR). OWA means that it cannot
be assumed that something does not exist until it has been explicitly stated that it
does not exist. In other words, just because something has not been stated as true,
it cannot be assumed to be false. Instead, it must be assumed that the knowledge
has just not yet been added to the knowledge base.
2.3.3 An Example of Semantics Supporting Interoperability: Se-
mantic Web Services
Current XML-based Web service technology provides limited support in mech-
anizing service discovery and invocation, and their integration and composi-
tion. The vision of semantic Web services is to describe the various aspects of
a Web service using explicit, machine-understandable semantics, enabling the
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automatic location, combination and use of Web services. Approaches from the
area of semantic Web are being applied to Web services in order to keep the inter-
vention of the human user to the minimum. Semantic markup can be exploited
to automate the tasks of discovering services, executing them, composing them
and enabling interoperation between them [63].
A number of different initiatives are growing around the Semantic Web ser-
vice architecture i.e. W3C Semantic Web Services Interest Group1, Semantic Web
Services Initiative Architecture Committee (SWSA)2, Large Scale Distributed In-
formation System project3 and Web Service Modeling Ontology working group4.
Moreover, different frameworks have been proposed to design the overall
conceptual model. The most interesting projects addressing this point are the
ones proposed in [66] [15] [32]. All these projects identify the following major
phases:
• Automatic Web service discovery: Automatic Web service discovery involves
automatically locating Web services that provide a particular service and
that accomplish to requested properties. A user might require, for example,
“Find a service that sells train tickets between Rome and Milan and that
accepts payment by VISA credit card.” Currently, a human must perform
this task by first using a search engine to find a service and then either read-
ing theWeb page associated with that service or executing the service to see
whether it accomplishes to the requested properties. With semantic markup
of services, one can specify the information necessary for Web service dis-
covery as computer-interpretable semantic markup at a service registry and
an (ontology-enhanced) search engine can automatically locate appropriate
services.
• Automatic Web service execution: Automatic Web service execution involves a
1http://www.w3.org/2002/ws/swsig/
2http://www.daml.org/services/swsa/
3http://lsdis.cs.uga.edu/
4http://www.wsmo.org/
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computer program or agent automatically executing an identified Web ser-
vice. A user could request, “Buyme a train ticket fromwww.worldtrain.com
from Rome to Milan on 20 February 2009”. To execute a particular service
on todaysWeb, such as buying a train ticket, a user generally must go to the
Web site offering that service, fill out a form, and click a button to execute
the service. Alternately, the user might send an http request directly to the
service URL with the appropriate parameters encoded. Both cases require
a human to understand what information is required to execute the service
and to interpret the information the service returns. Semantic markup of
Web services provides a declarative, computer-interpretable API for exe-
cuting services. The markup tells the agent what input is necessary, what
information will be returned, and how to execute, and potentially interact
with, the service automatically.
• Automatic Web service composition and interoperation: Automatic Web service
composition and interoperation involves the automatic selection, composi-
tion, and interoperation of appropriate Web services to perform some task,
given a high-level description of the tasks objective. A user might say,
“Make the travel arrangements for SACMAT 2009 conference”. Currently,
if some task requires a composition of Web services that must interoperate,
the user must select the Web services, manually specify the composition,
ensure that any software for interoperation is custom-created and provide
the input at choice points. With semantic markup of Web services, the in-
formation necessary to select, compose, and respond to services is encoded
at the service Web sites. One can write software to manipulate this markup,
together with a specification of the tasks objectives, to automatically exe-
cute the task. Service composition and interoperation leverage automatic
discovery and execution.
In order to achieve such goals some general assumption has to be introduced.
First of all, services can access and interpret Web published ontologies, and can
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communicate usingmessageswhose content is represented, or can be interpreted,
in terms of published ontologies. Service providers publish semantic descriptions
of their service capabilities and interaction protocols that can be interpreted by
prospective consumers.
The potential benefits of Semantic Web services have led to the establishment
of an important research area of interest to both academia and industry. Several
initiatives have been proposed for semantically annotating Web services extend-
ing the conceptual model given above. Each of such approaches provides differ-
ent descriptions of Web services and their related aspects that bring a different
kind of support for discovery and composition.
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2.4. Ontology Matching
In this Sectionwe provide background notions about the ontologymatching prob-
lem and the most interesting ontology matching techniques. We conclude the
Section with a comparative table (Table 2.3) which lists the features of each one of
the reviewed approach. The information provided in this Section are taken into
account in Chapter 6 when considering the ontology matching algorithm that is
most eligible in our context. This Section is organized as follows: in Section 2.4.1
we provide the motivations behind ontology matching, in Section 2.4.2 we give
a formalization of the problem whereas in Section 2.4.3 we propose a review of
state of the art techniques.
2.4.1 Overview
Schema matching aims at determining relations between entities of two different
input schemas. This task is a research area in a number of different domains.
Examples are data warehouses, e-commerce, database integration and more re-
cently Semantic Web. Like the Web, the semantic web [9] will be distributed and
heterogeneous. In addiction, well defined information is added in order to allow
interoperability between software agents involving aminimal human efforts. The
semantic interoperability over the next Web generation will be grounded in the
use of ontologies. An ontology typically provides a vocabulary that describes a
domain of interest and a specification of the meaning of terms used in the vocab-
ulary.
As it has been introduced above, in the idea of its supporters, the Semantic
Web will be distributed and heterogeneous. Consequently, the aim of the Seman-
tic Web community is not to create a huge, comprehensive knowledge base but
to obtain a number of different, partially overlapping ontologies. Each system
based on Semantic Web technologies is expected to develop its own ontology
either created from sketch or composed by exploiting some other ontology. In or-
der to grant semantic interoperability between all this systems, it is necessary to
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provide mapping techniques between ontologies that are defined on overlapping
domains.
2.4.2 Ontology Matching: Formalizing the Problem
Following the approach proposed in [51], it is necessary to clarify the meaning of
mapping with respect to other concepts such as aligning or merging. Alignment
is the process whereby two ontologies are aligned one to the other. This means
that the ontologies (or at least one of the ontologies involved into the alignment
process) will bemodified. Mapping could be used to solve problems as alignment
but it does not aim to modify the ontologies. Merging, on the contrary, is the task
that taking in input two schemas returns a reconciled schema. Even for merging,
a mapping provide the basic building onwhich a technique can be created but the
aims are different. An ontology mapping is the association between entities that
belong to different ontologies along with a confidence score representing their
similarity.
Following the definition given in [80] we formally define a mapping element
as follows:
Definition 2.1 A mapping element is the 5-tuple 〈id, e, e ′, n, R〉 where:
• id: is a unique identifier of the given mapping element;
• e and : are the entities of the first and the second ontology respectively;
• n: is a confidence measure in some mathematical structure (typically in the [0, 1]);
• R: is a relation holding between the entities e and.
A mapping element maps the element e belonging to O to element e ′ belong-
ing to O ′. An ontology matching between O and O ′ is a set of mapping elements
in which e ∈ O and e ′ ∈ O ′. The ontology matching problem is the problem of find-
ing the set of mapping element between some input ontologies that detect all the
overlapping entities.
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Figure 2.8: Categories of schema matching techniques
In these years a number of different approaches have been proposed to solve
the ontology matching problem. Here is defined a classification model so that
each involved technique can be categorized. By this way an implicit structure in
which the reviewed approaches can be plugged in is offered. The just presented
classificationmodel was proposed in [77] and enhanced in [80]. It is reported here
in Figure 2.4.2.
The overall classification can be read both in descending (following on how
the techniques interpret the input information) and ascending manner (focusing
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on the kind of manipulated objects). Moreover, ontology matching approaches
could be divided into local methods and global methods. Local methods are the
basic ones and enable to measure the similarity correspondence at a local level
i.e. given a matching element 〈id, e, e ′, n, R〉 for the specific R, the value of n is
computed taking into account only the features of the elements and not working
at the global scale of ontologies. On the contrary, global methods work on the
results returned by local methods combining them and considering the ontology
in its totality.
For these reasons a description of principal local methods is given and only
the ascending classification of the presented model is considered. An explanation
of the main methods is given below. Semantic methods are not taken into account
because they are not used in the reviewed approaches. Terminological methods
compare strings. They can be applied to the name, the label or the comments
concerning entities in order to find the ones with which are similar. This class
could be divided into:
• String-based methods: these approaches take advantage of the structure of
the string (as a sequence of letters). A simple string-based method example
is the string equality which returns 0 if the strings are not the same and 1
if they are the same. Formally, String equality is a similarity σ : S × S →
[0, 1] such that ∀x, y ∈ S, σ(x, x) = 1 and if x 6= y, σ(x, y) = 0. Where
S is the set of strings. A more meaningful example is Substring similarity.
Substring similarity is a similarity σ : S× S→ [0, 1] such that ∀x, y ∈ S let t
be the largest common substring of x and y and σ(x, y) =
2 | t |
| x | + | y |
. This
definition can be used for building function based on the largest common
prefix or largest common suffix.
• Language-based methods: this approach relies on using Natural Language
Processing techniques to find associations between instances of concepts
or classes. An example of such method is the similarity measure proposed
by Resnik [citation]. Resnik semantic similarity makes use of an external re-
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source in which semantically relations among terms are defined. Given two
terms s and t and a partially ordered synonym resource 〈Σ,6〉 provided
with a probability π, Resnik semantic similarity is a similarity σ : S × S →
[0, 1] such that: σ(s, t) = maxk∈S(s,t)(−log(π(k))). Where k is a concept of
Σ and S(s, t) ∩ Σ so that contains the concepts that subsume both s and t.
Intuitively π(k) provides the probability of encountering such concept k.
Basically, this equation simply means that we search for a concept k, with
maximum information content i.e. with an high value of π(k), that sub-
sumes both s and t.
Structural methods compare the entity structure instead of comparing their
names or identifiers. This comparison can be extended considering methods that
take into account the internal structure of an entity (attributes or properties) and
whose that consider the similarity between related entities.
• Methods based on the internal structure of entities use criteria such as the
range of their properties (attributes and relations), their cardinality, and the
transitivity and/or symmetry of their properties to calculate the similarity
between them.
• Concerning methods based on the external structure, the similarity compar-
ison between two entities (belonging to different ontologies) can be based
on the position of entities within their hierarchies. If two entities from two
ontologies are similar, their neighbors might also be similar.
Extensional-based methods compare the extensions of classes. The easiest way
to compare classesA and Bwhen they share features it is to test their intersection.
The intersection between two classes is defined as the set of common features i.e.
their set of instances. Basically, classes are very similar whenA∩B = A = Bwhile
when A ∩ B = 0 the classes are very different. An example of extensional based
similarity measure is Jaccard Similarity: Given two sets A and B, let P(x) the
probability of a random instance to be in set X, the Jaccard similarity is defined
as: σ(A,B) =
P(A ∩ B)
P(A ∪ B) .
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Now that an overview of the mapping problem is given, in Figure 2.4.2 the
implicit structure introduced above is presented. A similar table was firstly pro-
posed in [77]. Figure 2.4.2 is a simplified version of the classification proposed
there.
2.4.3 Reviewed approaches
In this section we provide some review of state of the art ontologymatching tools.
Figure 2.3 shows the classification of the reviewed approaches according to the
categories introduced in previous section.
Anchor-PROMPT.
Anchor-PROMPT presented in [74] is an ontology merging and alignment tool
with a sophisticated promptmechanism for possiblematching terms. The anchor-
PROMPT is a hybrid alignment algorithm which takes as input two ontologies,
(internally represented as graphs) and a set of anchors-pairs of related terms,
which can be identified using string-based techniques, using user definition, or
another matcher computing linguistic similarity. Then the algorithm refines them
by analyzing the paths of the input ontologies limited by the anchors in order to
determine terms frequently appearing in similar positions on similar paths. Fi-
nally, based on the frequencies and a user feedback, the algorithm determines
matching candidates.
COMA
COMA (COmbination of MAtching algorithms) proposed in [26] is a composite
schema matching tool. It provides an extensible library of matching algorithms,
a framework for combining obtained results and a platform for the evaluation
of the effectiveness of the different matchers. Matching library is extensible, and
as from it contains 6 elementary matchers, 5 hybrid matchers, and one reuse-
oriented matcher. Most of them implement string-based techniques as a back-
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ground idea; others share techniques with Cupid (thesauri look-up, etc.); and
reuse-oriented is a completely novel matcher, which tries to reuse previously ob-
tained results for entire new schemas or for its fragments. Schemas are internally
encoded as DAGs, where elements are the paths. This aims at capturing contexts
in which the elements occur. Distinct features of COMA tool in respect to Cupid,
are a more flexible architecture and a possibility of performing iterations in the
matching process
Cupid
Cupid proposed in [59] implements a hybrid matching algorithm comprising lin-
guistic and structural schema matching techniques, and computes similarity co-
efficients with the assistance of a domain specific thesauri. Input schemas are
encoded as graphs. Nodes represent schema elements and are traversed in a
combined bottom-up and topdown manner. The matching algorithm consists
of three phases and operates only with tree-structures to which non-tree cases
are reduced. The first phase (linguistic matching) computes linguistic similar-
ity coefficients between schema element names (labels) based on morphologi-
cal normalization, categorization, string-based techniques (common prefix, suffix
tests) and a thesauri look-up. The second phase (structural matching) computes
structural similarity coefficients which measure the similarity between contexts
in which basic schema elements occur. The third phase (mapping elements gen-
eration) computes weighted similarity coefficients and generates final alignment
by choosing pairs of schema elements with weighted similarity coefficients value
higher than a fixed threshold.
GLUE
GLUE proposed in [27] employs machine learning techniques to find mappings.
Given two ontologies, for each concept in the first ontology GLUE finds the most
similar concept in the second one using probabilistic definitions of several prac-
tical similarity measures. In addition to this, GLUE also uses multiple learning
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strategies, each of which exploits a different type of information either in the data
instances or in the taxonomic structure of the ontologies. The employed sim-
ilarity is the joint probability distribution of the concepts involved, so instead
of committing to a particular definition of similarity, GLUE calculates the joint
distribution of the concepts, and lets the application use the joint distribution to
compute any suitable similarity measure. The overall process could be divided
into three main steps:
1. learning distributions: it learns the joint probability distributions of classes of
each ontologies;
2. similarity estimation: the system estimates the similarity between two classes
in function of their joint probability distributions;
3. relaxation: produces an alignment from the similaritymatrix by using heuris-
tic rules in order to choosing the more likely correspondences.
Quick Ontology Mapping
The approach presented in [30] is based on the efficiency / efficacy trade off eval-
uation: the quality of matching algorithm could be slight reduce to obtain a great
improvement of efficiency. This fact allows QOM to produce mapping elements
fast, even for large-size ontologies. However, due to the efficiency requirements
the use of some rules is restricted. The overall process can be divided as follows:
1. QOM uses RDF triples as features;
2. Instead of comparing all entities of the first ontology with all entities of
the second ontology, QOM uses heuristics to lower the number of candi-
date mappings, which is a major problem for run-time complexity. In this
dynamic programming approach it only chooses promising candidate map-
pings.
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3. The actual similarity computation is done by using a wide range of similar-
ity functions [30]. The similarity computation was disburdened by remov-
ing extremely costly feature-measure combinations such as the comparison
of all subclasses of two concepts.
4. These individual measures are all used as input to the similarity aggre-
gation. Instead of applying linear aggregation functions, QOM applies a
sigmoid function, which emphasizes high individual similarities and de-
emphasizes low individual similarities.
5. From the similarity values we derive the actual mappings. A threshold to
discard spurious evidence of similarity is applied. Further mappings are
assigned based on a greedy strategy that starts with the largest similarity
values first.
6. Through several iteration the quality of the results rises considerably. The
returned output is a mapping table between the input ontologies.
2.4.4 Falcon-AO
Falcon-AO [48], [45] is defined in [48] as an automatic tool for aligning ontologies.
There are two matchers integrated in Falcon-AO: one is a matcher based on Lin-
guistic Matching for Ontologies, called LMO; the other is a matcher based on Graph
Matching for Ontologies, called GMO and introduced in [44] by the same authors.
In Falcon-AO, GMO takes the alignments generated by LMO as external input
and outputs additional alignments. Reliable alignments are gained through LMO
as well as GMO according to the concept of reliability. The reliability is obtained
by observing the linguistic comparability and structural comparability of the two
ontologies being compared. Figure 2.9, depicts the Falcon-AOmain components.
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Figure 2.9: The FALCON-AO architecture.
Linguistic Matching for Ontologies
As is known, linguistic matching plays an important role in matching process.
Generally, linguistic similarity between two entities relies on their names, labels,
comments and some other descriptions. The LMO combines two different ap-
proaches to gain linguistic similarities: one is based on lexical comparison; the
other is based on statistic analysis.
In lexical comparison, we calculate the edit distance between names of two
entities and use the following function to capture the string similarity (denoted
by SS):
SS = 1/e
(
ed
s1.len+ s2.len− ed
)
Where ed denotes the edit distance between s1 and s2; s1.len and s2.len de-
note the length of the input strings s1 and s2, respectively. In statistic analysis, we
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use the algorithm of [76] based on the Vector Space Model (VSM) in our imple-
mentation. Given a collection of documents, we denote N the number of unique
terms in the collection. In VSM, we represent each document as a vector in an
N-dimensional space. The components of the vector are the term weights as-
signed to that document by the term weighting function for each of the N unique
terms. Clearly, most of these are going to be 0, since only a few of the N terms
actually appear in any given document. In our scenario, we construct a virtual
document for each of the ontology entities (classes, properties and instances).
The virtual document of an entity consists of “bag of terms” extracted from the
entity’s names, labels and comments as well as the ones from all neighbors of this
entity. Once the virtual document is constructed it is possible to define a similar-
ity between documents, and thus between ontology elements, using the cosine
distance by taking the vectors’ dot product.
DS = N ·Nt
The two methods described above will both take effect in ontology match-
ing. In our implementation, we combine them together, and use the following
equation to calculate the final linguistic similarity
LinguisticSimilarity = wDSDS+wSSSS
Where wDS and wSS are weights associated to respectively the statistical dis-
tance (or document similarity) and the string similarity. In [48] the author assign
to wDS the value 0.8 and the value 0.2 to wSS.
Graph Matching for Ontologies
Another important component in Falcon-AO is GMO, which is based on a graph
matching approach for ontologies. It uses directed bipartite graphs to represent
ontologies and measures the structural similarity between graphs by a new mea-
surement. Details of the approach are described in [44] The main idea of GMO is
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as follows. Similarity of two entities from two ontologies comes from the accu-
mulation of similarities of involved statements (triples) taking the two entities as
the same role (subject, predicate, object) in the triples, while the similarity of two
statements comes from the accumulation of similarities of involved entities of the
same role in the two statements being compared.
Usually, GMO takes a set of matched entity pairs, which are typically found
previously by other approaches, as external mapping input in the matching pro-
cess, and outputs additional matched entity pairs by comparing the structural
similarity. Our previous experiments showed that GMOwere irreplaceable when
there was little gain from lexical comparison. In addition, GMO can be inte-
grated with other matchers. While using GMO approach to align ontologies,
there should be another component to evaluate reliability of alignments gener-
ated by GMO.
Linguistic vs. Structural Comparability
Given two ontologies to be aligned, GMO always tries to find all the possible
matched entity pairs. However, how to evaluate the reliability of these matched
entity pairs is still a problem. As mentioned above, another component is needed
to select more reliable matched entity pairs by using other information. In Falcon-
AO, we use a simple approach to observe the reliability of matched entity pairs
output by GMO, and select more reliable matched entity pairs to the users. The
approach is based on the measure of linguistic comparability (LC) and structural
comparability (SC) of two ontologies to be aligned. Given two ontologies O1, O2
to be aligned, the linguistic comparability (LC) ofO1 andO2 is defined as follows:
LC = M√
NO1 ·NO2
WhereM denotes the number of entity pairs with similarity larger than c and
c is an experience value; NO1 and NO2 represent the number of named entities in
O1 and O2, respectively.
48 Chapter 2. Background
System Terminological Structural Extensional
Anchor-PROMPT
√ √ √
COMA
√ √
Cupid
√ √
GLUE
√
QOM
√ √ √
Falcon-AO
√ √ √
Table 2.3: Classification of reviewed approaches
We use VSM method to observe the structural comparability. The vectors V1,
V2 represent the frequency of built-in properties used in O1 and O2 and the el-
ement vij denotes the number of occurrence of built-in property pj in Oi. The
structural comparability of O1 and O2 is the cosine similarity of V1 and V2:
SC = V1 · V2
| V1 | · | V2 |
Part I
Related Work and Preliminary
Definitions
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Chapter 3
Related Work
The techniques proposed in this thesis are closely related to work in the area of
access control policy analysis and policy integration.
3.1. Policy Analysis
Approaches to policy analysis can be broadly classified into two categories: (i)
those that deal with verification of properties of a single policy and (ii) those that
deal with policy similarity analysis that may involve verification of different re-
lationships such as equivalence, refinement, redundancy etc among two or more
policies.
3.1.1 Single Policy Analysis
Most approaches for single policy property analysis are based on model checking
techniques [3], [39] and [93]. Ahmed et al. [3] propose a methodology for analyz-
ing four different policy properties in the context of role-based CSCW (Computer
Supported Cooperative Work) systems; this methodology uses finite-state based
model checking. Since they do not present any experimental results, it is not clear
if their state exploration approach can scale well to policies with a very large set
of attributes and conditions. Guelev et al. propose a formal language for express-
ing access-control policies and queries [39]. Their subsequent work [93] proposes
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a model-checking algorithmwhich can be used to evaluate access control policies
written in their proposed formal language. The evaluation includes not only as-
sessing whether the policies give legitimate users enough permissions to perform
their tasks, but also checking whether the policies prevent intruders from achiev-
ing somemalicious goals. However, the tool can only check policies of reasonable
size.
3.1.2 Policy Similarity Analysis
Existing approaches to the policy similarity analysis are mostly based on graph,
model checking or SAT-solver techniques [35], [2], [7], [53], [58] and [69]. Koch
et al. [53] use graph transformations to represent policy change and integration,
which may be used to detect differences among policies. Such an approach sup-
ports an intuitive visual representation which can be very useful in the design of
a customized access control policy. However, it can only be used as a specification
method but not as an execution method. Backes et al. [7] propose an algorithm
for checking refinement of enterprise privacy policies. However, their algorithm
only identifies which rule in one policy needs to be compared with the rules in
the other policy. They do not provide an approach to the evaluation of condition
functions. A more practical approach is by Fisler et al. [35], who have developed
a software tool known as Margrave for analyzing role-based access-control poli-
cies written in XACML. Margrave represents policies using the Multi-Terminal
Binary Decision Diagram (MTBDD), which can explicitly represent all variable
assignments that satisfy a Boolean expression and hence provides a good repre-
sentation for the relationships among policies. Policy property verification is then
formulated as a query on the corresponding MTBDD structures. For process-
ing a similarity query involving two policies, the approach proposed by Fisler et
al. is based on combining the MTBDDs of the policies into a CMTBDD (change-
analysisMTBDD)which explicitly represents the various requests that lead to dif-
ferent decisions in the two policies. The MTBDD structure has been credited with
helping model checking scale to realistic systems in hardware verification. The
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major shortcoming of Margrave is that it can only handle simple conditions, like
string equality matching. A direct consequence of such limitation is an explosion
of the MTBDD size when conditions on different data domains (e.g. inequality
functions) have to be represented. For example, to represent the condition time
is between 8am to 10pm, the MTBDD tool needs to enumerate all possible values
between 8am to 10pm(e.g., time-is-8:00am, time-is-8:01am, time-is-8:02am, ...).
Other relevant approaches are the ones based on SAT-solver techniques. Most
such approaches [58], [69] however only handle policy conflict detection. A recent
approach by Agrawal et al. [2] investigates interactions among policies and pro-
poses a ratification tool by which a new policy is checked before being added to a
set of policies. In [65], McDaniel et al. carry out a theoretical study on automated
reconciliation of multiple policies and then prove that this is an NP-complete
problem. In [56], Kolovski et al. formalize XACML policies by using descrip-
tion logics and then employ logic-based analysis tools for policy analysis. These
SAT-solver based approaches formulate policy analysis as a Boolean satisfiability
problem on Boolean expressions representing the policies. Such approaches can
handle various types of Boolean expressions, including equality functions, in-
equality functions, linear functions and their combinations. By construction, the
SAT algorithms look for one variable assignment that satisfies the given Boolean
expression, although they may be extended to find all satisfying variable assign-
ments. For each round of analysis or query, SAT algorithms need to evaluate
the corresponding Boolean expression from scratch. They cannot reuse previ-
ous results and are not able to present an integrated view of relationships among
policies. Most recently, Mazzoleni et al. [64] have investigated the policy similar-
ity problem as part of their methodology for policy integration. However, their
method for computing policy similarity is limited to identifying policies referring
the same attribute. Unlike aforementioned works that focus on a special case or
a certain type of policy analysis, our approach aims at providing an environment
in which a variety of analysis can be carried out. In particular, our environment is
able not only to handle conventional policy property verification and policy com-
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parison, but also to support queries on common portions and different portions
of multiple policies. Unlike all approaches to policy similarity analysis which re-
quire extensive comparison between policies, our proposed similarity measure
is a lightweight approach which aims at reducing the searching space, that is, at
reducing the number of policies that need to be fully examined. From the view
of an entire policy analysis system, our policy similarity measure can be seen as
a tool which can act as a filter phase, before more expensive analysis tools are
applied. For completeness it is also important to mention that the problem of
similarity for documents has been investigated in the information retrieval area.
Techniques are thus available for computing similarity among two documents
(e.g. [29], [40] and [67]). However, these cannot be directly applied because of the
special structures and properties of the XACML policies.
3.2. Semantic Web-Based languages
Recently there has been a great amount of attention to how Semantic Web tech-
nologies can be used in policy systems. In particular, there have been a number of
proposals that show how to ground or express policies in a Semantic Web frame-
work [91], [50], [49] and [90]. Rei [50] is a policy specification language based
on a combination of OWL-Lite, logic-like variables and rules. It allows users to
develop declarative policies over domain specific ontologies in RDF and OWL.
Rei allows policies to be specified as constraints over allowable and obligated ac-
tions on resources in the environment. A distinguishing feature of Rei is that it
includes specifications for speech acts for remote policy management and policy
analysis specifications like what-if analysis and use-case management. The suc-
cessor of Rei is Rein [49], which is a policy framework grounded in semantic web
technologies that allows for different policy languages and supports heteroge-
neous policy systems. Rein provides an ontology for describing policy domains
in a decentralized manner and provides a reasoning engine built on top of CWM,
an N3 rules reasoner. Using Rein and CWM, the authors showed how it is pos-
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sible to develop domain and policy language specific security systems. Rein has
been successfully used as a policy management system in the Policy AwareWeb
project [91], which in turn provides an architecture for scalable, discretionary,
rule-based access control in open and distributed environments. PeerTrust [37]
deals with discretionary access control on the web using semantic web technolo-
gies. It provides a mechanism for gaining access to secure information/services
on the web by using semantic annotations, policies and automated trust negoti-
ation. In PeerTrust, trust is established incrementally through an iterative pro-
cess which involves gradually disclosing credentials and requests for credentials.
PeerTrusts policy language for expressing access control policies is based on def-
inite Horn clauses. A distinguishing feature of PeerTrust is that it expects both
parties to exchange credentials in order to trust each other and assumes that poli-
cies are private, which is appropriate for critical resources such as military ap-
plications and e-commerce sites. Finally, KaOS Policy and Domain Services [90]
use ontology concepts encoded in OWL to build policies. These policies con-
strain allowable actions performed by actors which may be clients or agents. The
KAoS Policy Service distinguishes between authorizations and obligations. The
applicability of the policy is defined by a class of situations which definition can
contain components specifying required history, state and currently undertaken
action.
3.3. Access Control and Ontologies
Themost relevant work has focused on strategies for themapping between RBAC
and OWL [34, 52], on the integration between XACML and OWL [24]. Finin et
al. [34] have introduced ROWLBAC, a representation of RBAC in OWL. They
propose two different approaches: mapping roles to classes, and mapping roles
to values. In the first case roles are represented as class of users, and the role
dominance relation is then mapped to the subsumption relation in OWL. SoD
constraints are then mapped onto to class disjointness constraints in OWL. We
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remark that this solution has several drawbacks and cannot be applied in the
general case. Consider two classes Di and Dj such that Di ⊆ Dj. Now suppose
that there is a SoD constraint between Di and Dj. If SoD constraints are mapped
onto class disjointness constraints, we have that DIi ∩DIj = ∅. This results in an
inconsistency in the ontology since we have at the same time that Di is included
in Dj and that Di and Dj are no common values. The second solution is to map
classes onto individuals and to bind users to classes through the property role.
This solution is similar to the one adopted in our work but with a substantial
difference: in ROWLBAC constraints are modeled through specialized properties
e.g. dsod and ssod, binding roles together. This solution is more compact than
the one we have adopted in our paper; however a standard DL-reasoner is not
able to detect constraint violations and rules must be added to the ontology, thus
degrading performance. Knetchel et al. [52] have proposed an approach that ex-
ploits OWL for reasoning about RBAC authorizations. The model can support
both roles and class hierarchies; however it does not take into consideration SoD
constraints. The approach that is closer to our XACML+OWL is the one pro-
posed by Damiani et al. [24]. Their approach directly embeds RDF statements
into XACML. However, their approach does not provide any support for OWL
reasoning. Crampton [22] has proposed an extended XACML profile for RBAC
exploiting obligations and blacklists to support DSoD constraints. This approach
is similar to XACML+OWL in the use of obligations; however since in our model
we exploit ontologies, we are able to provide more expressive functionalities.
Other approaches that have different purposes but are related to the technolo-
gies adopted in XACML+OWL are by Kagal et al. [49] and by Kolovski et al. [56].
Rein [49], a general framework based on semantic web technologies, is able to
support general purpose policy systems, and for this reason it is well suited for
solving mismatches among different policy languages. Kolovski et al. [56] have
proposed a DL-based analysis tool for XACML policies. In their approach they
propose a mapping between XACML and Description Logics along with reason-
ing techniques for verifying properties of XACML policies.
Chapter 4
Policy Analysis: Preliminaries
In this chapter we analyze the issues arising from the design and development of
analysis services in a multi-domain environment. Usually, policy analysis tools
offer a number of different services that are executed on policy sets that belong to
the same domain. This assumption makes easier the definition of such services
but represents a strong limitation in the applicability of such tools. Therefore,
with the increasing popularity of distributed systems and of collaborative appli-
cations, there is the need to compare policies from multiple domains. In order to
have a better understanding of the problem we will give a formal definition of
the main issues and the preliminary notions and terminology that will be used
throughout the following chapters.
4.1. Heterogeneity in Policy Analysis
In the analysis of a policy, several information need to be taken into account. Ex-
amples of such information are the names of the subjects that are defined into the
rules, the resources that may be accessed and the actions that may be performed
by the subjects over the resources.
We refer to such data as the Vocabulary of a policy. For example, the vocab-
ulary of the policy depicted in Figure 4.1, is the set of terms:
Vocabulary(P1) = {PhDStudent,FullProfessor,TechnicalPaper,Read}
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Figure 4.1: An example policy for an university policy-based access control
model.
The terms Any, Permit and Deny are keywords defined in XACML and for
this reason are not considered in the vocabulary of the policy.
Usually, the existent analysis services are defined considering just the vocab-
ulary on the policies involved in the analysis process. The general assumption is
that if the policies adopts different terms within a rule, then those rules concerns
different concepts.
This assumption is generally true when the policy analysis tools are used in a
centralized scenario. In such a case, we say that the policy vocabularies are coher-
ent with respect to each other and no further improvements to the analysis tool
are necessary. Obviously, this is not the general case. When analyzing policies
belonging to heterogeneous owners, it is crucial to make distinctions between
such inconsistencies that from now on are referred to as naming heterogeneity. We
classify the conflicts that can occur in naming heterogeneity into syntactic and
terminological variations:
• Syntactic variations arise because of the use of different character combina-
tions to denote the same term. An example is the use of TechnicalReport and
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Tech Rep to denote a technical report.
• Terminological variations refer to the use of different terms to denote the same
concept. An example of terminological variation is the use of the synonyms
Report and Study to refer a a written document describing some research
results.
Usually, the two categories of variations described above can be handled us-
ing traditional Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques such as look up
tables and external linguistic resources. Specifically, look up tables enumerate
the possible ways in which the same term can be written by using different char-
acter combinations and, thus, can be exploited when dealing with syntactic vari-
ations. Instead, to detect terminological variations, dictionaries or thesaurus such
as WordNet [31] can be exploited. Such kind of external resources are very useful
in this case since they allow to retrieve all the synonyms of a given term. Ap-
pendix A reports the details of an approach for the application on ontology-based
technologies in Digital Identity Management. Moreover, some detailed results on
naming heterogeneity issues have been reported in [10]1.
4.1.1 From Vocabularies to Domains
So far, we have introduced the simple notion of policy vocabulary and how het-
erogeneities issues arising in this scenario can be solved using standard NLP
techniques. However, the solution we have introduced is far to be considered
exhaustive. It is very difficult, maybe impossible, to effectively determine all the
possible ways a concept can be represented in different systems. For this reason,
we need to take into account some additional information and thus to exploit
more powerful techniques.
A possibility is to consider not only the representation of a concept but also
the relations the concept has with other entities. For example, PhDStudent and
1In the paper an approach is proposed to solve naming heterogeneity in a Digital Identity
Management scenario
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Figure 4.2: The domain of the policy P1 depicted in Figure 4.1.
FullProfessor (see Figure 4.1) are not completely decoupled concepts: they
have the common feature of belonging to the more general class of Faculty enti-
ties. Moreover, assuming the perspective of a security administrator, wemay also
note that a FullProfessor is expected to have a larger set of permissions than
a PhDStudent. The latter consideration can be mapped to the role subsumption
relation in a typical Role Based Access Control (RBAC) scenario [33], [79]. All this
information represents important knowledge that must be taken into account in
the analysis of heterogeneous policies. We define the Domain of a policy the
set of the terms in the policy vocabulary enriched with the relations defined over
such terms. The domain of policy P1 shown in 4.1 is shown in Figure 4.2: the do-
main is represented as a hierarchy in which each node represent one of the policy
concept whereas each arrows is the standard subsumption relation.
Considering the knowledge modeled within a domain gives the possibility of
exploiting powerful techniques but also it raises new interesting issues. Specif-
ically, when we have two concepts modeled in two different domains we may
have additional conflicts that we refer to as semantic variations. Semantic varia-
tions are related to the use of two different concepts in different semantic schemas
to denote the same term.
Usually, the techniques that take advantage of domain analysis for solving
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complex issues such as heterogeneity and interoperability are referred to as se-
mantic techniques. Such approaches have been applied in several application
domain such as multimedia [46], [18] and [87]; databases [86] and [11]; geo-
graphic information systems [36]; connectivity [88] and networks [92], [20]; Web
services [15], [63] and [32]; e-learning [73], [81] and [19]; grid [78], [38] and [83];
bio-informatics [16]; recommender systems [68], [17] and [94].
4.1.2 The Formalization of a Policy Domain
The formalization of a domain is essentially a problem of knowledge represen-
tation. Due to the issues introduced by the Semantic Web view [9], the adoption
of ontologies as a formal knowledge representation system has rapidly grown in
popularity. The notion of ontology has been defined in [13] as the formal speci-
fication of a shared conceptualization. There are several languages for the creation
of ontologies such as DAML+OIL [43], RDF Schema [14] and the Ontology Web
Language (OWL) [25] which is the W3C Recommendation formalism for the de-
velopment of ontologies over the Web.
In this thesis we use OWL as the language for formalizing a policy domain.
This choice is due to several reasons. On one hand OWL is a XML-based lan-
guage with a well defined semantics grounded on Description Logics [6]. On the
other hand OWL is a widely adopted formalism supported by a number of differ-
ent reasoning tools. Moreover, several techniques have been developed with the
purpose of finding relationships between OWL ontologies modeled on different
but related domains. Especially this last feature, known with the name of ontol-
ogy matching, is particularly interesting in our scenario since it allows us to find
similarities between concepts belonging to different semantic schemas. In the
remaining part of this section we introduce the definition of the entities of our
model related to ontologies and ontology matching. The definitions have been
defined considering the ones introduced in [61], [29], [80] and [6].
First of all we define the notion of ontology. Recalling the background section
about ontologies and ontology mapping, we have that an ontology contains two
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different parts: the Terminological Box (TBox) that is the structure of the ontol-
ogy, and its Assertional Box (ABox) that is the instances of the entities (classes
and relations) defined in the TBox. In Definition 4.1 we define an ontology TBox,
the ABox is defined in 4.2 whereas the ontology is defined in 4.3
Concerning the TBox we have defined the relations between concepts in two
different sets: R and P , respectively the set of relations and properties. This dis-
tinction intercepts the difference between object properties and datatype proper-
ties in OWL.
Definition 4.1 (Terminological Box) The extensional part of an ontology, or TBOX,
is the tuple:
OT := 〈C,6C,DT ,R,6R, σR,P,6P, σP〉
where C is the set of concepts and 6C is the hierarchy defined over C. DT is the set of
datatypes. R is a set of relations, 6R is the hierarchy defined overR and σR : R→ C ×C
is the signature of R. Finally, P is a set of properties, 6P is the hierarchy defined over P
and σP : P → C × DT is the signatures of P .
An ABox is defined over entities belonging to a TBox.
Definition 4.2 (Assertional Box) The intensional part of an ontology, or ABOX, is
the tuple:
OTA := 〈CT ,DT T ,RT ,PT , I, V, ιCT , ιDT T , ιRT , ιPT 〉
where CT , DT T ,RT and PT are respectively the set of concepts, datatypes, relations and
properties defined inOT. I and V are respectively the set of individuals and of values. The
sets ιCT : CT → 2I, ιDT T : DT T → 2V, ιRT : RT → 2I×I and ιPT : PT → 2I×V are the
instantiations of CT , DT T ,RT and PT respectively.
Finally, the ontology is defined as a pair of a Tbox and an ABox defined over
it.
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Definition 4.3 (Ontology) An ontology is a tuple:
O := 〈OT, OTA〉
where OT is a terminological box and OTA is the assertional box defined over O
T.
Moreover, we define the set of the entities belonging to an ontology Oi as the
set:
E(Oi) := C ∪ R ∪ P ∪ I
In Definition 4.4 we introduce the notion of a mapping element following the
approach proposed in [80]:
Definition 4.4 (Mapping Element) Given two ontologies Oi and Oj, a mapping ele-
ment is a tuple:
〈eOi , eOj , s〉
where eOi and eOj are entities of ontologies Oi and Oj respectively and s is a confidence
measure in some mathematical structure (typically in the range [0, 1]);
An ontology matching is then defined as a set of mapping elements.
Definition 4.5 (Ontology Matching) Given two ontologies Oi and Oj, an ontology
matching is a set πOi,Oj of mapping elements such that: if 〈eOi , eOj , s〉 ∈ πOi,Oj ∧
〈eOi , e′Oj , s′〉 ∈ πOi,Oj then eOj = e′Oj and s = s′.
Definition 4.5 is very general and does not specify a unique procedure for
obtaining a mapping between two ontologies. As we have introduced in the
background section, several matching techniques have been proposed. Each such
approach has some advantages and disadvantages, most of which related to the
trade off between performance andmapping accuracy. However, most approaches
provide mappings that reduce to the general form introduced in Definition 4.5.
We discuss the specific ontology matching algorithm used in EXAM-S in Chapter
6. In the rest of this section we use the symbol πOi,Oj as one of the possible ontol-
ogy matching computed between ontologies Oi and Oj regardless to the specific
implementation.
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4.2. Dealing with Heterogeneous and Partial Knowl-
edge
The computation of a policy vocabulary is a simple task since can be reduced to
the enumeration of all attribute names and values appearing in the policy. In-
stead, when working with the domain of a policy, we have to take into consid-
eration also the relations between those terms. If policy attributes are directly
mapped to ontology concepts then the process of obtaining the Domain of a pol-
icy is trivial since we just need to access the associated ontology.
4.2.1 Ontology Merging
One of the key feature in the development of modern ontologies is “reusability”.
The reason is that usually, the development of an ontology, is a complex, time-
consuming and error-prone task. Moreover, is quite common to have different
ontologies that model a partially overlapping domain. Hence, is usually a good
practice (when possible) to reuse already defined ontologies instead of creating
new ones2.
For this reason, in considering ontology-based policy, more complicated sce-
narios may arise. For example we may have heterogeneous knowledge, that is
when the same policy use concepts belonging to different ontologies. This may
represent an additional problem since it is important to verify the consistency of
those concepts and thus to align the group of ontologies exploited verifying ad-
ditional properties. We define the different ontologies that are exploited in the
policy Pi as the set Ontologies(Pi) := {Oj | ∃ eOj ∈ Vocabulary(Pi)}
This problem is usually referred to as Ontology Merging [51] and can be con-
sidered a general case of the ontology matching problem. Ontology merging is
the process of generating a single ontology from two or more existing ontologies.
A merged single ontology includes information from all source ontologies but is
2This feature is supported in OWL by the command owl:imports
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more or less unchanged. The original ontologies have similar or overlapping do-
mains but they are unique and not revisions of the same ontology. The intuitive
idea is that, given ontologies Oi and Oj we aim to construct the union of entities
ei ∈ E(Oi) and ej ∈ Oj such that if ei and ej can be considered as the same element
then just one of them is added to the result ontology. For example, we may con-
sider as equivalent the pair of entities eOi , eOj belonging to the mapping element
〈eOi , eOj , s〉 such that s is greater than a certain threshold τ. Thus, in building up
the merged ontologies we can consider just one of the two entities.
Definition 4.6 (Policy Merged Ontology) Given a policy Pi its merged ontology O˜Pi
is the ontology recursively defined as:
O˜Pi := MERGE
|Ontologies(Pi)|
j=1 (O˜,Oj)
Where Oj ∈ OntologiesPi, O˜ is the initial empty ontology and MERGE(Oi, Oj) is a
function that takes in input to ontologies and add the entities in eOj ∈ Oj toOi such that
∄ 〈eOi , eOj , s〉 ∈ πeOi ,eOj with s greater than an acceptance threshold τ.
It is worth noting that, according to Definition 4.6, if Ontologies(Pi) = {Oj},
that is, the concepts in Vocabulary(Pi) belong all to the same ontology, then
O˜Pi = Oj.
The O˜Pi represents the result of merging recursively all the ontologies ex-
ploited by the policy Pi. Once the merge ontology has been created than it is
possible to execute policy analysis services considering just such common knowl-
edge base.
4.2.2 Ontology Extraction
When a policy does not use semantic data, it is necessary to create a new on-
tology extracting semantic knowledge by the information that can be deduced
from the policy itself. The problem of extract meaningful knowledge by unstruc-
tured data is usually referred to as Ontology Extraction or Ontology Learning and
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has been deeply investigated, especially after the introduction of the Semantic
Web paradigm. Interesting approaches have been proposed in [60], [85], [4], [82]
and [84]. In [60] the authors proposes a complex machine learning approach
for the semi-automatic creation of an ontology from generic unstructured data.
In [85], [4] and more recently in [82], the proposed approach is to extract infor-
mation using the data provided in web pages. In [85] the ontology is created ex-
tracting data from general purpose tables and finally in [84] the authors propose
an interesting approach based on Fuzzy Formal Concept Analysis for automatic
generation of ontologies on uncertainty information.
The automatic extraction of meaningful knowledge by unstructured and un-
certain data is a complex task [60]. So, most of the approaches propose some
alternative solutions. Usually, if no assumption can be made on the involved
data then the extraction process is semi-automatic. On the contrary, whenever
the data is organized in a structured fashion it is always possible to obtain more
semantic informations and, thus, create a completely automatic process for the
extraction of the knowledge base.
In our scenario, we consider data defined in XACML policies; this means that
we can exploit the explicit knowledge provided by the policy language to obtain
a first classification of terms. In doing so, we adopt the mapping XACML to
Description Logics proposed in [56]. The details of the mapping are reported in
Section 4.3.3, the key idea is that each attribute-value pair in a XACML policy can
be translated adding two entities to the extracted knowledge base: given the pair
〈attribute, value〉, the relation attribute and the concept value are added
to the ontology. In [56] the authors propose a translation between XACML and
Description Logics, in our case wework with OWL and for this reason we need to
check also the data type of the value before translating the attribute in the correct
OWL properties. In our approach we deal with Strings and all the data types
related to numbers, in future work we plan to extend this mapping for managing
more data types. In our mapping, if the value is a String then it is translated
into a new concept and the attribute become an object property. If the value
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is a XML Schema number data type, no concepts are added and the attribute
become a data type property. Given a policy Piwe refer to its extracted ontology
using the symbol O¨Pi .
4.2.3 Hybrid Scenarios
The more complicated scenario is when we have together both heterogeneous
domains and partial knowledge. However, we can easily manage such scenario
by combining together the approaches defined in Definition 4.6 and in Section
4.2.2. We define the Policy Reference Ontology as follows:
Definition 4.7 (Policy Reference Ontology) Given a policy Pi its reference ontology
O˙Pi is the ontology defined as:
O˙Pi := MERGE(O˜Pi , O¨Pi)
It important to underline that O˙Pi is a general case of both O˜Pi and O¨Pi . And
this more general definition can be applied in all of the three cases regardless the
specific category3 of the policy.
where  ∈ {=, 6=, <,6, >,>}
4.3. Trade-off between Expressivity and
Complexity
In order to define our analysis services, we need to translate an XACML policy
to a more convenient formalism. The choice of such formalism is not trivial since
it influences the efficiency and the expressivity of the services we define. In this
section we discuss in the detail the approach adopted over different formalisms.
Specifically, we analyze the translations of XACML into both Propositional Logic
3Single ontology, multiple ontology, no ontology and partial knowledge
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(PL) [35], [93] and Description Logic (DL) [56]. Mappings with First Order Logic
(FOL) have been proposed as well, for example using systems like Alloy [47],
however due to the complexity of some real case policies4 FOL-based systems
are very inefficient, despite the advantage provided by powerful expressivity.
For this reason, in order to find the best trade off between expressivity and com-
plexity, we take into considerations just the mappings with Propositional and De-
scription Logic, in the remaining part of this section we give details about such
interpretations providing both weak and strong features.
4.3.1 XACML and Propositional Logic
One of the first attempt in providing efficient reasoning procedure over subsets
of the XACML language was made employing Propositional Logic. With PL it is
not possible to express all the features defined in the XACML, however it allow
efficient implementation of analysis services using structures such as binary deci-
sion diagrams (BDD). The execution of services using BDD results to be very useful
when dealing with large policy sets. In literature there are essentially two ap-
proaches based on BDD and, thus, to Propositional Logic: Margrave [35] and the
work proposed by Zhang et al. [93]. However, the model proposed by Zhang et
al. is defined over the language RW5 that is slightly different from XACML. For
example in their framework they can obtain two terminal decisions: Permit and
Deny, whereas in XACML it is possible to have also a NotApplicabile terminal.
This is the reason why they can use BDD conversely to Margrave in which a
more powerful structure is employed. For this motivations, in the remaining part
of this section we focus on the XACML-PL mapping proposed by Fisler et al..
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Figure 4.3: An example MTBDD.
A closer look to Margrave
Margrave is a tool for the analysis of XACML policies. The key idea in Margrave
is to transform a XACML policy into a boolean function that associates decisions
to the incoming requests. Fisler et al. represent such boolean functions using
Multi Terminal Binary Decision Diagrams (MTBDD). In the following we detail
how a boolean function can be represented with an MTBDDs.
Let f be a boolean function such that f :Bn→BwhereB = {True, False}. The
function f can be represented as a Binary Decision Diagram (BDD). Each BDD is
essentially a DAG with only one source vertex and two sink vertexes representing
the values True and False. Each internal node i represents the evaluation of
the ith element of the input boolean tuple. If the internal node i is True then the
remaining n− i elements have to be evaluated according to the subtree rooted in
4In [35] Margrave is evaluated against policies with a cardinality of 50 attribute-value pairs.
Moreover, the author say that in real case scenarios each of the typical policies has 5 - 20 pairs
with an upper bound of about 100 pairs.
5Proposed by the same authors.
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Figure 4.4: An example MTBDD for a simple policy.
the right child element of the ith node. Otherwise, the left branch is considered.
Conversely, if the function f assume the form f : Bn→ P , where B = {True,
False} and P is a final set of terminals, then a BDD is no more sufficient. We
remark that this is the situation of the XACML policies since they have a num-
ber n of input values that have to be evaluated and three terminals Permit (P),
Deny (D) and Not Applicable (NA). This kind of functions can be efficiently rep-
resented by MTBDDs that are nothing but BDDs in which the cardinality of the
set of terminals can be higher than two. An example of MTBDD is shown in
Figure 4.3.
Given a policy, Margrave constructs a MTBDD that represents that policy.
Each MTBDD is then queried for verifying the properties that the associated pol-
icy should satisfy. Figure 4.4 shows an example of an MTBDD representing a
simple security policy in which faculty can assign grades and students can re-
ceive grades (faculty, student, receive, assign and grades).
4.3.2 Policy Analysis Services in PL
Analysis services that are usually defined overPL are property verification queries.
A property verification is a procedure that aims to verify if the policies under in-
vestigation satisfy a certain property. In this case property verification can be
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easily implemented updating the MTBDD representing the policies according to
the feature to verify. We take ad example the restriction to decision property, that
is the set of requests that yield the specified decision. To implement restriction
to decision, Margrave replaces the terminal for the given decision in the policy
MTBDD with logical true and all other terminals with logical false.
Moreover, Fisler et al., define change impact analysis on MTBDDs. Change
impact analysis is the process whereby considering together different policies it
is possible to check the changes into them effects. This service is very useful when
we would like to analyze different version of the same policies and, specifically,
the impact of a policy update.
4.3.3 XACML and Description Logic
In [56] Kolovski et al., define a framework for policy analysis providing a map-
ping with DL. This solution fits in between FOL and PL approaches. On one
hand it provides more expressiveness than PL on the other one, being DL a de-
cidable fragment of FOL, the analysis services come with a lower computation
complexity than the ones defined over FOL.
The basic unit in XACML that yields an access decision is a Rule. To capture
the behavior of XACML correctly, we need to formalize the prerequisite of the
Rule (which is the Target element), and its head (the access decision). We also
need to capture how the access decision is propagated upwards toward the root
PolicySet - for this, the rule and policy combining algorithms have to be taken
into account. While the Target element of Rules and Requests can be mapped to
a DL concept expression (we discuss this in more detail below), the interaction
of the access decision of various policy elements is difficult, if not impossible, to
do using only description logics. This is because of the semantics of the combin-
ing algorithms which requires us to use a formalism that supports preferences.
To capture the behavior of the XACML combining algorithms, we use Defeasi-
ble description logics, which is a formalism that allows for expressing defeasible
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rules on top of description logics. Only a limited fragment of DDL is needed to
formalize the combining algorithm.
Mapping rules and requests
A XACML Rule is translated to a rule in R. The Target element is translated to a
DL concept expression C and becomes the antecedent of the new rule. The Effect
is mapped to an effect-literal L ∈ L and becomes the conclusion. The effect-literal
can be either Permit-P or Deny-Pwhere P is the Policy that contains the Rule. This
new rule, denotedC→ L, is added to R. For any policy P and rules r1, r2 such that
Permit−P ∈ Con(r1) andDeny−P ∈ Con(r2), we state that r1 and r2 are conflict-
ing. The full mapping of the Target element to a DL concept expression is given
in Table 4.1. The main idea is that attribute-value pairs are mapped to existential
restrictions for example (role Developer) would be mapped to ∃ role.Developer.
We also allow for propositional combinations of attribute-value pairs. Note here
that we enforce a one-to-one mapping from attribute names and values used in
the XACML policy to their corresponding DL roles and concepts in K (we create
a DL role or a concept with the same name as the XACML attribute or value).
For the XACML construct Any, we formalize it as a disjunction where each
disjunct corresponds to an attribute. For each attribute, we create another dis-
junction from all possible attribute values for that attribute. For example, formal-
izing Any using this mapping would create 15 disjuncts (there are 3 attributes
and 5 attribute values). By assuming that the values for role, action and resource
attributes are disjoint, we can prune the search space significantly (see how the
Any occurring in the running example is mapped below).
Example 4.1 Consider the policy Pi containing the only (natural language) rule Rj: Rj =
Students cannot write and read technical papers. Rj can be mapped inDL as follows:
∃role− type.Students⊓∃res− type.TechnicalReport⊓ (∃action− type.read⊔
∃action− type.write) 7→ Deny− Pi
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XACML requests are mapped in the same manner as rules, since they also
can be represented as a list of attribute value pairs. To check whether a request r
matches a rule with target T , we only need to check whether K |= π(T)(r) (equiv-
alent to instance checking in description logics).
Mapping policies and policy sets
To propagate the access decisions from Rules to the root PolicySet, we introduce
the following rules inR:
• For each XACML Rule r : (TargetDenyP), add an axiom to R, R = R ∪
{π(Target) 7→ Deny− P};
• For each XACML Rule r : (TargetDenyP), add an axiom to R, R = R ∪
{π(Target) 7→ Permit− P}
• For each policy element P and parent policy element PS introduce the fol-
lowing axioms: Permit− P 7→ Permit− PS Deny− P 7→ Deny− PS
A Policy or a PolicySet can also have a Target element. However, we can
propagate the constraints specified in Target down to Targets of its children. In
this manner, we propagate the constraints to the XACML Rule elements. Thus,
without loss of generality, we can assume that Policy and PolicySet elements have
empty Target all of the constraints are propagated down to the Target of their
XACML Rules descendants. Table 4.1 summarize the mapping details.
4.3.4 Policy Analysis Services in DL
In [56] the following services are provided:
• Constraints. We already mentioned separation of duty constraints. In addi-
tion, we can also specify more general cardinality constraints; for example,
a user cannot be a member of more than 3 security roles at a time. Property
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Syntax π
R ::= (Rule T Effect) π(T) 7→ π(Effect)
Effect ::= Permit | Deny Permit-P | Deny-P
T ::= ((Sub) (Act) ((Res))) π(Sub) ⊓ π(Act) ⊓ π(Res)
Sub | Act | Res ::= Any | Fcn ⊤ | π(Fcn)
Fcn ::= AV | Fcn ∩ Fcn | Fcn
∪ Fcn | ¬ Fcn
π(AV) | π(Fcn) ⊓ π(Fcn) |
π(Fcn) ⊔ π(Fcn) | ¬π(Fcn)
AV ::= (attr-id attr-val) ∃π(attr− id).π(attr− val)
attr-id DL property corresponding
to attr− id
attr-value DL property corresponding
to attr− value
Table 4.1: The mapping function between XACML and DL
(attribute) hierarchies are allowed as well: if X is a brother-of Y, then he is a
relative-of Y.
• Policy Comparison. For two policies (or policy sets) P1 and P2 check if when-
ever P1 yields a decision α, P2will yield α, too. If not, give a counter exam-
ple.
• Policy Verification. Check if the policy satisfies a particular policy property.
If not, give a counterexample.
• Policy Incompatibility. If for two policies P1 and P2, there cannot exist an ac-
cess request where both policies apply (yield a decision), then these policies
are incompatible.
• Policy Redundancy. For a policy and an access decision (Permit or Deny),
check whether the policy can ever satisfy that decision (or it will be always
overridden by some other policy higher up the hierarchy).
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• Policy Querying. Search for policies in the document based on attribute val-
ues.
4.3.5 Results and Discussion
In this section we summarize the key features of Margrave and the DL approach
outlining weak and strong points. In Table 4.2 we briefly represents the differ-
ences between the expressivity of the two approaches.
Summarizing, Margrave represents policies using the Multi-Terminal Binary
Decision Diagram (MTBDD), which can explicitly represent all variable assign-
ments that satisfy a Boolean expression and hence provides a good representation
for the relationships among policies. Policy property verification is then formu-
lated as a query on the corresponding MTBDD structures. The MTBDD structure
has been credited with helping model checking scale to realistic systems in hard-
ware verification. The major shortcoming of Margrave is that it can only handle
simple conditions, like string equality matching. A direct consequence of such
limitation is an explosion of the MTBDD size when conditions on different data
domains (e.g. inequality functions) have to be represented. For example, to rep-
resent the condition “time is between 8am to 10pm”, the MTBDD tool needs to
enumerate all possible values between “8am” to “10pm” (e.g., “time-is-8:00am”,
“time-is-8:01am”, “time-is-8:02am”, . . .).
On the contrary, the approach proposed in [56] is based on DL. Mapping
XACML to Description Logics provide a more interesting subset of the XACML
language but it has the obvious drawback of a higher computational complexity.
The proposed mapping directly translates XACML targets into DL concepts and
attribute value pairs are translated into existential restriction. The effect of a rule
is defined over this basic building blocks and then is propagated to policy and
policy sets effects. The advantage of using Description Logic, is that it is possible
to gain significantly in expressivity but not loosing too much with respect to per-
formance as we will introduce later. However, it is not clear how their mapping
with the different semantic assumptions made in XACML and
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Feature Margrave Kolovski et al.
Permit-Overrides yes yes
Deny-Override yes yes
First-Applicable yes yes
Only-One Applicable no no
Ordered-Permit-Overrides no no
Ordered-Deny-Override no no
Different attribute datatype no yes
Role Hierarchy no yes
Resource Hierarchy no yes
Continuous Domains no yes
Multi-subject request no no
Table 4.2: Differences between XACML features supported by the reviewed ap-
proaches
Concerning results in [35] the authors say that Margrave take at most 355 mil-
liseconds (ms) for the parsing of a policy and no longer than 10 ms for property
verification. Regarding the approach by Kolovski, in [54] it is showed to have
comparable time values when considering the translation of a policy and, as ex-
pected, slower performance in the property verification. However, the approach
by Kolovski et al., appear to be much more scalable with respect to Margrave.
This is due to the fact that Margrave need to discretize continuous domains into
finite sets of values each one resulting in a new node in the graph. This means
obtaining an explosions of nodes in the creation of the MTBDD and problems in
the translations of policies.
Finally, we argue that even regardless expressivity, due to the problem of
nodes explosion [56] works better in some specific situations:
• policies with predicates defined over continuous domains;
• policies with a large number of attribute value pairs;
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However, Margrave is extremely fast when considering policies with a rea-
sonable numbers of pairs and for this reason is most suitable when comparing
large dataset of policies.
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Part II
EXAM-S: the Model
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Chapter 5
Extending XACML with Semantic Functions
In this Chapter we discuss the issue of defining new XACML function for manag-
ing information modeled within ontologies. This part of the thesis is not directly
related to the development of EXAM-S, however in Chapter 7.5 we introduce
new techniques with which we are able to perform policy analysis taking into
considerations the functions defined here.
5.1. Introduction
As we have seen in the background section, the management of data in native
XACML, is supported with low-level functions such as datatype comparison.
Because of such low-level functions it is often difficult to model some impor-
tant class of applications such as the ones requiring support for Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC). Even if XACML cannot support RBAC natively, due to its
flexibility, it can be extended to support these specialized access control models.
So far, several extensions have been proposed commonly referred to as XACML
profiles1. In particular, the XACML profile for RBAC [5] provides a mapping
between RBAC and XACML introducing new specialized policy sets. However,
the current RBAC profile does not provide any support for many relevant con-
straints, such as static and dynamic separation of duty (SoD). Extending XACML
1List of profiles currently available in XACML: http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/2.0/
82 Chapter 5. Extending XACML with Semantic Functions
to support such constraints, however, is an issue that requires extensions to the
XACML language, namely the introduction of specialized functions, and to the
XACML reference architecture and engine. One important requirement for such
an extended architecture and engine is to maintain the record of past accesses
in order to support dynamic SoD. It is also important to take into account the
semantics of role hierarchies with respect to the propagation of authorizations,
both positive and negative, along the role inheritance hierarchies. Supporting
such propagation and, at the same time, enforcing constraints requires some rea-
soning capabilities. Therefore, the main issue with respect to the XACML refer-
ence architecture and the engine is how to integrate such reasoning capabilities.
Because of the wide availability of semantic reasoning tools, such as the ones de-
veloped in the context of the semantic Web [9], the most suitable approach is to
couple XACML with one such tool.
In this paper we thus propose XACML+OWL, a general and powerful frame-
work that integrates XACML and OWL ontologies for supporting RBAC. Our
approach is to decouple the management of constraints, such as SoD, and RBAC
hierarchies from the specification and the enforcement of actual XACML policies.
Such an approach essentially allows to use any XACML engine without requir-
ing any extensions to it; all interactions between the XACML engine and the OWL
ontology are encapsulated inside of specialized functions, referred to as semantic
functions, that are also defined in this paper. XACML+OWL has thus been de-
signed as a two-layer framework in which constraints are modeled by an OWL
ontology, whereas policies are specified by using XACML. The two layers inter-
act through the semantic functions, that basically invoke reasoning operations
on underlying ontology and to return result of those operations to the invoking
XACML policy. Our approch has several advantages: (i) OWL ontologies have
been shown to be expressive enough for expressing security models, including
constraints [49], [56], [89] and [34]; (ii) because of the reasoning services provided
by an OWL ontology, the design and development of ontology-based XACML
policies become easier, thus leading the way to the use of semantic reasoning also
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in non-RBAC policies; (iii) since the ontology is decoupled from XACML policies,
the management of constraints and policies become more flexible; (iv) different
XACML-based systems can be based on a single ontology schema, allowing for
the development of distributed and more efficient architectures as well as simpli-
fying the interoperation among heterogeneous policy models.
Important contributions of the paper are as follows:
1. We show that OWL ontologies are powerful enough to represent hierarchi-
cal RBAC and SoD constraints. As a side effect we obtain a new approach to
the mapping of RBAC onto ontologies that addresses major shortcomings
of previous mapping approaches [34] and [52].
2. We propose an extension of the XACML standard for integrating into XACML
semantic reasoning services based on the OWL ontology. Such extension is
based on the semantic functions, to retrieve and reason about the informa-
tion modeled by the ontology. As part of such extension, we extend the
reference architecture of XACML and the XACML data-flow for access con-
trol decisions with the invocation of such functions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we provide
relevant background notions. In Section 5.3 we introduce a running example to
illustrate our approach. The XACML+OWL framework is discussed in Section
5.4. We introduce our strategy for the RBAC and OWL mapping in Section 5.5
whereas details about the extended XACML policies and a complete example of
the policy enforcement process are presented respectively in Sections 5.6 and 5.7.
5.2. Background notions about RBAC
We represent a role hierarchy with a tuple 〈R,6〉, where R is the set of roles and6
is a partial order relation over the elements of R. We represent users as elements
ui of the set of all usersU. For the representation of separation of duty constraints
we follow the definition proposed by Crampton [21]: a SoD constraint is a tuple
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Full Professor
Business Office Manager
Dean
Associate Professor
Assistant Professor
Figure 5.1: Role hierarchy.
〈S, (Ci, Cj), ρ〉, where: S is the scope associatedwith the constraint setCi, called the
antecedent constraint set; Cj is the consequent constraint set to which the constraint
is applied; and ρ is the temporal context that can take a value in the set {s, d},
where s and d stands respectively for static and dynamic context. The differences
between a static (SSoD) and dynamic (DSoD) SoD is that a SSoD limits the entire
space of the constraint set, whereas a DSoD limits the assignment to the constraint
set during run-time. A constraint 〈S, (Ci, Cj), ρ〉 is satisfied if, whenever x ∈ S is
associatedwithCi and y is associatedwithCj, then (x, y) ∈ ρ. The general form of
a SoD constraint presented above can be applied to different scenarios restricting
the scope or the constraint set. For example the SSoD constraint 〈U, (Ri, Rj), s〉
specifies that the sets of users assigned to Ri and Rjmust be disjoint.
5.3. Running Example
To illustrate our approach we consider a simple scenario from an academy do-
main environment. Specifically, we consider a process for submitting research
proposals. Roles in such scenario are organized according to the hierarchy shown
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in Figure 5.1. Other relevant entities in our scenario are the Project resource and
the Submit, Review and Approve action. The overall process consists of the
following activities: (i) the submission of a project; (ii) its review performed by
at least two subjects; and (iii) its approval. Moreover, user-to-role assignments,
permissions, and actions must satisfy the following requirements:
• Req1: a subject cannot belong to more than one role.
• Req2: every subject in the hierarchy except the business office manager can
submit a project.
• Req3: every professor, except assistant professor can review a project.
• Req4: a subject cannot review a project he/she has submitted.
• Req5: a professor can review the same project at most one time.
• Req6: only the business office manager and the dean can approve a project;
• Req7: a subject cannot approve projects he/she has reviewed or submitted;
Req2, Req3 and Req6 constrain the privileges that can be assigned to the roles.
Req1, Req4, Req5 and Req7 specify the SoD constraints holding in our scenario.
Specifically, Req1 is a SSoD constraint whereas Req4, Req5 and Req7 are DSoD
constraints. We finally remark that the scope of the policies is limited to a single
instance of the process where the process is composed by the activities (i), (ii) and
(ii) introduced above.
5.4. The XACML+OWL Framework
The XACML+OWL framework is organized according to the three major com-
ponents (see Figure 5.2): (i) Authoring Environment, (ii) Repositories, and (iii) En-
forcement System. The Authoring Environment supports the specification of ac-
cess control policies, role hierarchies, and constraints. The Repositories store the
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Figure 5.2: The XACML+OWL framework.
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OWL ontology and the XACML policies. Such repositories are not directly acces-
sible to the user; however the user that can manage both repositories from the
Authoring Environment. The policies and the ontology are then exploited by the
enforcement level during the enforcement of authorization requests. Finally, the
Enforcement System contains the core XACML engine, organized according to
the XACML reference architecture, extended with additional modules for han-
dling our semantic functions and obligations. The Enforcement System receives
in input an authorization request and performs policy evaluation by querying
the ontology through the invocation of the semantic functions and the obliga-
tions. The result of the enforcement process is the final authorization decision. A
detailed discussion of the extended XACML data flow diagram is presented in
Section 5.8.
A critical module in our architecture is the obligation generator. Obligations in
our model are crucial since they are used to support DSoD constraints. Our ap-
proach to manage such constraints can best be illustrated as follows. Consider a
DSoD constraint stating that no subject can be granted both permissions pi and
pj during the same session
2. Suppose a policy P1 (P2) exists which grants per-
mission pi (pj); it is obvious that if such a policy is applied and the permission is
granted to a subject s, the enforcement system must remember this information,
so that in the same session, permission pj is not granted. Our approach to “re-
member such information” is to include in the policies (P1 and P2 in this case)
an obligation that adds such information to the ontology. In our example, the
enforcement system will store the information that s has been granted pi. Now
suppose that during the same session, s issues a request to which P2 applies. The
application of such policy would then result in s receiving permission pj. As for
the case of permission pi, the execution of the obligation associated with P2 will
result in an attempt to update the ontology with the information that s has been
granted pj; such update however will fail, because of an inconsistency in the on-
tology, and thus such information will not be stored and the authorization will
2The specific notion of session is not relevant here.
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be denied. Because of the relevance of obligation in enforcing constraints, the
XACML+OWL includes an obligation generator that support for the automatic
creation of obligations. Whenever a new policy is created, this module generates
the necessary obligation and updates automatically the policy.
5.5. SoD Constraints Definition using OWL Ontolo-
gies
In this section we discuss the use of OWL ontologies for the representation role
hierarchies and constraints. We would like to remark here that OWL ontolo-
gies are flexible and the solutions provided here can be easily extended for ap-
plication to different scenarios. Given a role hierarchy 〈R,6〉, we model R as
an OWL class Role,and all the roles in R as instances of this class. The 6 re-
lation is represent through the OWL ObjectProperty subRoleOf(Role,Role).
Moreover, we define subRoleOf to be transitive, thus making it an instance of
owl:TransitiveProperty class. Transitivity makes it possible for a reasoner
to infer that if subRoleOf( Ri, Rj) and subRoleOf( Rj, Rk), then subRoleOf( Ri,
Rk). For example, wemodel the relation between FullProfessor andAssistantProfessor
in our sample scenario by adding to the ontology the property subRoleOf(
Assistant Professor, Full Professor). For optimization purposes we
also define the property supRoleOf( Role, Role). supRoleOf( Ri, Rj) rep-
resents that Ri dominates Rj. Like subRoleOf, supRoleOf is transitive. We
also specify that subRoleOf and supRoleOf are inverse properties by adding
the owl:inverseOf construct. Pi owl:inverseOf Pjmeans that for every pair
(x, y) ∈ Pi, there is (y, x) ∈ Pj and vice versa. We finally represent the set of sub-
ject by the Subject class whose instances represent the subjects on which the
policies are defined. The association between a subject to a role is obtained by the
ObjectProperty hasRole(Subject,Role).
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Permission
Role Subject
Resource Action
subRoleOf
hasRole
hasPermission
hasActionhasResource
Figure 5.3: OWL schema for RBAC.
5.5.1 Static Separation of Duty Constraints
Let 〈Subject, (Ri, Rj), s〉 be a role-based SSoD constraint. Representing this con-
straint in our ontology means imposing the constraint that the users that are as-
signed to Ri cannot be assigned to Rj and viceversa. In DL ontologies, given a
relation R(A,B), the set of individuals belonging to A that are associated with a
specific instance of B, say b, is represented by the class ∃R : b where : is the role
filler construct. Thus, in order to model the 〈Subject, (Ri, Rj), s〉 constraints, the
following axioms are added to the ontology:
• C′ ≡ ∃hasRole : Ri.
• C′′ ≡ ∃hasRole : Ri.
• C′ owl : disjointWith C′′.
For example, according to Req1 in our running example, the SSoD constraint
concerning full professors and assistant professors is modeled with the axiom
∃hasRole : FullProfessor owl:disjointWith ∃hasRole : AssistantProfessor.
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5.5.2 Dynamic Separation of Duty Constraints
Let 〈Subject, (Ri, Rj), d〉 be a role-based DSoD constraint. We model this kind of
constraints by adopting a similar approach to the one introduced for SSoD. The
only difference is that at design time not all the assignments between subjects
and roles are known. Following [34], we create an other class of roles, called
ActiveRole. The instances of such class are all the roles that can be activated
at run-time (from now on we refer to this kind of roles as active roles). Moreover,
also the the hasRole object properties must be extended for handling also ac-
tive roles: hasRole(Subject, (Role ⊔ ActiveRole)). For example, to enforce
Req4 from our running example we add to the ontology roles Submitter and
Reviewer, and the following axiom: hasRole : Submitter owl:disjointWith
hasRole : Reviewer. The dynamic assignment of subjects to roles cannot be
handled by an OWL ontology by itself. Typically, the assignment of a user to
a dynamic role is the result of some specific administrative operations. Instead
of introducing a new specific module to handle such operations, we exploit the
obligation mechanism of XACML. The details of the approach are discussed in
Section 5.6.2.
We can also specify more complex constraints involving not only subjects, but
also actions and resources. For example, we may be interested in add a DSoD be-
tween the set of users that have reviewed a project and the set of users that can ap-
prove a project. It is worth noting that, following the above example, wemay add
a constraint between the classes Reviewer andApprover. However, when the ap-
plication has a large number of resources and actions, such an approch would po-
tentially result in creating an exponential number of classes each one for each pos-
sible action-resource pair. In order to address this issue, we add three new classes:
Resource, Action, and Permission. Classes Resource and Action repre-
sent, respectively, resources and actions. The Permission class binds a user to
an action-resource. This association can be obtained through the two functional
ObjectProperties hasAction( Permission, Action), hasResource( Permission,
Resource) linking an action and a resource to a permission and the ObjectProp-
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erty hasPermission( Subject, Permission) that links a subject to a permis-
sion. For example, Req7 ca be modeled by adding the following axioms:
• D′ ≡ ∃hasPerm.(∃hasAct : {Review} ⊓ ∃hasRes : {Project});
• D′′ ≡ ∃hasPerm.(∃hasAct : {Submit} ⊓ ∃hasRes : {Project});
• D′ owl : disjointWith D′′;
We remark that after the specification of a new constraint at the Authoring en-
vironment, the associated axioms are automatically generated and added to the
ontology.
5.6. XACML Policies
In XACML a policy is represented by a target, a set of rules, and a rule combin-
ing algorithm (see Section 2). The applicability of the policy to a request is then
determined by evaluating the list of attribute-value pairs provided in the request
against the conditions in the rule target. The XACML profile expresses role as a
subject attributes. Other attributes can also be associated with the subject in or-
der to support fine-grained policies. In XACML+OWL subjects are represented
as OWL individuals. The attributes with which a subject is associated are repre-
sentedwith both the OWL individuals and data type values related to that subject
through properties. Since the subject role is an individual associatedwith the sub-
ject through the hasRole property, in our model roles are represented through
subject attributes as defined in the XACML RBAC profile. However, instead of
specifying all the possible subject attributes, the request specifies just the actual
individual that represents the subject in the ontology. Then, we let the policies
specify which are the attributes they require by specifying the name of the prop-
erties associated with the individual. Specifically, we first use the attribute id to
retrieve the subject in the request context, then we apply to such subject the se-
mantic functions able to access the additional attributes required for the policy
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evaluation. An example of a function is hasObjectValue(si,Pj) that takes in
input the individual si and the object property Pj and retrieves the set of individ-
uals associated with si through Pj. Such approach does not require modifications
to the policy structure nor to the attribute retrieval mechanism.
5.6.1 Semantic Functions for instances
Given an individual, there are essentially three kinds of information that can be
extracted: (i) the class the individual belongs to; (ii) the class instances with which
the individual is related through an object property; and (iii) the data values asso-
ciated with the individual through a datatype property. In order to retrieve such
information we define the following functions:
• hasObjectValue(si,Pj): it returns the set of instances associated with si
through the object property Pj;
• hasStringValue(si,Pj): it returns the set of string values associatedwith
si through the datatype property Pj of type String;
• hasIntValue(si,Pj): it returns the set of integer values associated with
si through the datatype property Pj of type Integer;
• relatedTo(si,Pk): it returns all the individuals associatedwith si through
the object property Pk;
• transitiveRelatedTo(si,Pk): it is the same as the relatedTo function
but the property given in input is the transitive object property Pk. This
means that if (si, sj′) ∈ Pk and (sj′, sj) ∈ Pk then transitiveRelatedTo
returns both sj and s
′
j.
Functions instanceOf and hasObjectValue are associated respectively with
categories (i) and (ii) introduced above. hasStringValue and hasIntValue
provide a way to retrieve the datatype values associated with the input individ-
ual. The only datatype we support are String and Integer. We plan to extend our
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<Policy>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId=‘‘string-equal’’>
<AttributeValue>Ri</AttributeValue>
<Apply FunctionId:‘‘transitiveRelatedTo’’>
<Apply FunctionId:‘‘hasObjectValue’’>
<SubjAttrDesignator AttrId:‘‘subject-id’’>
<AttributeValue>hasRole</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
<AttributeValue>supRoleOf</AttributeValue>
</Apply>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject>
</Subject>
<Resource>
<AttributeValue>Project</AttributeValue>
<ResAttrDesignator AttrId=‘‘resource-id’’>
</Resource>
<Action>
<AttributeValue>Submit</AttributeValue>
<ActttrDesignator AttrId=‘‘action-id’’>
</Action>
</Policy>
Table 5.1: A XACML policy with ontology elements.
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model to other datatypes in future work. The boolean functions relatedTo and
transitiveRelatedTo are both related to category (ii). transitiveRelatedTo
is particularly useful in our scenario because allow us to check the dominance
relation between two roles. An example, is shown in Table 5.1 in which we pro-
vide an abstraction of a policy that exploits with our functions. Consider the
subject match of the policy, in order to check role dominance we first extract
the role of the subject with the function hasObjectValue, then we retrieve all
the roles subsuming the role Ri. Finally, we compare the obtained bag of roles
with the role Ri with the standard function string − equal. It is worth not-
ing that to support RBAC we just need the functions transitiveRelatedTo
and hasObjectValue. We provide however the functions hasStringValue,
hasIntValue and relatedTo for dealing with some attributes that, even if not
supplied in the standard RBAC, that may be associated with the subject in some
specialized implementations.
Notice that instead of introducing new functions there are some alternative so-
lutions to retrieve subject attributes from an XACML policy. For example wemay
embed the name of the property that binds the individual to the required attribute
directly within the attribute id. For example, if we want to determine the role of a
subject, we may define the attribute id urn:subject:subject-id:hasRole.
However, this solution requires an additional module in the context handler able
to “understand” the attribute id and retrieve the intended values. Moreover, if
we want to exploit the full power of DL reasoning, we have to be able to embed
complex expression in the attribute id creating an ad hoc DL-like syntax. Another
solution is to define a function supporting the specification an ontology query (for
example with the SPARQL query language3). However, such an approach has the
problem of the run-time customization of the queries with the actual values pro-
vided in the request.
3http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-sparql-query/
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<Obligation
Id=‘‘addPermission’’, FulfillOn=‘‘Permit’’>
<AttributeAssignment
AttributeId:‘‘urn:addpermission:subject’’>
&lt;SADesignator AttrId:‘‘subject-id’’/&gt;
</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment
AttributeId:‘‘urn:addpermission:resource’’>
&lt;RADesignator AttrId:‘‘resource-id’’/&gt;
</AttributeAssignment>
<AttributeAssignment
AttributeId:‘‘urn:addpermission:action’’>
&lt;AADesignator AttrId:‘‘action-id’’/&gt;
</AttributeAssignment>
</Obligation>
Table 5.2: The addPermission obligation.
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5.6.2 XACML Obligations
In our approach, constraints are modeled within the ontology, and the PDP is
not aware of which constraints hold for the policies. This a critical issue when
considering dynamic constraints because a policy, in order to grant an authoriza-
tion, must be aware whether such authorization violates come constraints. In
XACML+OWL we solve such issue by exploiting the XACML obligation mecha-
nism. An obligation is an operation that the PDP can send to the PEP along with
the policy evaluation result. The PEP should fulfill the obligation it receives dur-
ing the enforcement of the authorization decision. Depending by the semantics
of the obligation, a failure of its execution may influence the enforcement pro-
cess. In XACML+OWL, we exploit the obligation mechanism for managing the
DSoD constraints. Specifically, we define the new obligation addPermission.
addPermission is considered as a mandatory operation; this means that even
if the PEP should allow access to the required resources, if it cannot fulfill the
obligation, then the access shall be denied. The effect of the addPermission is
to add to the ontology a list of axioms if the permission specified in the associated
policy is granted. As shown in Table 5.2, addPermission is sent to the PEP only
if the effect of the associated policy is evaluated as Permit. In the following, we
list the axioms that are added to the ontology by such obligation:
Ax 1 : Individual(p i type(Permission))
Ax 2 : hasAction(p i, a)
Ax 3 : hasResource(p i, s)
Ax 4 : hasPermission(u, p i)
Those axioms are related to the permissions that are allowed by such policy.
For example, consider a policy that permits to a role r to perform the action a on
the resource s. If a request satisfy the requirements of the policy, the above axioms
are instantiated with the actual values and added to the ontology. Specifically,
Ax1 creates the new permission pi. Ax2 and Ax3 associate pi respectively with
the action a and the resource s. Finally, Ax4 associates the subject u specified in
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the request with the permission pi. The addition of new axioms to the ontology
is exploited for checking constraints violation. As we have discussed in Section
5.5, in our approach we reduce constraint evaluation to the problem of checking
the consistency of an ontology. This means that if the addition of new axioms
to a consistent ontology yields an inconsistency, the new axioms that have been
introduced violate some of the constraints defined in the ontology. Obviously, if
an inconsistency is detected the new axioms are deleted from the ontology. This
ensure the consistency of the ontology after each execution of the obligation.
Notice that there are some alternative solutions formanagingDSoD constraints.
For example, we may let each policy checks if the enforcement of the permissions
it grants violates the constraints in the ontology. This means to replicate the con-
straints in each policy the constraints are involved. An obvious drawback is that
when we have to change a constraint we have to update both the ontology and
the involved policies. Another possibility is to introduce a dedicated module
specifically designed for acting as a mediator between XACML policies and the
OWL ontology. The role of this new module is to interact with the XACML com-
ponents to provide the necessary information for the enforcement of the requests.
For example we may associate the id of a policy with a certain constraint in the
ontology and, whenever that policy applies, the module checks if the granted
permission violates the constraints. This approach has several drawbacks: first of
all we have to update the XACML enforcement process for dealing with the new
module. Moreover, when a policy or a constraint is changed we have to update
(if necessary) also the associations maintained by the mediator.
5.6.3 Policy Semantics
A XACML policy is a set of rules combined through a rule combining algorithm.
The semantics of a policy defined over a role hierarchy depends from the eval-
uation of its rules and the algorithm by which the rules are combined. Given a
policy Pi we categorize the rules belonging to a policy into two sets DR and PR
defined as follows:
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fdeny−override(r, s, a) =
IF
∃ r′ : r 6 r′ ∧ (r′, s, a) ∈ DR;
THEN Deny;
ELSE IF
∃ r′′ : r′′ 6 r ∧ (r′′, s, a) ∈ PR;
THEN Permit;
ELSE NotApplicable;
Figure 5.4: The function fdeny−override
fpermit−override(r, s, a) =
IF
∃ r′ : r′ 6 r ∧ (r′, s, a) ∈ PR
THEN Permit;
ELSE IF
∃ r′′ : r 6 r′′ ∧ (r′′, s, a) ∈ DR;
THEN Deny;
ELSE NotApplicable;
Figure 5.5: The function fpermit−override
DR = {Rulej | Rulej ∈ Poli ∧ EffectRulej = Deny}
PR = {Rulej | Rulej ∈ Poli ∧ EffectRulej = Permit}
where Effect{Rulej} extracts the effect of rule Rulej. Given the role hierarchy
〈R,6〉 and an authorization request (r, s, a), such that r ∈ R, s ∈ S and a ∈
A, the semantics of a policy is specified according to functions fdeny−override and
fpermit−override shown respectively in Figures 5.6.3 and 5.6.3.
fdeny−override grants the access request (r, s, a) if: (i) an applicable rule ∈ PR
exists defined on a role r ′′ that is dominated by r; and (ii) no applicable rule ∈ DR
exists defined on a role r ′ that dominates r. Conversely, given the authorization
request (r, s, a), if an applicable rule ∈ PR exists defined on a role r ′ that is domi-
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1: A(Rulek,r) ∧ P(Rulek)→ 〈e, (f>(r), s, a)〉 ∈ XAB
2: A(Rulek,r) ∧D(Rulek)→ 〈e, (f6(r), s, a)〉 ∈ XAB
Table 5.3: Formalization of authorization rules.
nated by r, then fpermit−override grants the access request without checking for the
presence of deny rules.
5.6.4 Automatic Creation of XACML policies
In this section, we discuss how we translate the authorizations defined by using
the Authoring Environment into the XACML+OWL policies. We remark that the
actual version of XACML+OWL does not provide an automatic procedure for in-
ferring a rule combining algorithm. The user must thus specify the appropriate
algorithm to use for combining the authorization rules into a policy. For simplic-
ity, we first consider the case in which authorization rules are defined on a single
subject. We discuss multi-subject rules later in this section.
At the level of the Authoring Environment an authorization rule is seen as
a tuple 〈Effect, (r, s, a)〉, where Effect ∈ {Permit,Deny}, r ∈ R, s ∈ S and
a ∈ A. We define the predicate A(Rulei, r) as a Boolean predicate that checks
whether the Rulei applies to the role r. We define also the new Boolean predicates
D(Rulei) and P(Rulei) that check respectively whether the Rulei has a Deny or
Permit effect. We also refer to the XACML Authorization Base, that is the repos-
itory containing the rules used for integration of XACML and OWL, as XAB. A
policy is then defined over the rules in XAB by selecting a combining algorithm
and defining the policy target. Given a role hierarchy 〈R,6〉, the interpretation
of a Rulek is given in Table 5.3. The first formula states that if a Permit Rulek
is applicable to role r, then the tuple 〈e, (f>(r), s, a)〉 is added to XAB. f>(r) is
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a shortcut for specifying the applicability of Rulek also to roles that dominates
r. In XACML+OWL f> is obtained through the combination of the functions
transitiveRelatedTo and hasObjectValue as shown in Table 5.1. Simi-
larly, the second formula states that if a rule Deny Rulek is applicable to the role
r, then the tuple 〈e, (f6(r), s, a)〉 is added to XAB, where f6 has the inverse se-
mantics of f>.
It is worth noting that the mechanism introduced so far for the automatic cre-
ation of policies, is consistent to the XACML standard even if we have a rule
with multiple subjects. Consider a rule Rulei and the roles r and r
′ such that
A(Rulei, r) ∧ A(Rulei, r
′) are verified. Then in order for Rulei to be applicable
to a certain subject sk, sk must have both roles r and r
′. This means to have two
<subject> element each one specifying: (i) a different role, in our case r and r ′;
(ii) the combination of function hasObjectValue and transitiveRelatedTo
for retrieving the role of the sk. First, we retrieve all the roles dominated by the
role of sk through the functions. Then, this bag of roles is evaluated against each
one of the <subject> element of the rule.
5.6.5 Policy evaluation
In this sectionwe show how the formalization of the policies given in Section 5.6.4
is sound with respect the policy semantics defined in Section 5.6.3. The XACML
policy evaluation process checks whether the target of a policy is applicable, if
this is the case all the rules in the policy are evaluated and the policy value if
finally determined according to the rule combining algorithm. Given a policy Pi,
let XABi = {Rulej ∈ XAB | Rulej ∈ Pi be the set of all rules in Pi. The rules in the
policy and the policy are then evaluated according to the pseudo-code shown in
Figure 5.6.5. Given a role hierarchy 〈R,6〉, the correspondence with the function
fdeny−override is verified by considering that: (i) according to the semantics defined
in Section 5.6.4, r ∈ fleq(r ′) and r ∈ fgeq(r ′) are evaluated True respectively when
r 6 r ′ and r ′ 6 r; and (ii) given Rulek if Effect(Rulek) = Deny then Rulek ∈ DR
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deny− override(r, s, a) =
IF
∃ 〈 e, (f6(r′), s, a) 〉 : r ∈ f6(r′) ∧ e = Deny;
THEN Deny;
ELSE IF
∃ 〈 e, (f>(r′), s, a) 〉 : r ∈ f>(r′) ∧ e = Permit;
THEN Permit;
ELSE NotApplicable;
Figure 5.6: Policy evaluation
whereas if Effect(Rulek) = Permit then Rulek ∈ PR. The case for permit −
override follows the approach proposed for deny− override.
5.7. A Complete Example of Policy Enforcement
In this Section we provide a complete example to illustrate the enforcement pro-
cess in XACML+OWL. Suppose we have the request REQUESTi, in which Alice
requires to Review a Project:
REQUEST i:
<Request>
<Subject>
<Attribute AttributeId=‘‘subject-id’’>
<AttributeValue>Alice</AttributeValue>
</Subject>
<Resource>
<Attribute AttributeId=‘‘resource-id’’>
<AttributeValue>Submit</AttributeValue>
</Resource>
<Action>
<Attribute AttributeId=‘‘action-id’’>
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<AttributeValue>Project</AttributeValue>
</Action>
</Request>
Suppose now the policy POLICYk that contains the rule RULEj. RULEj allows
the access to perform the Review action on the Project resource to subjects
having a role that subsumes the role Associate Professor:
RULE j
1:<Rule Effect=‘‘Permit’’>
2: <Subject>
3: <SubjectMatch MatchId=‘‘string-equal’’>
4: <AttrValue>Associate Professor</AttrValue>
5: <Apply FunctionId:‘‘hasTransitiveObjectValue’’>
6: <Apply FunctionId:‘‘hasObjectValue’’>
7: <SubjAttrDesignator AttrId:‘‘subject-id’’>
8: <AttributeValue>hasRole</AttributeValue>
9: </Apply>
10: <AttributeValue>supRoleOf</AttributeValue>
11: </Apply>
12: </SubjectMatch>
13: </Subject>
14: <Resource>
15: <AttributeValue>Project</AttributeValue>
16: <ResAttrDesignator AttrId=‘‘resource-id’’>
17: </Resource>
18: <Action>
19: <AttributeValue>Review</AttributeValue>
20: <ActttrDesignator AttrId=‘‘action-id’’>
21: </Action>
22:</Rule>
Moreover, POLICYk has the addPermission obligation introduced in Table
5.2. Now, in order to evaluate RULEj against the individuals in REQUESTi we
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need to retrieve the role of Alice. This is done by combining the functions
transitiveRelatedTo and hasObjectValue as is shown from rows 3 to 12.
According to the hierarchy in Figure 5.1, the request is authorized and through
the obligation the following axioms are added to the ontology.
Ax 1 : Individual(p i type(Permission))
Ax 2 : hasAction(p i, Submit)
Ax 3 : hasResource(p i, Project)
Ax 4 : hasPermission(Alice, p i)
Suppose now that Alice requires again the authorization REQUESTi. RULEj
is evaluated again and the and the authorization is granted. However, when the
PEP tries to fulfill the obligation associatedwith POLICYk, the new axioms violate
the constraint Req5 and an ontology inconsistency is detected. Due to such incon-
sistency, the new axioms are deleted from the ontology and the authorization is
denied.
5.8. Extended XACML architecture
In this Section we propose an extension of the XACML architecture for managing
semantic functions. Figure 5.7 shows the XACML architecture extended for deal-
ing with our new semantic functions. Black boxes represents standard XACML
components whereas blue boxes represents the newmodules we have introduced
or extended.
As in the standard XACML model, the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) re-
ceives an access request, extracts the attributes in the request, generates an XACML
request and sends it to the Context Handler (CH) for the evaluation. It also makes
sure that all the obligations with an authorization decision are executed. The CH
receives a request and forward it to the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The PDP
in turn fetches the applicable policies from the policy repository in the reposi-
tory level. Applicable policies are determined by evaluating, among others, the
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Figure 5.7: Extended XACML Data Flow Diagram.
semantic functions we have defined in XACML+OWL. In doing this we have in-
troduced an ontology reasoner that performs the required operations on the OWL
ontology. The PDP returns an authorization decision along with the obligation (if
any) that has to be fulfilled by the PEP. Obligations are resolved by the obligation
service that interact with ontology reasoner and returns exceptions if the addition
of new axioms results in an ontology inconsistency.
Chapter 6
Dealing with Heterogeneous Domains
A key feature in our approach is the ability to execute queries and verify prop-
erties on a dataset of heterogeneous policies. This means to create a unified and
consistent vocabulary of terms in a way that every policy in the dataset can be
expressed with it. In Chapter 4 we have identified three different kind of vari-
ations: syntactical, terminological and semantic variations. Usually, Syntactic vari-
ations can be identified by using look up tables. Look up tables enumerate the
possible ways in which the same term can be written by using different character
combinations. Instead, to detect terminological variations, dictionaries or the-
saurus such as WordNet [31] can be exploited. Dictionaries are used to retrieve
all the synonyms of a given term. Dictionaries and look up tables are typical Nat-
ural Language Processing techniques that could be considered as a way to detect
the meaning that lies behind the representation of a word. Semantic variations
can be determined by using ontology matching techniques. However, it is crucial
to adopt muchmore powerful techniques in order to obtain better mappings and,
in turn, a better reference knowledge base for the policy set to be analyzed.
In this chapter we introduce solutions to the issues introduced in Chapter 4.
Specifically, our aim is to develop a set of technologies that allows us to create
a unified knowledge base for a given policy set. The conceptual architecture of
our approach is depicted in Figure 6.1: the basic building block is the Ontol-
ogy Matching process that is used by all the other methods, on top of ontology
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Figure 6.1: The stack of technologies developed for solving domain heterogene-
ity.
matching we have Ontology Merging and Ontology Extraction. These processes
are not completely decoupled approaches since in the general case, the result of
an ontology merging can be exploited during the extraction of an ontology form
the unstructured policy data. Final blocks are represented by the creation of the
policy reference ontology and in turn reference ontology of the policy set.
In the remaining part of this chapter we describe the architecture in Figure 6.1
adopting a bottom-up approach. In Section 6.1 we describe the ontology match-
ing technique that we use in EXAM-S. Section 6.2 and Section 6.3 are dedicated to
Ontology Merging and Ontology Extraction respectively. Finally Sections 6.4 and
6.5 describe how such technologies are combined in building the Policy Reference
Ontology and the Policy Set Reference Ontology.
6.1. Ontology Matching
An ontology is a formal representation of a domain in terms of concepts and
properties with which those concepts are related. It is used to define the domain
and reason about its features. Ontology matching is the process whereby two
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ontologies are semantically related at conceptual level; concepts belonging to the
source ontology are mapped onto the target ontology concepts according to those
semantic relations [80]. As introduced in Definition 4.5, an ontology matching
function takes as arguments two ontologiesOi andOj, and returns a set of tuples
of the form 〈eOi , eOj , s〉, where eOi is a concept belonging to ontology Oi, eOi is a
concept belonging to ontology Oj that matches concept eOi , and s is a confidence
score, that typically is, a value between 0 and 1, indicating the similarity between
the matched concepts. In Section 2.4 we have reviewed several approaches for
solving the ontology mapping problems. In our approach we use a modified ver-
sion of Falcon-AO [48]. The 2007 OntologyAlignment Evaluation Initiative(OAEI
07) results indicate Falcon to be the best performing ontology matcher available.
Policy View of an Ontology
The Falcon-AO tool is very accurate in finding mappings but when considering
large ontologies the matching function is quite slow. Moreover, as we discussed
in Section 4.2.1, we may have policies that exploit several ontologies in the defi-
nition of the vocabulary. However, not all the entities defined in an ontology are
useful for our purposes. Especially when considering large ontologies it is rea-
sonable to take into consideration only the subset of the entities that are relevant
for the policy vocabulary creation.
For this reason, we introduce the notion of policy view of an ontology. Given
a policy Pi and an ontologyOj such that some elements eOj are referred by Pi, the
view of policy Pi of the ontology Oj is an ontology Ω
Pi
Oj
such that: (i) ΩPiOj ⊆ Oj;
(ii) for each eOj ∈ Pi, eOj is added to ΩPiOj along with all the axioms related to it
e.g. if eOj is a concept we extract the relation defined over it, and all the entities
that belong to the hierarchy in which eOj appear.
In Chapter 10 we discuss experiments that show that the use ifΩPiOj instead of
the whole Oj provides a trade-off between performance and mapping accuracy
that is good enough for our purposes.
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6.2. Ontology Merging Process
Ontology merging is to process whereby it is possible to obtain a reconciled on-
tology merging the elements belonging to different semantic schemas. In our
model, ontology merging plays a crucial role since is one of the building block
in the architecture of our model. Conceptually, the ontology merging process is
something more than just adding elements belonging to decoupled schemas to
an empty knowledge base. When comparing two ontologies it is possible to have
some overlapping elements, if this is the case the ontology merging algorithm
have to detect this similarities in order to avoid redundancies in the resulting
schema.
Formally, we have to take in consideration the intersection of the elements of
the input ontologies.
Definition 6.1 According to Definition 4.1 and 4.2 we define the intersection of two
ontologies Oi and Oj as the set:
⋂T
Oi,Oj
:= OTi ∩ OTj⋂AT
Oi,Oj
:= OATi ∩ OATj⋂
Oi,Oj
:=
⋂T
Oi,Oj
∪ ⋂ATOi,Oj
However,
⋂
Oi,Oj
may be difficult to obtain in case of semantic variations. This
is the reason why we exploit the ontology matching algorithm in the merging
process. Since ontology matching provides mappings between entities belong-
ing to different schemas, we can check if such mappings are “good enough” to be
trustable and in such a case we can consider those mapped elements as the same
entity avoiding to repeat them in the merged ontology.
In order for the elements of a mapping to be considered as the same entity, we
evaluate the score of the mapping against a threshold τ. A mapping element is
then considered trustable if its score is greater then the threshold. Obviously, the
higher is the value of the threshold the higher is the probability to have trustable
mappings. The drawback is that assigning an high value to τ we may discard
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good mappings obtaining redundancy in the merged ontology. In order to have
the best performance we have executed several experiments considering both
accuracy and recall of our model according to different values of τ. The details of
such experiments are reported in Chapter 10.
6.2.1 Ontology Merging Process
The ontology merging process is composed by two different algorithms:
• MERGE (Algorithm 1): is the base Merge algorithm that takes in input two
ontologies and returns the reconciled knowledge base. This algorithm im-
plements the functionMERGE defined in 4.6.
• ONTOLOGY MERGING (Algorithm 2) : is the function that applies MERGE for
the number of ontologies exploited by policy Pi. This algorithm implements
all the components defined in 4.6;
In the rest of this section we provide the details of the two algorithms.
MERGE (Algorithm 1)
The process starts with the creation of a new empty ontology, then we match
the two input ontologies and the result of the matching is stored in the variable
mapping (line 2). Now there are two important issues to deal with:
1. Given the mapping element 〈eOi , eOj , s〉 such that s > τ, which one of the
mapped elements eOi and eOj we add to the resulting ontology?
2. In an ontology an entity can be associated to several other entities. For
example a concept may be the root of a hierarchy or maybe is in the range
of some property. For this reason, after one of the two elements is chosen,
say eOi , and added to the merged ontology, all the axioms in Oj associated
to eOj have to be modified accordingly.
110 Chapter 6. Dealing with Heterogeneous Domains
The first issue is described later in section 6.2.2. Concerning the second one,
there are several solutions depending by the adopted implementation. For clarity,
in Algorithm 1, we deal with the problem with the genericOj.update() function
that rename the specified ontology entity with the input name. In the implemen-
tation Chapter we describe alternative solutions and we give detail of the one
that is currently adopted in our prototype.
In lines 3-6, for each mapping element in the mapping list, if the score is
greater than the threshold τ the value belonging to ontology Oi is added to the
result ontology. In lines 7-8 and 9-10, the algorithm check whether there are el-
ements belonging to input ontologies that are not added to the result ontology
and if this is the case the O˜i,j is updated with those new elements. The algorithm
terminates returning the merged knowledge base (line 11).
ONTOLOGY MERGING (Algorithm 2)
The ONTOLOGY MERGING algorithm iteratively applies the MERGE procedure to
all the ontologies in the Ontologies(Pi) set. However, one may have the doubt
that changing the order of the ontologies in the input set wemay obtain a different
result. Section 6.2.2 addresses this issue offering some interesting considerations
about the MERGE procedure and, more in general, about an ontology mapping
process.
6.2.2 Order of the Ontologies in the Merging Algorithm
There is one question that may arise when considering the two proposed algo-
rithms: if we change the order of the ontology in Ontologies(Pi) the result of
Algorithm 2 will be always the same? In general the reply to such a question
is “no”. However, in our case the probability of having different merging pro-
cesses with a different order of the same ontologies is very low. This is related
to the fact that we take into consideration just the mappings with a score greater
of the threshold τ. We discuss the value that may by assigned to τ in Chapter
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10, anyway a general consideration is the following: the meaning of τ is that if a
mapping has a score greater than τ then the elements in such mapping element
can be considered exactly the same. Moreover, if we have a mapping element
me1,2 between ontologies O1 and O2 that maps eO1 and eO2 with a score greater
than a high value of τ, then when mapping O1 and O2 with O3 the probability
to have eO1 and eO2 mapped to the same element eO3 is very high. This yield to
the obvious consequence that mappings between ontologies are transitive: if eO1
maps eO2 with s1,2 > τ and eO2 maps eO3 with s2,3 > τ than we have also that
with eO1 maps eO3 with s1,3 > τ.
Algorithm 1: MERGE
Input:
Oi: The first ontology to be merged
Oj: the second ontology to be merged
Output:
O˜i,j: The ontology resulted by merging the input ontologies
(1) O˜i,j = new(Ontology());
(2) mapping = MAP(Oi, Oj);
(3) FOR EACHmek ∈ mapping
(4) IFmek.s > τ
(5) Oj.update(mek.eOj ,mek.eOi);
(6) O˜i,j.add(mek);
(7) FOR EACH eOi /∈ O˜i,j
(8) O˜i,j.add(eOi);
(9) FOR EACH eOj /∈ O˜i,j
(10) O˜i,j.add(eOj);
(11) return O˜i,j;
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Algorithm 2: ONTOLOGY MERGING
Input:
Ontologies(Pi): The ontologies exploited in the policy Pi
Output:
O˜Pi : The ontology resulted by merging the ontology exploited in
the policy Pi
(1) O˜Pi = new Ontology();
(2) FOR EACH Oj ∈ Ontologies(Pi)
(3) O˜Pi = MERGE(O˜Pi , Oj);
(4) return O˜Pi ;
6.3. Ontology Extraction Process
Ontology extraction is the process whereby it is possible to build an ontology
from either structured or unstructured data with no explicit semantics relations.
We have discussed the theoretical background of this problem in Section 4.2.2, in
this section we provide an algorithm for extracting an ontology having in input
the vocabulary of the policy and some additional semantic data.
6.3.1 From a Vocabulary to a Domain: the Model
The algorithm improves the mapping in Section 4.3.3 by refining the resulting
ontology through a hierarchical organization of the new entities. The motiva-
tion for such refinement is that after the extraction of the entities based on the
mapping between XACML and DL , we obtain a simple list of new properties
and concepts. However, the extracted ontology may be involved in some on-
tology matching processes exploited in further steps. Since ontology matching
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takes advantage of both the entity names and their organization in the ontology,
a knowledge base without a structure i.e. without hierarchies between entities,
is useless for our purposes. For this reason, we combine the mapping in Section
4.2.2 with the subsumption relation between the terms that we retrieve from a
lexical databases, such as WordNet [31].
In WordNet, terms are organized in hierarchies following a standard sub-
sumption relation. We extract the list of concepts1, or path, that bound the term
under consideration to the root of the hierarchy. Then, given two terms ti and
tj, we intersect WordNet pathsWNPath(ti) andWNPath(tj) and we pick up the
least common subsumer. Three different scenarios may arise:
1. the common least subsumer is tj (tj subsumes ti): we add to the ontology a
subclass relation between concept ti and tj;
2. the common least subsumer is ti (ti subsumes tj): we add to the ontology a
subclass relation between concept tj and ti;
3. the common least subsumer is the term tk: if a concept tk does not belong to
the ontology, we add the new concept tk along with the subclass relations
between tk and ti and tj, respectively;
4. no common subsumers are found: no relations are added to the ontology;
For example consider the policy shown in Figure 4.1. The least common
subsumer between t1 (Associate Professor), t2 (Full Professor) and t3
(Student) is theWordNet synset represented by the term Person. Moreover, by
just considering together t1 and t2, we obtain as the least common subsumer the
term Professor. The hierarchy returned by the refinement function will have
Person as root. Person then subsumes Student and Professor that in turn
subsumes the concepts Full Professor and Associate Professor.
1Named synset (set of synonyms) in WordNet.
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6.3.2 Ontology Extraction Algorithm
For simplicity we show just the creation of object properties, the case for data
type properties is straightforward because we just need to add the new property
without creating any concept. In lines 2-5 we create a new property and a new
concept given a certain attribute-value pair. In line 6 we update the range of the
property with the new concept, finally in line 7 we return the O¨Pi enriched with
the hierarchies added by the CREATE HIERARCHY function.
Algorithm 3: ONTOLOGY EXTRACTION
Input:
Pairs(Pi): The attribute-value pairs of the policy Pi
Output:
O¨Pi : The ontology extracted by the policy Pi
(1) O¨Pi = new Ontology();
(2) FOR EACH 〈attributej, valuek〉 ∈ Pairs(Pi)
(3) IF O¨Pi .not contains(attributej)
(4) O¨Pi .add(new(ObjectProperty(attributej)));
(5) O¨Pi .add(new(Concept(valuek)));
(6) O¨Pi .attributej.range = O¨Pi .valuek;
(7) return CREATE HIERARCHY(O¨Pi );
6.4. Policy Reference Ontology
In this section we describe the process whereby we create the Reference Ontology
of an input policy. The process, detailed in Algorithm 4, combine the procedures
introduced above. The input of the process is the policy Pi whereas its output
is the Reference Ontology O˙Pi . In lines 3-4 we create O˜Pi merging up all the
ontologies exploited in Pi and retrieved by the function Ontologies(Pi). In line
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we apply ONTOLOGY EXTRACTION obtaining the reconciled Knowledge Base for
those terms that does not belong to any ontology. It is worth noting that if all
terms used in the policy belong to a semantic schema then Vocabulary(Pi) is the
empty set. Finally, we build O˙Pi merging O˜Pi and O¨Pi .
Algorithm 4: POLICY REFERENCE ONTOLOGY
Input:
Pi: The Policy
Output:
O˙Pi : The Reference Ontology Associated with Pi
(1) O˜Pi = new Ontology();
(2) O¨Pi = new Ontology();
(3) IF | Ontologies(Pi) |> 1
(4) O˜Pi = ONTOLOGY MERGING(Ontologies(Pi));
(5) O¨Pi = ONTOLOGY EXTRACTION(Vocabulary(Pi), O˜Pi );
(6) O˙Pi = MERGE(O˜Pi , O¨Pi );
(7) return O˙Pi ;
6.5. Policy Set Reference Ontology
The creation of the Policy Set Reference Ontology is the final step in the con-
ceptual architecture of our model. The procedure detailed in Algorithm 5 takes
advantage off all the functions defined in the above sections. The main role of
this algorithm is thus to coordinate each activity calling the related functions.
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Algorithm 5: Policy Set Reference Ontology creation
Input:
PS: Policy Set
Output:
O˙PS: The Unique Ontology Associated with PS
(1) O˙PS = new Ontology();
(2) FOR EACH Pi ∈ PS
(3) O˙Pi = POLICY REFERENCE ONTOLOGY(Pi);
(4) Ontologies.add(O˙Pi );
(5) FOR EACH O˙j ∈ Ontologies
(6) O˙PS = MERGE(O˙PS, O˙j);
(7) return O˙PS;
Chapter 7
Policy Similarity Analysis
In this chapter we introduce the EXAM-S policy analysis services. In the defi-
nition of such services we rely on the preliminary section introduced in Section
4. We propose two different approaches: the core of this chapter (Section 7.5) in
which we define an hybrid system that exploits a modified version of MTBDDs.
The second one (Section 7.4) presents a similarity technique that can be exploited
on large policy data sets for optimization purposes. Whereas in Section 7.5 the ap-
proach is very precise and both combines and extends state of the art approaches,
the one proposed in Section 7.4 rely on data mining techniques and is used for
computing quickly a similarity score between policies. The score is used in a fil-
tering techniques for optimizing the data set maintaining only the policies that
are more similar. In both Sections 7.4 and 7.5 we assume that policies involved
into the analysis process have been already processed by the technologies intro-
duced in Section 6. Thus, we assume that if the policies belong to heterogeneous
domains, all the variations introduced in Section 4.1 have been already solved.
The rest of the sections, Section 7.2 and Section 7.1, introduce respectively the
running example and preliminary definitions that will be used in the rest of the
chapter.
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7.1. Analysis Queries on Heterogeneous Policies
The notion of analysis query is a key notion in our approach. Because one can
analyze policies and sets of policies from different perspectives, it is important
to also devise a comprehensive categorization of such queries. In our work, we
have thus identified three main categories of analysis queries, which differ with
respect to the information that they query. These categories are: policy metadata
queries, policy content queries, and policy effect queries. Policy metadata queries
analyze metadata associated with policies, such as policy creation and revision
dates, policy author, and policy location. A policy content query, by contrast,
extracts and analyzes the actual policy content, such as the number of rules in
the policy, the total number of attributes referenced in the policy, the presence of
certain attribute values.
A policy effect query determines and analyzes the requests allowed or denied
by policies and interactions among policies. The category of the policy effect
queries is the most interesting one among the query categories we have iden-
tified. The processing of policy effect queries is also far more complex than the
processing of queries in the other two categories, and thus we address its process-
ing in details (see next section). The policy effect query category can be further
divided into two subcategories: (i) queries on single policy; and (ii) queries on
multiple policies. The first subcategory contains one type of query, referred to
as property verification query. The second subcategory contains two main types
of queries, namely common property query and discrimination query. Figure 3.2
provides a taxonomy summarizing the various query types.
In the following, we first introduce some preliminary notions, and then present
more details for each type of policy effect query (query for short), including their
definitions and functionalities.
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7.2. An Illustrative Example
To illustrate the discussion we consider a scenario from a content delivery net-
work (CDN) system built on P2P network in which parties can replicate their
data in storage made available by third party resource providers. Real systems
adopting this model are for instance Lockss [8] and LionShare [70]. In such sce-
nario, there are usually two types of parties: data owner and resource owner. A
data owner owns some data, whereas a resource owner manages some resources
for storing data and processing queries on data. A data owner typically needs
to determine which resource owners can be more suited for storing its content.
Examples of such CDN systems can be found in Grid computing systems and
P2P systems. Each such party in a CDN typically has its own access control poli-
cies. The policies of a data owner specify which users can access which data,
among these owned by the data owner, under which conditions. The access con-
trol policies of the resource owners specify conditions for the use of the managed
resources. In large dynamic environments, we cannot expect such policies to be
integrated and harmonized beforehand, also because policies may dynamically
change. Therefore, a subject wishing to run a query has to comply with both the
access control policy associated with the queried data and the access control pol-
icy of the resource to be used to process the query. Because such parties may not
have the same access control policies, in order to maximize the access to the data,
it is important to store the data at the resource owner having access control poli-
cies similar to the access control policies associated with the data. Furthermore,
besides determining the common parts of the access control policies shared by
the data owner and resource owner, the data owner may also be interested in
checking if certain key requests can be successfully handled, if the data were to
be located at a given resource owner. In other words, the data owner may want to
know if the difference among the multiple access control policies has a negative
effect on some important tasks. We now introduce two example policies from the
above scenario.
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Full Professor
Business Office Manager
Dean
Associate Professor
Assistant Professor
Figure 7.1: The Faculty role hierarchy.
Example 7.1 Pol1 (Data Owner): Any user with role the is subsumed by “Full Profes-
sor” is authorized to access the data from 8am to 10pm everyday.
Pol2 (Resource Owner): Any user with role that subsumes “PhD Student” or affiliated
with “Purdue University” is authorized to access the resource from 6am to 8pm every-
day.
With the attribute Role associated with the role hierarchy depicted in Figure
7.1. We assume that the Role attribute is associated to the same ontology. If this
is not the case, the procedures introduced in Chapter 6 are applied.
In order for the data owner to decide whether to store the data at the resource
owner, it is crucial to determine which kinds of requests will be permitted by
both policies and which will not. Because in this case we are dealing with only
two policies, the filtering phase is not required and the policies can be directly
transmitted to the PSA. The PSA then returns the following characterization of
the similarity for the input policies:
• When the role is between “Full Professor” and “PhD Student” and time is
in the range of [8am, 8pm], such requests are permitted by Pol1 and Pol2.
• When the role is subsumed by “Full Professor” and time is in the range of
(8pm, 10pm], such requests are permitted by Pol1, denied by Pol2.
• When affiliation is “Purdue University” and time is in the range of [6am,
8pm], such requests are denied by Pol1, permitted by Pol2.
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• When (the role subsumes “PhD Student” or affiliation is “Purdue Univer-
sity”), and time is in the range of [6am, 8am), such requests are denied by
Pol1, permitted by Pol2.
By using such characterization, the data owner can check if most requests
(or some important requests) are satisfied and then decide whether to send his
data to such resource owner. More specifically, if the data owner knows that
a large percentage of requests are issued during the time interval [8am, 8pm],
sending the data to this resource owner would be a good choice, as both policies
yield same effect for the requests during that time period. If, instead, it is crucial
that the data be also available at other times, the data owner may determine if
there are other resource owners, whose policies are closer to its own, or use some
data replication strategies to make sure that at any point of time there is at least
one resource owner whose policies allow the data queries to be processed. The
data owner may also investigate additional properties concerning the policies:
for example the data owner may also issue queries like “when are the requests
of users with a role that subsumes “PhD Student” permitted by both policies?”.
For such query the PSA will return the time interval in which both policies are
satisfied.
7.3. Prelimary Notions
In our work, we assume the existence of a finite set A of names. Each attribute,
characterizing a subject or a resource or an action or the environment, has a name
a in A, and a domain, denoted by dom(a), of possible values. The following two
definitions introduce the notion of access request and policy semantics.
Definition 7.1 (Access Request) Let a1, a2, . . . , ak be attribute names in policy P,
and let vi ∈ dom(ai) (1 6 i 6 k). r ≡ {(a1, v1), (a2, v2), . . . , (ak, vk)} is a request, and
ePr denotes the effect of this request against P.
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Definition 7.2 (Policy Semantics) Let P be an access control policy. We define the
semantics of P as a 2-tuple {Bpermit, Bdeny}, where Bpermit and Bdeny are Boolean
expressions corresponding to permit and deny rules respectively. Bpermit and Bdeny
are defined as follows.
rs1i =


Bpermit = TP ∧ ((TPR1 ∧ CPR1) ∨ · · ·∨ (TPRk ∧ CPRk))
Bdeny = TP ∧ ((TDR1 ∧ CDR1) ∨ · · ·∨ (TDRj ∧ CDRj))
(7.1)
where, TP denotes a Boolean expression on the attributes of policy target; TPRi and
CPRi (i = 1, . . . , k) denote the Boolean expressions on the attributes of the rule target
and rule condition of permit rule PRi; and TDRi and CDRi (i = 1, .. . . . , j) denote the
Boolean expressions on the attributes of the rule target and rule condition of deny rule
DRi.
Example 7.2 Consider policy Pol2 in Example 7.1. An example of request to which
this policy applies is that of a user affiliated with “Purdue University” wishing to access
the data at 9am. According to Definition 7.1, such request can be expressed as r ≡
{(affiliation, ‘‘PurdueUniversity ′′), (time, 9am)}.
Example 7.3 According to Definition 7.2, policy Pol1 in Example 7.1 can be represented
as follows.
rs1i =


Bpermit = (f
sub(Ok, Role,FullProfessor)) ∧ (8am 6 time 6 10pm)
Bdeny = NULL
The Boolean expressions (B, T and C) that frequently occur in policies can be
broadly classified into the following five categories, as identified in [13] :
• Category 1: One variable equality constraints. x = c, where x is a variable
and c is a constant.
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• Category 2: One variable inequality constraints. x ⊲ c, where x is a vari-
able, c is a constant, and ⊲∈ {<,6, >,>}.
• Category 3: Real valued linear constraints. ∑ni=1aixi ⊲ c, where xi is vari-
able, ai, ci are constants, and ⊲∈ {<,6, >,>}.
• Category 4: Semantic constraints. fsub(Ok, C,D), where Ok is the ontology
with respect to the subsumption relation is checked and C, D are concepts
belonging to Ok;
• Category 5: Regular expression constraints. s ∈ L(r) or s /∈ L(r), where s is
a string variable, and L(r) is the language generated by regular expression
r.
• Category 6: Compound Boolean expression constraints.
This category includes constraints obtained by combining Boolean constraints
belonging to the categories listed above. The combination operators are ∨, ∧ and
¬. By using ¬, we can represent the inequality constraint x 6= c as ¬(x = c). It is
worth noting that Boolean expressions on the attributes of policy targets or rule
targets (TP, TPR) usually belong to Category 1. The domains of the attributes that
appear in the above Boolean expressions belong to one of the following categories
:
• Integer domain : The attribute domains in Boolean expressions of categories
1,2 and 6 can belong to this domain.
• Real domain : The attribute domains in Boolean expressions of categories
1,2,3 and 6 can belong to this domain.
• String domain : The attribute domains in Boolean expressions of categories
1,5 and 6 can belong to this domain.
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• Semantic domain: The attribute domains in Boolean expressions of cate-
gories 4 belong to this domain.
• Tree domain : Each constant of a tree domain is a string, and for any con-
stant in the tree domain, its parent is its prefix (suffix). The X.500 directories,
Internet domain names and XML data are in the tree domain. For example,
an Internet domain constant .edu is the parent of an Internet domain con-
stant purdue.edu. The attribute domains in Boolean expression of categories
1 and 6 can belong to this domain.
We define a query constraint fq as a Boolean function that represents constraints
on a set of requests. Currently, our system supports two types of fq functions and
their combinations: (i) true, which means there is no constraint; (ii) |R| ⊳ x(⊳∈
{<,6,=, 6=, >,>}), where |R| is the number of requests and x is a constant. For
example, |R| > 0 is a query constraint which checks if the corresponding query
returns at least one request.
Note that in the following discussions on query definitions, the Boolean ex-
pression Bqmay belong to any of the five categories mentioned above.
7.4. Policy Filtering
In this section we propose a similarity measure for XACML policies based on
data mining techniques. The same approach have been applied for obtaining
the similarity of policies written in another language: the Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P). This approach is presented in Chapter 8. Concerning XACML,
the proposed policy similarity measure is based on the comparison of each cor-
responding component of the policies being compared. Here, the corresponding
component means the policy targets and the same type of elements belonging to
the rules with the same effect. For this reason we are able to deal also with the
semantic functions that we have introduced in Chapter 5. We use a simplified
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XACML format for defining the policy similarity measure. Each XACML policy
must be converted to this format when calculating the similarity score.
Table 7.1 gives the syntax of the simplified format1. We would like the policy
similarity measure between any two given policies to assign a similarity score
that approximates the relationship between the sets of requests permitted (de-
nied) by the two policies. The similarity score is a value between 0 and 1, which
reflects how similar these rules are with respect to the targets they are applica-
ble to and also with respect to the conditions they impose on the requests. For
example, in a scenario where a set of requests permitted (denied) by a policy P1
is a subset of requests permitted (denied) by a policy P2, the similarity score for
policies P1 and P2 must be higher than the score assigned in a scenario in which
the set of requests permitted (denied) by P1 and P3 have very few or no request
in common.
7.4.1 Computation of the Mapping
In this subsection we proceed to introduce how to obtain the similarity score of
two policies. Given two policies P1 and P2, the rules in these policies are first
grouped according to their effects, which results in a set of Permit Rules (denoted
as PR) and a set Deny Rules (denoted as DR). Each single rule in P1 is then com-
pared with a rule in P2 that has the same effect, and a similarity score of two rules
is obtained. The similarity score obtained between the rules is then used to find
one-many mappings (denoted as Φ) for each rule in the two policies. For clarity,
we choose to use four separate Φ mappings ΦP1, Φ
D
1 , Φ
P
2 and Φ
D
2 . The mapping
ΦP1 (Φ
d
1) maps each PR(DR) rule r1i in P1 with one or more PR(DR) rules r2j in
P2. Similarly the mapping Φ
P
2 (Φ
D
2 ) maps each PR(DR) rule r2j in P2 with one or
more PR(DR) rules r1i in P1. For each rule in a policy P1(P2), theΦmappings give
similar rules in P2(P1) which satisfy certain similarity threshold.
The computation of the Φ mapping will be addressed in the Section 7.4.2. By
1We have already presented this Table in Chapter 2
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POLICY: <policy policy-id = ”policy-id combining-algorithm = ”combining-algorithm >
(TARGET ELEMENT)?
< permitrules >
(RULE ELEMENT)*
</permitrules>
<denyrules>
(RULE ELEMENT)*
</permitrules>
</policy>
RULE ELEMENT:
<rule rule-id=”rule-id effect=”rule-effect>
(TARGET ELEMENT)?
<condition>PREDICATE</condition>
</rule>
TARGET ELEMENT:
<target>
<subject>PREDICATE</subject>
<resource>PREDICATE</resource>
<action>PREDICATE</action>
</target>
PREDICATE:
(attr name ⊕ (attr value)+)*
attr name denotes attribute name, attr value denotes attribute value and
⊕ denotes any operator supported by the XACML standard.
Table 7.1: A XACML policy structure.
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using the Φ mappings, we compute the similarity score between a rule and a
policy. We aim to find out how similar a rule is with respect to the entire policy
by comparing the single rule in one policy with a set of similar rules in the other
policy. The notation rs1i(rs2j) denotes the similarity score for a rule r1i(r2j) in
policy P1(P2). The rule similarity score rs1i(rs2j) is the average of the similarity
scores between a rule r1i(r2j) and the rules similar to it given by the Φ mapping.
rs1i and rs2j are computed according to Equations 7.2 and 7.3, where Srule is a
function that assigns a similarity score between two rules.
Next, we compute the similarity score between the permit(deny) rule sets
PR1 (DR1) and PR2(DR2) of policies P1 and P2 respectively. We use the notations
SPrule−set and S
D
rule−set to denote the similarity scores for permit and deny rule sets
respectively. The similarity score for a permit(deny) rule set is obtained by aver-
aging the rule similarity scores (Equations 7.2 and 7.3) for all rules in the set. The
permit and deny rule set similarity scores are formulated by Equation 7.4 and 7.5,
where NPR1 and NPR2 are the numbers of rules in PR1 and PR2 respectively, NDR1
and NDR2 are the numbers of rules in DR1 and DR2 respectively.
rs1i =


∑
rj∈Φ
P
1
(r1i)
Srule(r1i, rj)
| ΦP1(r1i) |
, r1i ∈ PR1∑
rj∈Φ
P
1
(r1i)
Srule(r1i, rj)
| ΦD1 (r1i) |
, r1i ∈ DR1
(7.2)
rs2j =


∑
ri∈Φ
P
2
(r1j)
Srule(r2j, ri)
| ΦP2(r2j) |
, r2j ∈ PR2∑
ri∈Φ
D
2
(r2j)
Srule(r2j, ri)
| ΦD2 (r2j) |
, r2j ∈ DR2
(7.3)
SPrule−set =
NPR1∑
i=1
rs1i+
NPR2∑
i=1
rs2j
NPR1 +NPR2
(7.4)
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SPrule−set =
NPR1∑
i=1
rs1i+
NPR2∑
i=1
rs2j
NPR1 +NPR2
(7.5)
Finally, we combine the similarity scores for permit and deny rule sets be-
tween the two policies along with a similarity score between the Target elements
of the two policies, to develop an overall similarity score, Spolicy. The formulation
of Spolicy is given by the following equation:
Spolicy(P1, P2) = wTST(P1, P2) +wpS
P
rule−set+wdS
D
rule−set (7.6)
where ST is a function that computes a similarity score between the Target
elements of any two given policies; wp and wd are weights that can be chosen to
reflect the relative importance to be given to the similarity of permit and deny
rule sets respectively. For normalization purpose, the weight values should sat-
isfy the constraint: wT + wp + wd = 1. The intuition behind the similarity score
assigned to any two policies is derived from the fact that two policies are sim-
ilar to one another when the corresponding policy elements are similar. In the
following sections, we introduce the detailed algorithms for the computation of
Φ mappings and rule similarity score Srule. Table 7.4.1 lists main notations used
throughout this section.
7.4.2 Computation of ΦMappings
In this section, we discuss the procedure for determining the Φ mappings for
each rule in the permit and deny rule sets in a policy. The one-manyΦmappings
determine for each PR(DR) rule in P1(P2) which PR(DR) rules in P2(P1) are very
similar. Intuitively, two rules are similar when their targets and the conditions
they specify are similar. Thus we define a Φmapping as follows:
Φ(ri) = {rj | Srule(ri, rj) > ǫ} (7.7)
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Notation Meaning
P Policy
PR Permit rule set
DR Deny rule set
r Rule
a Attribute
v Attribute value
H Height of a hierarchy
Spolicy Similarity score of two policies
Srule Similarity score of two rules
SPrule−set Similarity score of two sets of permit rules
SDrule−set Similarity score of two sets of deny rules
S〈Element〉 Similarity score of elements, 〈Element〉 ∈
{ ′T ′, ′ t ′, ′ c ′, ′ s ′, ′ r ′, ′ a ′}
scat Similarity score of two categorical values
Scat Similarity score of two categorical predicates
snum Similarity score of two numerical values
Snum Similarity score of two numerical predicates
rs Similarity score between a rule and a policy
Φ Rule mapping
Ma Set of pairs of matching attribute names
Mv Set of pairs of matching attribute values
NPR Number of permit rules in a policy
NDR Number of deny rules in a policy
Na Number of attributes in an element
Nv Number of values of an attribute
SPath Length of shortest path of two categorical values
w〈Elementi〉 Weight of similarity scores of elements,
〈Elementi〉 ∈ { ′T ′, ′ t ′, ′ c ′, ′ s ′, ′ r ′, ′ a ′}
ǫ Rule similarity threshold
δ Compensating score for unmatched values
Table 7.2: Notations.
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where Srule is computed by Equation 7.8 and ǫ is a threshold. The threshold
term is important here, since it allows us to calibrate the quality of the similarity
approximation. We expect that the actual value of the threshold will be very
specific to the policy domain. This procedure takes two rule sets R′ and R′′ as
input and computes a mapping for each rule in R′ based on Equation 7.7.
7.4.3 Similarity Score between Rules
Since our similarity measure serves as a lightweight filter phase, we do not want
to involve complicated analysis of Boolean expressions. Our similarity measure
is developed based on the intuition that rules ri and rj are similar when both
apply to similar targets and both specify similar conditions on request attributes.
Specifically, we compute the rule similarity function Srule between two rules ri
and rj as follows:
Srule(ri, rj) = wtSt(ri, rj) +wcSc(ri, rj) (7.8)
wt and wc are weights that can be used for emphasizing the importance of
the target or condition similarity respectively. For example, if users are more
interested in finding policies applied to similar targets, they can increase wt to
achieve this goal. The weights satisfy the constraint wt + wc = 1. St and Sc
are functions that compute a similarity score between two rules based on the
comparison of their Target and Condition elements respectively. As the Target
element in each rule contains the Subject, Resource and Action elements, each of
these elements in turn contains predicates on the respective category of attributes.
Thus, the Target similarity function St is computed as follows:
St(ri, rj) = wsSs(ri, rj) +wrSr(ri, rj) +waSa(ri, rj) (7.9)
In Equation 7.9, ws, wr, wa represent weights that are assigned to the corre-
sponding similarity scores. Like in the previous equations, weight values need to
satisfy the constraint ws + wr + wa = 1. Ss, Sr and Sa are functions that return
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a similarity score based on the Subject, Resource and Action attribute predicates
respectively in the Target elements of the two given rules. The computation of
functions Sc, Ss, Sr and Sa involves the comparison of pairs of predicates in the
given pair of rule elements, which we discuss in detail in the next subsection.
7.4.4 Similarity Score of Rule Elements
Each of the rule elements Subject, Resource, Action and Condition is represented
as a set of predicates in the form of {attr name1⊕1 attr value1, attr name2⊕2
attr value2, . . .}, where attr name denotes the attribute name,⊕ denotes a com-
parison operator and attr value represents an attribute value. Based on the type
of attribute values, predicates are divided into two categories, namely categorical
predicate and numerical predicate.
• Categorical predicate: The attribute values of this type of predicate belong
to the string data type and semantic functions. In case of String data type
such values may or may not be associated with a domain specific ontology.
Attribute values that belong to semantic functions are always associated
with an ontology. If values are associated with more than one ontology,
the techniques introduced in Chpater 6 are applied. Example of predicates
that belong to categorical predicates are “FileType = Documentation” and
“fsub(Ok, Role, FullProfessor)”.
• Numerical predicate: The attribute values of this type of predicate belong
to integer, real, or date/time data types. For example, predicates ”FileSize
< 10MB”, ”Time=12:00” are of numerical type.
The similarity score between two rules ri and rj regarding the same element
is denoted as S〈Element〉, where 〈Element〉 refers to condition, subject, resource or
action. The 〈Element〉 is computed by comparing the corresponding predicate
sets in two rules. There are three steps. First, we cluster the predicates for each
rule element according to the attribute names. It is worth noting that one attribute
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name may be associated with multiple values. Second, we find the predicates in
the two rules whose attribute names match exactly and then proceed to compute
a similarity score for their attribute values. The way we compute similarity score
between attribute values differs, depending on whether the attribute value is of
categorical type or numerical type (details about the computation are covered
in the following subsection). Finally, we summarize the scores of each pair of
matching predicates and obtain the similarity score of the rule element. Since not
all attributes in one rule can find a matching in the other, we include a penalty
for this case by dividing the sum of similarity scores of matching pairs by the
maximum number of attributes in a rule. In addition, there is a special case when
the element set is empty in one rule, which means no constraint exists for this
element. For this case, we consider the similarity of the elements of the two rules
to be 0.5 due to the consideration that one rule is a restriction of the other and the
0.5 is the estimation of the average similarity. The formal definition of S〈Element〉
is given by Equation 7.10.
S〈Element〉 =


∑
(a1k,a2l)∈Ma
S〈attr typ〉(a1k, a2l)
max(Na1, Na2)
, Na1 > 0 and na2 > 0;
1, otherwise.
(7.10)
In Equation 7.10,Ma is a set of pairs of matching predicates with the same at-
tribute names; a1k and a2l are attributes of rules r1i and r2j respectively; 〈attr typ〉
is the similarity score of attribute values of the type attr typ; and Na1 and Na2
are the numbers of distinct predicates in the two rules respectively. In addition,
the computation of the similarity score of two policy targets ST is the same as that
for the rule targets i.e. St.
7.4.5 Similarity Score for Categorical Predicates
For the categorical values, we not only consider the exact match of two values,
but also consider their semantic similarity. For example, policy P1 is talking about
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Figure 7.2: An Example Hierarchy
the priority of professors, policy P2 is talking about faculty members, and policy
P3 is talking about business staff. In some sense, policy P1 is more similar to
policy P2 than to policy P3 because “professors” is a subset of ”faculty members”
which means that policy P1 could be a restriction of policy P2. Based on this
observation, our approach assumes that a hierarchy relationship exists for the
categorical values. The similarity between two categorical values (denoted as
Scat) is then defined according to the shortest path of these two values in the
hierarchy. The formal definition is shown below:
Scat(v1, v2) = 1−
SPath(v1, v2)
2H
(7.11)
where SPath(v1, v2) denotes the length of the shortest path between two val-
ues v1 and v2, and H is the height of the hierarchy. In Equation 7.11, the length
of the shortest path of two values is normalized by the possible maximum path
length which is 2H. The closer the two values are located in the hierarchy, the
more similar the two values will be, and hence a higher similarity score scat will
be obtained. Figure 4.1 gives an example hierarchy, where each node represents
a categorical value.
The height of the hierarchy is 3, and the length ofmaximumpath of two values
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is estimated as 2 3 = 6 (the actual maximum path in the figure is 5 due to the
imbalance of the hierarchy). SPath(E,B) is 1 and SPath(E,F) is 2. According
to Equation 7.11, the similarity score of nodes E and B is 1-1/6 = 0.83, and the
similarity score of nodes E and F is 1 − 2/6 = 0.67. From the obtained scores,
we can observe that E is more similar to B than to F. The underlying idea is that
the parent-child relationship (B and E) implies that one rule could be a restriction
of the other and this would be more helpful than the sibling relationship (E and
F). To avoid repeatedly searching the hierarchy tree for the same value during
the shortest path computation, we assign to each node a hierarchy code (Hcode),
indicating the position of each node. In particular, the root node is assigned an
Hcode equal to 1, and its children nodes are named in the order from left to right
by appending their position to the parents Hcode with a separator ., where we
will have Hcodes like 1.1 and 1.2. Then the process continues till the leaf level.
The number of elements separated by . is equal to the level at which a node is
located.
From such Hcodes we can easily compute the length of shortest path between
two nodes. We compare twoHcodes element by element until we reach the end of
one Hcode or there is a difference. The common elements correspond to the same
parent nodes they share, and the number of different elements correspond to the
levels that they need to be generalized to their common parent node. Therefore,
the shortest path is the total number of different elements in two Hcodes. For
example, the length of the shortest path from node 1.1 to 1.2 is 2, as there are
two different elements in the Hcodes. Note that our definition of scat can also be
applied to categorical values which do not lie in a hierarchy. In that case, if two
values are matched, their shortest path SPath is 0 and their similarity score will
be 1; otherwise, SPath is infinity and their similarity score becomes 0. Having in-
troduced our approach to compare two single values, we now extend the discus-
sion to two sets of values. Suppose there are two attributes a1 : {v11, v12, v13, v14}
and a2 : {v21, v22, v23}, where a1 and a2 are the attribute names belonging to policy
P1 and P2 respectively, and the values in the brackets are corresponding attribute
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values. Note that the values associated with the same attribute are different from
one another. The similarity score of the two attribute value sets is the sum of
similarity scores of pairs 〈v1k, v2l〉 and a compensating score δ (for non-matching
attribute values). Obviously, there could be many combinations of pairs. Our
task is to find a set of pairs (denoted asMv) which have the following properties:
1. If v1k = v2l, then (v1k, v2l) ∈Mv.
2. For pairs v1k 6= v2l, pairs contributing to the maximum sum of similarity
scores belong toMv.
3. Each attribute value v1k or v2l occurs at most once inMv.
The process of finding the pair set Mv is the following. First, we obtain the
hierarchy code for each attribute value. Then we compute the similarity between
pairs of attribute values with the help of the hierarchy code. Next, we pick up ex-
actly matched pairs, which are 〈v11, v21〉 and 〈v14, v23〉 in the example. For the re-
maining attribute values, we find pairs that maximize the sum of similarity scores
of pairs. In this example, 〈v12, v22〉 has the same similarity score as 〈v13, v22〉, and
hence we need to further consider which choice can lead to a bigger compensat-
ing score.
The compensating score δ is for attribute values which do not have matchings
when two attributes have different number of values. δ is computed as average
similarity scores between unmatched values with all the values of the other at-
tribute. For this example, no matter which pair we choose, the compensating
score is the same. Suppose we choose the pair 〈v12, v22〉, and then one value v13
is left whose compensating score δ is (0.33+0.67+0.17)/3 = 0.39. Finally, the simi-
larity score for the two attribute a1 and a2 takes into account both the similarity
of attribute names and attribute values. Specifically, the similarity score for at-
tribute names is 1 as the exact matching of names is used. The similarity score for
attribute values is the average scores of pairs and the compensating score. The
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final score is 1
2
[1 + (1 + 1 + 0.67 + 0.39)/4] = 0.88. The similarity score of two
categorical predicates is finally defined as below:
Scat(a1, a2) =
1
2
[
1+
∑
(v1k,v2l)∈Mv
scat(v1k, v2l) + δ
max(Nv1, Nv2)
]
(7.12)
δ =


∑
(v1k,−)/∈Mv
Nv2∑
l=1
scat(v1k, v2l)
Nv2
, Nv1 > Nv2
∑
−,(v2l)/∈Mv
Nv1∑
k=1
scat(v1k, v2l)
Nv1
, Nv2 > Nv1
(7.13)
where Nv1 and Nv2 are the total numbers of values associated with attributes
a1 and a2 respectively.
7.4.6 Similarity Score for Numerical Predicates
Unlike categorical values, numerical values do not have any hierarchical relation-
ship. For computation efficiency, the similarity of two numerical values v1 and v2
is defined based on their difference as shown in Equation 7.14.
snum(v1, v2) = 1−
| v1− v2 |
range(v1, v2)
(7.14)
snum tends to be large when the difference between two values is small. The
computation of the similarity score of two numerical value sets is similar to that
for two categorical value sets; we thus have the following similarity definition for
numerical predicates:
Snum(a1, a2) =
1
2
[
1+
∑
(v1k,v2l)∈Mv
scat(v1k, v2l) + δ
max(Nv1, Nv2)
]
(7.15)
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δ =


∑
(v1k,−)/∈Mv
Nv2∑
l=1
snum(v1k, v2l)
Nv2
, Nv1 > Nv2
∑
−,(v2l)/∈Mv
Nv1∑
k=1
snum(v1k, v2l)
Nv1
, Nv2 > Nv1
(7.16)
7.5. Policy Similarity Analyzer
In this Section we present the core analysis services provided by EXAM-S. In this
section we exploit a modified version of MTBDDs in which we allow to label
nodes with Description Logic predicates. This allow us to analyze a large va-
riety of policies: (i) policies with standard functions, (ii) policies with semantic
functions, and (iii) policies with both standard and semantic functions. The sec-
tion is organized as follows. Section 7.5.1 presents our query processing Strategy.
Subsections 7.5.1 and 7.5.1 discusses respectively the policy preprocessor and the
ratification module. Subsection 7.5.1 describe the approach based on MTBDDs
whereas in Subsection 7.5.2 we introduce how to execute queries on the model
we have defined.
7.5.1 Query Processing Strategy
For the purposes of this Section, Policies are nothing but Boolean formulae (or
constraints) on attributes. The problem of analyzing policies is then translated
into the problem of analyzing Boolean formulae. The main task of the PSA mod-
ule is to determine all variable assignments that can satisfy the Boolean formulae
corresponding to one or more policies, and also variable assignments that lead to
different decisions for different policies. The Policy Similarity Analyzer module
(PSA) uses the ratification module to preprocess the Boolean formulae, and then
constructs a MTBDD for each policy and a CMTBDD (change-analysis MTBDD)
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for each pair of policies to be compared. In order to deal with the semantic func-
tion introduced in Chapter 5 we create an MTBDD which nodes labeled with the
ontology predicates involved int the policies. Queries on a single policy are car-
ried out on the MTBDD of the policy being queried, whereas queries on multiple
policies are carried out on the CMTBDD of corresponding policies.
The technique used for queries on a single policy is a special case of the tech-
nique used for queries on multiple policies; thus we only describe the most gen-
eral technique. It is worth noting that our query processing algorithm applies
to all types of queries on multiple policies. Such algorithm includes two main
phases. The first phase is the construction of the MTBDD and CMTBDD data
structures. Because the MTBDDs and CMTBDDs can be reused for different
queries, thus, once these structures are generated, they are cached in the policy
repository. When such structures are already in the cache, the first phase of the
algorithm reduces to fetching the structures from the cache. The second phase is
related to specific queries, and in turn consists of three steps. The first step pre-
processes the query, the second step constructs the query MTBDD and performs
model checking, and the final step performs some postprocessing. We describe
the details of each phase in the following subsection.
Policy Prepocessor
Given a set of input policies, the first step is to translate these policies expressed
in XACML into Boolean expressions. Another task of the policy preprocessor is
to identify the type of Boolean expressions for all variables in the policies. There
are two steps. First, Boolean expressions of the same variables in all policies are
clustered. Second, in each cluster, the type of the Boolean expressions is checked.
In particular, for a variable x, if the Boolean expressions containing x all belong
to category 1, this cluster of Boolean expressions will be labeled category 1; if
the Boolean expressions of x belong to either category 1 or 2, the cluster will
be labeled category 2; if there is at least one Boolean expression of x belongs
to category 3 or 5, the cluster will be labeled category 3 or 5 respectively. If a
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variable appears in a semantic function then it is labeled with category 4. It is
worth noting that, since a semantic function parameter is an entity that belong to
an ontology, is not possible to have a variable that belong to category 4 and to the
other categories at the same time. Note that we do not need to take special care
of Boolean expressions of category 6 since they are just combinations of previous
types of Boolean expressions and such combinations are naturally reflected by
the MTBDD structure. The labeled Boolean expressions are finally sent to the
ratification module for further processing.
Ratification Module
The ratification module has two main tasks. First, it needs to generate unified
nodes for all the policies. Second, it needs to generate auxiliary rules for ad-
ditional constraints introduced by the node unification and domain check. The
unified nodes and auxiliary rules will later be consumed by the MTBDDmodule.
We now proceed to discuss how the ratification module handles various types
of Boolean expressions. The Boolean expressions of category 1 can be directly
treated as nodes of the formN(f(x)) by theMTBDDmodule, whereN is the name
of the node and f(x) is the Boolean expression of x. To generate unified nodes for
the Boolean expressions of category 2, i.e. one variable inequality constraints, we
need to first find the disjoint domain ranges of the same variable occurring in
different policies. Assume that the original domains of a variable x are [d−1 , d
+
1 ],
[d−2 , d
+
2 ], . . . , [d
−
n, d
+
n], where the superscript ’-’ and ’+’ denote lower and upper
bound respectively, d−i can be −∞, and d+i can be +∞ can be (1 6 i 6 n). We
sort the domain bounds in an ascending order, and then employ a plane sweep-
ing technique which scans the sorted domain bounds from left to right and keeps
the ranges of two neighbor bounds if the ranges are covered in the original do-
main. The obtained disjoint ranges: [d′−1 , d
′+
1 ], [d
′−
2 , d
′+
2 ], . . . , [d
′−
m, d
′+
m] satisfy the
following three conditions.
1. d−i , d
+
i ∈ D,D = {d−1 , d+1 , . . . d−n, d+n}.
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2.
⋃m
i=1[d
′−
i , d
′+
i ] =
⋃n
j=1[d
−
j , d
+
j ].
3.
⋂m
i=1[d
′−
i , d
′+
i ] = ∅.
It is easy to prove that m is at most 4n − 2. After having obtained disjoint
domain ranges, all related Boolean functions are rewritten by using new domain
ranges. Specifically, an original Boolean function d′−j ⊳ x ⊳ d
+
j (1 6 j 6 n,⊳∈
{<,6}) is reformatted as
∨k
i=1 (d
′−
i ⊳ x ⊳ d
+
i ), where
⋃m
i=1[d
′−
i , d
′+
i ] =
⋃n
j=1[d
−
j , d
+
j ].
Then, the ratification module generates unified nodes in the form of N(f(x)),
where f(x) is an inequality function in the form of d′−i ⊳ x ⊳ d
+
i .
Example
Pol3: (x1 < 10 ∧ x1 + x2 < 20), Pol4: (x2 < 10 ∨ x1 + x2 > 10). We can see that
there are two conjunctions containing linear constraints:
(x1 < 10∧ x2 < 10∨ x1+ x2 < 20)
(x1 < 10∧ x1+ x2 < 20∨ x1+ x2 > 10).
We adopt a similar approach for the ratification of Boolean expression belong-
ing to category 4, i.e. semantic functions. In this case we need to find disjoint
ranges of classes associated to the same attribute name. Given a variable x we
create the set [c−1 , c
+
1 ], [c
−
2 , c
+
2 ] where the superscripts assume the same meaning
as defined above. Each [c−i , c
+
i ] represents classes in the ontology specified in
the semantic function. Lower and Upper bounds are respectively owl : Nothing
and owl : Thing. Then we calculate disjoint ranges applying the same algorithm
proposed for category 2.
Example
Consider as example the following semantic functions:
1. subConceptOf(Attr− id,D)
2. superConceptOf(Attr− id,D ′)
Where D and D ′ are organized in the ontology Ok as follows: D ⊑ D ′. After
the ratification of the variable Cwe obtain the set of ranges:
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[owl : Nothing, D], [D,D ′], [D ′,owl : Thing]
Next, we introduce the processing of Boolean functions of category 3, i.e. real
value linear constraints. Given a linear constraint in the form of f(x1, . . . , xk), we
need to consider it togetherwith other constraints containing variables x1, . . . , xk
in all policies. Consider, for example, the following two Boolean expressions of
two policies. The ratification module will check if each conjunction can be satis-
fied. Sometimes linear constraints can be reduced to and processed in the same
way as Boolean expressions of category 1 or 2, such as the first conjunction which
can be reduced to (x1 < 10 ∧ x2 < 10). For other cases, the ratification mod-
ule generates a node for each linear constraint and an auxiliary rule to indicate
whether there is a solution. If there is a solution, the effect of the rule will be con-
ditional permit, where conditional means the function is satisfied in certain cases.
Otherwise, the effect of the rule will be not applicable. Note that the number of
such conjunctions containing linear constraints is usually very small in real poli-
cies, though the disjunctive form of a formula may become exponentially larger
than the original formula. For the Boolean function of category 5, i.e., regular
expression constraints, finite automata techniques are used to determine satisfia-
bility [41]. An auxiliary rule is then generated to indicate the satisfiability, in the
similar way as that for the Boolean function of category 3.
Finally, we will introduce how to construct auxiliary rules for the domain con-
straint. For a variable x in the integer, real or string domain, an auxiliary rule is
generated to indicate that each time only one node of x can be assigned the value
true. In other words, this rule tells the MTBDD module that each variable can
only have one value or belong to one disjoint range during each round of the
assessment. An example is shown in Figure 7.5.1. For a variable x in the tree
domain, we collect all its values appearing in the policies. For values along the
same path in the tree, an auxiliary rule is needed to guarantee that if a variable
cannot be assigned a certain value, then none of its children value can be satis-
fied. For example, suppose there are two constraints, domain = .edu and domain =
purdue.edu. The auxiliary rule will state that if the node of domain=.edu is false, the
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node of domain=purdue.edu should also be false.
MTBDDModule
The MTBDD represents policies as rooted, directed acyclic graphs whose internal
nodes represent Boolean predicates on policy attributes and whose terminals de-
note policy decisions, i.e. Permit, Deny and Not Applicable. MTBDDs are the same
as BDDs (Binary Decision Diagrams) except that they can have more than two
types of terminal nodes as compared to BDDs which have only 0 or 1 terminals.
While in the worst case the number of nodes in an MTBDD is exponential in the
number of variables, in practice the number of nodes is often polynomial or even
linear [35]. So far, we have obtained all inputs for the MTBDD module:
1. unified nodes;
2. reformatted Boolean expressions;
3. auxiliary rules;
We proceed now to present the construction procedure used by the MTBDD
module. First, the MTBDD module constructs the MTBDD for each policy ac-
cording to the reformatted Boolean expression. Then, the MTBDD module com-
bines the MTBDDs of policies to be compared and constructs the corresponding
initial CMTBDD. Note that our system currently only support CMTBDD con-
structed from two policies. For multiple policies, we need to construct CMTBDD
for each pair of policies to be compared and then aggregate the analysis results.
Next, the auxiliary rules are applied to the initial CMTBDD. When the effect of
the rule is permit, the terminal function follows the original CMTBDD. When the
effect of the rule is conditional permit, the terminal function changes its origi-
nal decision to conditional decision, e.g., permit will be changed to conditional
permit. When the effect of the rule is not applicable, the corresponding terminal
function changes to not applicable. Since each MTBDD has five terminals, i.e.,
Permit, Deny, ConditionalPermit, ConditionalDeny, NotApplicable, a CMTBDD has
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twenty-five terminals, one for each ordered pair of results from the policies be-
ing compared (such as Permit-to-Permit, Permit-to-deny). Here, we can see that
our CMTBDD has two more types of terminals indicating conditional permit(CP)
and conditional deny(CD) than that in [35]. The CMTBDD contains comparison
results of the associated policies which is then used for various types of queries.
Algorithm 6 summarizes the construction procedure followed by the PSA mod-
ule.
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Algorithm 6: MTBDD CMTBDD Construction
Input:
Pi: Pi is a policy and 1 6 i 6 n
Output:
CMTBDD(Pi): The CMTBDD associated with policy Pi
(1) BF= Translate Policy To Boolean Formulae(P1, P2, · · · , Pn);
(2) FOR EACH variable bfi ∈ BF
(3) [f1(x), · · · , fn(x)]← atomic Boolean expressions with x;
(4) IF every fi(x)(1 6 i 6 n) belongs to category 1
(5) construct node N(fi(x));
(6) ELSE
(7) IF fi(x)(1 6 i 6 n) belongs to category 2
(8) compute disjoint domains of x;
(9) convert every fi(x) to f
′
i(x) by using new domains;
(10) construct node N(f ′i(x));
(11) construct an auxiliary rule;
(12) ELSE
(13) IF fi(x)(1 6 i 6 n) belongs to category 4
(14) compute disjoint domains of x;
(15) convert every fi(x) to f
′
i(x) by using new domains;
(16) construct node N(f ′i(x));
(17) construct an auxiliary rule;
(18) ELSE
(19) IF fi(x)(1 6 i 6 n) belongs to category 3, 5
(20) construct an auxiliary rule;
(21) construct anMTBDD for each policy;
(22) construct anMTBDD for each auxiliary rule;
(23) CMTBDD = combine(MTBDDi);
(24) combine the CMTBDD with auxiliary rules;
(25) returnMTBDD CMTBDD.
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To illustrate the above steps, let us consider again the Example 1 but this
time from the system’s perspective. Policy Pol1 and Pol2 are first translated into
Boolean formulae. There are three variables occurring in these policies, namely
domain, time and affiliation.
Pol1 = (f
sub(Role, FullProfessor)) ∧ (8 6 time 6 22)
Pol2 = (f
sup(Role, PhDStudent) ∨ affiliation = ‘‘PurdueUniversity ′′) ∧ (6 6
time 6 20)
For the variable domain and affiliation, whose Boolean expressions belong to
the first category, the preprocessor generate the node a(affiliation = ‘‘PurdueUniversity ′′),
and sends the node to the MTBDDmodule. For the Boolean formulae of variable
time and role which belong to categories 2 and 4 respectively, the preprocessor
sends them to the ratification module. The ratification module computes the
disjoint range of the variable time and obtain three nodes: t1(6 6 time < 8),
t2(8 6 time 6 20), t3(20 < time 6 22). For the variable Role the following nodes
are obtained:
r1(f
sup(Role, owl : Nothing), fsub(Role, PhDStudent))
r2(f
sup(Role, PhDStudent), fsub(Role, FullProfessor))
r3(f
sup(Role, FullProfessor), fsub(Role, owl : Thing))
Correspondingly, Pol1 and Pol2 are rewritten as:
Pol1 = (r1 ∨ r2) ∧ (t2 ∨ t3)
Pol2 = (r2 ∨ r3 ∨ a) ∧ (t1 ∨ t3)
By taking the unified nodes and new Boolean formulae as inputs, the MTBDD
module first constructs the MTBDD for each policy and auxiliary rules (as shown
in Figures 7.3(a), 7.3(b) and 7.4(a), 7.4(b)). Then it combines these MTBDDs into
a CMTBDD (a section of the resulting CMTBDD is shown in Figure 7.5). In the
following subsection, we show how the CMTBDD is used to execute our analysis
queries.
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Figure 7.3: MTBDD of policies.
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Figure 7.4: MTBDD for the auxiliary rules.
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Figure 7.5: CMTBDD.
7.5.2 Query Processing
Recall that each query has three types of components, Bq, eq and fq, where Bq is a
Boolean expression onAttrq, eq is the desired effect and fq is a constraint on a set
of attributes. For a given query, first we normalize itsBq, map the specified ranges
of attributes to the existing unified nodes, and represent the specified ranges as
corresponding unified nodes. Then, we construct the query MTBDD. Here, we
can treat the normalized Bq and effect eq in a query as a rule, and then construct
the MTBDD for it. Now consider a query in we would like to know all the possi-
ble requests allowed for a role that is subsumed by “PhD Student”. Such request
can be translated as “given fsup(Role, PhDStudent), Decision = permit, find all
possible requests”. Figure 7.6 shows the corresponding query MTBDD. After we
obtained the query MTBDD, we combine it with the MTBDD or CMTBDD of
the policies being queries, where we obtain a temporary structure called Query
CMTBDD. By using the model checking technique on the Query CMTBDD, we
are now able to find the requests satisfying the Aq and eq. As for the example
query, we just need to find all paths in the Query CMTBDD which leads to the
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N P
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r1
Figure 7.6: Query MTBDD.
terminal named “P-P”. Note that for conditional decisions, the nodes along the
path may need to be examined by plugging the specific variable values.
As for the policy queries with an empty set of Bq, such as the policy relation-
ship evaluation queries, the processing is even simpler. We only need to check
the terminals of the CMTBDD. For example, to check if two policies are equiva-
lent, we check whether there exist only three terminals containing “P-P”, “D-D”
and “N-N”, which means two policies always yield same effects for incoming
requests. Finally, a post-processing may be required if there are constraints speci-
fied by fq. This step is straightforward since we only need to execute some simple
examinations on the requests obtained from the previous step. The results will
then be collected and organized by the result analyzer before being presented to
the user.
Chapter 8
P3P Similarity
In this section we provide some results about the application of the data-mining
approach developed in Section 7.4 for P3P privacy policies. In Section 8.1 we pro-
vide some background information about P3P. We define the similarity function
in Sections 8.2 and . We discuss the meaning of a clustering approach for P3P
policies in Section 8.4. Finally, in Section 8.5, we report details about the experi-
mental evaluation.
8.1. P3P
The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) enables Web sites to express
their privacy practices in a standard format that can be retrieved automatically
and interpreted easily by user agents [23]. P3P user agents will allow users to be
informed of site practices (in both machine- and human-readable formats) and
to automate decision-making based on these practices when appropriate. Thus
users need not read the privacy policies at every site they visit.
With the widespread use of web services, a wide range of personal informa-
tion from personal hobby, shopping history to driver license and social security
number can be collected by the service providers. There is no doubt that the mis-
use of such personal information can cause problems like receiving tons of junk
mails and suffering from identity theft. To address the concerns about personal
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information privacy, the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) is proposed as a
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) standard for expressing privacy policies of
a website. P3P can help balance the web service providers need for information
to provide consumers with desired services and each individuals privacy prefer-
ences. P3P version 1.0 specifies a protocol for user agents to locate P3P policies
on websites and a syntax for compact policies sent in HTTP response headers. A
format is specified for policy reference files that indicate the location of P3P poli-
cies on a website and the parts of the website to which they apply. Compact P3P
policies is a summary of the sites privacy policy transmitted as a series of tokens
in a P3P HTTP header along with a cookie. Its main purpose to enable the web
browser to make a quick decision about whether to accept a cookie. In addition,
the P3P1.0 recommendation also specifies an XML syntax for privacy policies. In
what follows, we will describe the XML syntax in some detail.
A P3P policy consists of an Entity element(<ENTITY>) which is used to pro-
vide the name and contact information for thewebsite, anAccess element(<ACCESS>)
which indicates whether the site provides access to various kinds of information,
a Disputes(<DISPUTES>) which describes dispute resolution procedures and one
or more Statement elements (<STATEMENT>). The Statement element is the most
important component of the policy in that it specifies the data and the type of
information collected (<DATA> and <CATEGORIES> elements) along with how
the information may be used (<PURPOSE> element), how the information may
be shared (<RECIPIENT> element) and the associated data retention policies
(<RETENTION> element). Each of these elements may contain elements chosen
from a predefined set of options, although human readable fields are also pro-
vided for detailed explanations. In addition, the Purpose and Recipient elements
may be associated with a required attribute to indicate whether the correspond-
ing elements are always required or opt-in/opt-out policies apply. The <DATA>
element is associated with an optional attribute to indicate if the user is required
to provide this data. As an example, consider an online business “OnlineStore”.
Their website collects basic information about a visitors computer/connection
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for administration purposes and aggregate information about visited pages for
improving the site. They do not collect identifiable data and they purge any col-
lected within two weeks. Visitors can contact an independent agency “Foo” re-
garding disputes and will correct any wrongful errors or actions. The P3P policy
corresponding to their privacy practices is given in Table 8.1.
8.2. P3P Similarity Measure
P3P policies represents another domain that is suitable for applying our similar-
ity measure. Though many websites nowadays implement P3P policies [28], it is
still a headache for consumers to read a long policy literally and fully understand
it. Therefore, our goal is to develop a more convenient approach that provides
an overview of web service providers privacy practices by ranking all available
web services and displaying them in a descending order of the percentage of the
difference between the P3P policy and the user privacy concerns. On the other
hand, from the view of a service provider, a newweb service provider would like
to have a good P3P policy that can address most consumers privacy concerns. To
obtain the knowledge of common privacy concerns of consumers, the web service
provider may need to survey other websites providing similar services and study
their P3P policies. In such case, a meta policy or a policy writing guideline for
certain type of websites will be very helpful and can save a lot of efforts for a new
service provider. In addition, for web service providers looking for potential col-
laborators, they also need to make sure that their P3P policies are similar so that
their collaboration will not affect their existing customers privacy preferences.
Aims at achieving the above goals, we propose a novel and efficient approach
to quantify the difference between P3P policies. The basic idea is to assign a
similarity score to two P3P policies by summarizing the similarity between each
corresponding component in the two policies. The obtained similarity score can
be used to rank websites as well as clustering P3P policies. Clustering is an im-
portant technique for discovering interesting data patterns and policy clustering
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<POLICY name=”StorePolicy” discuri=”...” xml:lang=”en”>
<ENTITY>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref=”# business.name”>OnlineStore
</DATA>
</DATA-GROUP>
</ENTITY>
<ACCESS><nonident/></ACCESS>
<DISPUTES-GROUP>
<DISPUTES resolution-type=”independent” service=”Foo”/>
<REMEDIES><correct/></REMEDIES>
</DISPUTES>
</DISPUTES-GROUP>
<STATEMENT>
<PURPOSE><admin/><develop/></PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><stated-purpose/></RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref=”# dynamic.clickstream”/>
<DATA ref=”# dynamic.http”/>
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
</POLICY>
Table 8.1: An Example P3P Policy.
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will help to understand the most common statements in policies which helps to
find meta-policies or policy writing guidelines for different types of organiza-
tions. Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We have identified two interesting and important problems. The first prob-
lem is helping a consumer quickly select a suitable web service that satisfy
his privacy concerns from a long list of available web services. The second
problem is helping new web service providers write good P3P policies that
can cover most consumers privacy concerns.
• We have proposed an efficient approach for comparing P3P policies and
also applied it to clustering P3P policies.
• We have carried out a set of experimental studies which demonstrate both
efficiency and effectiveness of our approach.
8.3. P3P Policy Similarity Measure
In this section we apply the similarity measure defined for XACML in the area
of P3P policies 1. The general approach is similar to the one proposed above but
there are some important differences that need to be taken into account. First of
all, values within a P3P policy are predefined built-in keywords with a fixed se-
mantics. Secondary, it is important to deal with both the structure and the model
of a P3P policy. Actually the theoretical model behind a policy is slightly differ-
ent from the language defined for its formalization: this means that a similarity
measure that follows strictly the structure of a P3P document will bring to bad
results in the evaluation of the similarity measure.
The P3P policy similarity measure assigns a score between 0 and 1 to quantify
the distance(similarity) between two P3P policies. The scores are calculated by
comparing the corresponding elements of the given two policies. A score is cal-
culated for each pair of elements being compared. The scores for different types
1For the rest of this section the word “policy” will be used to refer to a P3P policy
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<dynamic.clickstream, {}, {admin, develop}, {ours}, {stated-purpose}>
<dynamic.http, {}, {admin, develop}, {ours}, {stated-purpose}>
Table 8.2: Simplified form of a P3P Policy
of elements are then aggregated to find the overall similarity score between the
policies. We use a semantically equivalent but simplified form of a P3P policy
when defining the policy similarity measure. In particular, we transform a policy
conforming to the P3P syntax into a list of tuples corresponding to the Statement
depicted in Table 8.2.
elements in the policy. We do not consider the Entity, Access and Disputes ele-
ments because these elements contain information like addresses that are specific
to the website that owns the P3P policy and are not related to their actual privacy
practices as such. The policy similarity measure must only compare elements
which are relevant to how a policy uses what data as we are mainly interested
in knowing how similar two policies are with respect to how each of them deals
with a visitors data. A simplified P3P policy is a list of tuples ti(1 <= i <= n),
where each ti is of the form : ti : 〈Di, Ci, Pi, RTi, RNi〉 where Di corresponds to
a Data element, Ci, Pi, RTi and RNi correspond to the categories, purposes, re-
cipients and retention policies respectively associated with the data element Di.
The simplified form of the P3P policy in Table 8.1 is shown in Table 8.2. The sim-
ilarity score between two policies is hence the similarity score between the list of
tuples corresponding to the policies. The similarity score between two tuples is
calculated as a weighted sum of the similarity between the data, categories, pur-
poses, recipient and retention components of the two tuples. In what follows, we
will first describe how the similarity for different types of components are calcu-
lated and then using these we will show how the overall similarity score between
policies is calculated.
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8.3.1 Data Similarity
A Data element in a P3P policy is associated with a uriref attribute whose value
specifices a URI reference of data and an optional attribute whose value can be
either yes or no and which specifies whether or not the website requires visitors
to provide this data to access a resource or complete a transaction. In addition,
each data is associated with a Categories element that specifies the intended uses
of the data. The P3P 1.0 standard provides a fixed set of categories to which
the data might belong. In case, the data does not belong to any of the available
categories, then a human readable explanation must be provided. In our work,
we only consider the cases where data fits into one of the available categories.
The similarity between twoData elementsDi andDj is calculated as aweighted
sum of the similarity between uriref/optional attribute values(Sdat) and the
categories associated with the data (Scat). The data similarity SDATA is thus given
in Equation 8.1.
SDATA(Di, Dj) = wdatSdat(Di, Dj) +wcatScat(Ci, Cj) (8.1)
where:
• wdat and wcat are weights such that wdat+wcat = 1,
• Di and Dj are Data elements,
• Ci and Cj are Categories element associated with Di and Dj respectively.
The score Sdat is a weighted average of the similarity between uriref value
and optional value and is given by:
Sdat(Di, Dj) = wuriSuri(ui, uj) +woptSopt(oi, oj) (8.2)
where:
• wuri and wopt are weights such that wuri+wopt = 1,
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• ui, uj and oi, oj represents the uriref and optional values respectively of
Data elements Di,Dj.
The score Sopt is equal to 1 iff oi is equal to oj and is 0 otherwise. The score
Suri is calculated as follows:
Snodes(ui, uj) =
| path(ui) ∩ path(uj) |
max(height(ui), height(uj))
(8.3)
where:
• path(ui) represents the set of ordered nodes of the data element referred by
ui,
• height(ui) represents the number of nodes in the path of ui.
Finally, the score Scat is given by:
Scat(Ci, Cj) =
| Ci ∩ Cj |
| Ci ∪ Cj | (8.4)
where:
• | Ci | represents the cardinality of the set Ci.
8.3.2 Purpose Similarity
The Purpose element of a P3P policy consists of a set of elements chosen from
a set of pre-defined purposes. Each of these purposes is associated with a re-
quired attribute whose value may be one of ”always”, ”opt-in” or ”opt-out”. The
similarity between two Purpose elements is calculated by taking into account the
number of common purposes with common value of required attribute between
the two elements. It is given by:
SPURPOSE(Pi, Pj) =
∑
p∈P Satt(p)
| Pi ∪ Pj | (8.5)
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Satt(p) =


1, if att1(p) = att2(p)
σ, otherwise
(8.6)
where:
• P = Pi ∩ Pj,
• atti(p) returns the value of the required attribute associated with the pur-
pose p in Pi,
• 0 6 σ 6 1 is the penality returned by Satt(p) if p has different value for
required attribute in Pi and Pj 2.
8.3.3 Recipient Similarity
The similarity between two Recipient elements is calculated in a manner similar
to that used for the Purpose elements. It is given by:
SRECIPIENT(RTi, RTj) =
∑
r∈RT Satt(r)
| RTi ∪ RTj | (8.7)
Satt(r) =


1, if att1(r) = att2(r)
σ, otherwise
(8.8)
where:
• RT = RTi ∩ RTj,
• atti(r) returns the value of the required attribute associated with the recip-
ient r in RTi,
• 0 6 σ 6 1 is the penality returned by Satt(r) if r has different value for
required attribute in RTi and RTj 3.
2Typically σmay be set to 0.5.
3Typically σmay be set to 0.5.
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8.3.4 Retention Similarity
The Retention element in P3P policy consists of retention values, indicating the
retention policies, chosen from a set of predefined retention values. The similarity
between two Retention elements is calculated by simply taking into account the
intersection of the set of values in the two elements. It is given by:
SRETENTION(RNi, RNj) =
| RNi ∩ RNj |
| RNi ∪ RNj | (8.9)
8.3.5 Tuple Similarity
The similarity between two tuples ti and tj is calculated by taking the weighted
sum of the similarity of the corresponding Data, Purpose, Recipient and Retention
elements in the two tuples. It is given by:
STUPLE(ti, tj) = wdataSDATA(Di, Dj) +wpurpSPURPOSE(Pi, Pj) +
wrecSRECIPIENT(RTi, RTj) +wretSRETENTION(RNi, RNj) (8.10)
where:
• ti = 〈Di, Ci, Pi, RTi, RNi 〉,
• wdata+wpurp+wrec+wret = 1,
• Di, Ci represent the data and categories belonging to tuple i,
• Pi represents the set of purposes belonging to the tuple i,
• RTi represents the set of recipients belonging to the tuple i,
• RNi represents the set of retention values belonging to tuple i.
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8.3.6 Policy Similarity
Finally, the similarity between two P3P policies Pi and Pj is calculated by aver-
aging the similarity scores obtained between pairs of tuples corresponding to the
two policies. Equation 8.11 is used for the computation of the family of sets Θa
that represents all the possible combinations of pairs of the form 〈tni , tmj〉 sat-
isfying the conditions that the similarity between each tuple is greater than the
threshold ε 4 and that each tuple is took into consideration at most once. Equa-
tion 8.12 define the setΘ that is the setΘa that maximize the sum of the similarity
between the pairs of tuples it contains. Finally, Equation 8.16, represents the simi-
larity between a pair of policy. Since it is possible that some tuple is not contained
in any of the pairs in Θ we take the average similarity between each of those tu-
ples and all the tuples belonging to the paired policy.
Θa(Pn, Pm) = {(tni , tmj) | tni ∈ Pn ∧ tmj ∈ Pm ∧ Striple(tni , tnj) > ε ∧
∀ (tni′ , tmj′ ), (tni = tni′ )⇒ (tmj = tmj′ )}
(8.11)
Θ = Θa′ so that:
∀a

 ∑
(tmi ,tnj )∈Θa
Striple(tni , Smj) 6
∑
(tni ,tmj )∈Θa′
Striple(tni , tmj)


(8.12)
Sum∈Θ =
∑
(tni ,tmj )∈Θ
2 Striple(tni , tmj) (8.13)
4This threshold is used as a filter. We do not take into considerations the similarities between
pairs of tuples that do not satisfy the constraint on the treeshold.
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Sum/∈Θn =
∑
(tni ,−)/∈Θ
S
avg
triple(tni , Pm) (8.14)
Sum/∈Θm =
∑
(−,tmj )/∈Θ
S
avg
triple(tnj , Pn) (8.15)
S(Pn, Pm) =
Sum∈Θ+ Sum/∈Θn + Sum
/∈Θ
m
| Pn | + | Pm |
(8.16)
8.4. P3P Policy Clustering
Policy clustering aims to separate policies into distinct groups based on the differ-
ences in the policies. Each group of policies has its unique characteristics which
can be later used to create a meta policy for this group. In what follows, we
present the details of the clustering algorithm. We use 1 − S(Pi, Pj) as the dis-
tance function between any two policies Pi and Pj and employ the well-known
K-median clustering algorithmwith minor modifications. The algorithm consists
of four main steps.
The first step is a preprocessing step which computes the distance between all
pairs of policies and stores the values in a matrix. This avoids distance recom-
putation during the clustering. Second, we randomly select k policies as initial
cluster centroids. Third, we assign each policy to the cluster that has the closest
centroid. Fourth, when all policies have been assigned, recalculate the k centroids
and then repeat Steps 3 and 4 until the centroids no longer change. Note that the
computation of the centroid for policies is different from calculating the center
point of a cluster of points in Euclidean space since it is impossible to compute
an ”average” policy. Therefore, we select a policy which has the minimum sum
of distance to all the other policies as the centroid.
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Figure 8.1: Average Radius varying K from 1 to 100 on a dataset of 1000 policies.
8.5. Experiments
We have implemented a Java prototype of the clustering algorithm presented in
section above and we have experimented our approach on a subset the TAPPA
db containing 23,891 P3P policies 5. First of all we used the average radius to
evaluate the results of the clustering algorithm. The average radius of a cluster
measures the average distance between two elements in a cluster (the normal-
ized distance between two policies can be obtained subtracting the value of the
similarity between the two policies to 1) and is one of indicators of the quality of
the clusters and hence in turn the quality of the distance measure (in our case the
proposed similarity measure). The smaller the radius the better the clustering in
Figure 8.1 we show the average radius for the value of K ranging from 1 to 100
on a dataset of 1000 policies.
Anyway, the results on the quality of the clusters are not enough. Typically,
a clustering algorithm is used to identify groups of objects in a certain dataset.
5http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/tappa/
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The groups are identified according to some specific features of the objects. For
example, if we have points in an euclidean space we can clusterize those points
taking into consideration their position within the space. In our case we have
policies that are complex objects that contains a number of different information
and for this reason different perspectives needs to be used in the evaluation step.
Average radius is a good choice for understanding the quality of the resulting
clusters (and in turn the quality of the clustering algorithm) but we need to take
into consideration additional data for understanding the meaning of our clusters.
The TAPPA db maintains some interesting meta-data for each policy:
• Top level domain;
• Top level domain type;
• Traffic rank;
• Domain name;
• URL of the policy;
• Owner of the policy;
• Email contact;
• Address of Website;
• Country where site is registered;
• P3P Policy name;
Moreover, in [28] is proposed an interesting categorization of P3P-enabled
site. The results depicted in Figure 8.2 show some implicit clusters based on how
web-sites (and hence the P3P policies defined for those sites) have been catego-
rized. Since the values reported in Figure 8.2 have been obtained running test
on the TAPPA db would be very interesting to retrieve those categories for the
policies we already have in our dataset.
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Figure 8.2: Distribution of P3P-enabled search results by search term category.
We are working on all these data in order to come up with interesting test
cases for deeper evaluations of both our P3P similarity measure and the cluster-
ing algorithm.
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Part III
EXAM-S: Implementation
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Chapter 9
EXAM-S: the Architecture
In this chapter we discuss the various components in the architecture of EXAM-S.
The Chapter is organized as follows: in Section 9.1 we give an overview of the
main components. Section 9.2 discuss the main module in which all the analysis
components are organized. The entities exploited for solving policy heterogene-
ity are introduced in Section 9.3. Finally, Section 9.4 discuss the features of the
repositories main module.
9.1. Architecture
The EXAM-S environment, an overview of which is shown in Figure 9.1, includes
three different modules. The first module is the analysis module, which receives
policies requests and queries from users, and returns request replies and query
results. The second module is the heterogeneity module that contains all the com-
ponents that have been defined in Chapter 6. This module handles policy hetero-
geneities providing a unified vocabulary for the policies involved into the analy-
sis process. Finally, the third module is the one that contains all the repositories
that are exploited by the other modules.
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Figure 9.1: The EXAM-S Architecture
9.2. Analysis Module
The Analysis Module, includes three different levels. The first level is the user
interface, which receives policies requests and queries from users, and returns re-
quest replies and query results. The second level is the request dispatcher, which
handles various requests received from the user interface, dispatches them to
proper analysis module and aggregates obtained results. The third level is the
core level of EXAM and includes four modules supporting different tasks in pol-
icy analysis, namely: policy annotation, policy filtering, policy analysis and Se-
mantic Reasoning. The policy annotation module pre-processes each newly ac-
quired policy by adding annotations to it. The annotations explicitly represent the
behavior or semantics of each function referred in the policy. Such annotations
help in automatically translating policies into Boolean formulae that can then be
evaluated by the policy analysis modules. The annotated policies are stored in
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the policy repository together with the policy metadata. The policy filter module
acts as a filter phase for policy similarity analysis when there is a large amount of
policies to compare. It is a lightweight approach which quickly evaluates similar-
ity between each pair of policies and assigns them a similarity score. According
to the obtained similarity scores, policies with low similarity scores can be safely
pruned from further analysis, whereas policies with high similarity scores can be
further examined. The main goal of the policy filter module is to reduce the num-
ber of policies that need to be analyzed more in details, when dealing with large
size policy sets. The filtering approach we use is based on techniques from infor-
mation retrieval and is extremely fast. The use of filtering in the policy analysis
process is however optional. The policy management module can directly send
analysis queries to the policy similarity analyzer (PSA), to carry out a fine-grained
policy analysis, without performing the filtering. Moreover, the PSA implements
the standard policy analysis queries supported by EXAM-S.
9.2.1 Architecture of the Policy Similarity Analyzer (PSA)
Figure 9.2 shows the architecture of PSA. The basic idea underlying its architec-
ture is to combine the functionalities of the policy ratification technique [2] and
MTBDD technique [35] by using a divide-and-conquer strategy. Specifically, poli-
cies are first passed to a preprocessor which identifies parts to be processed by the
ratification module and parts to be directly transmitted to the MTBDD module.
The ratification module then generates unified nodes and a set of auxiliary rules
that are transmitted to the MTBDD module. The MTBDD module then creates a
combined MTBDD that includes policies and additional rules. By using the com-
bined MTBDD, the PSA module can thus process the queries that we introduced
in Chapter 7. Queries are first translated by the query preprocessor and then ex-
ecuted by the MTBDD module. Finally, the result analyzer reformats the output
of the MTBDD module and reports it to the users.
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Figure 9.2: Architecture of the Policy Similarity Analyzer (PSA)
9.2.2 Semantic Reasoner submodule
Finally, the Semantic Reasoner component supports the PSA for the reasoning
tasks on the specified domain ontology. The main task of this module is to sup-
port the ratification module in finding the disjoint ranges over the involved do-
main ontologies. The Semantic Reasoner, receive the set of ranges and the ontol-
ogy they belong and then creates the set of disjoints ranges. Semantic reasoning
is executed through the use of the Pellet reasoner [75]. The result of the reasoning
procedure is then returned to the PSA and then exploited in the remaining steps
of the analysis process. The architecture of this module is shown in Figure 9.3.
9.3. Heterogeneity Module
This section discuss the features of the heterogeneity modules. This module con-
tains all the components that have been defined in Chapter 6. We have added an
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Figure 9.3: Architecture of the Semantic Reasoner Submodule
interface that is dedicated to the dispatch of the requests to the respective mod-
ule. We have implemented the stack of technologies defined for solving policy
heterogeneity has decoupled modules each one able to perform the associated
algorithm defined in Chapter 6. Subsection 9.3.1 is dedicated to the Policy Refer-
ence Architecture creation submodule.
9.3.1 Policy Reference Ontology creation
Figure 9.4 depicts a conceptual visualization of the Policy Reference Ontology
submodule (PSO). The PSO combine the architectural components exploited in
the involved procedures. The ontology extraction procedure is implementedwith
two submodule: the first extracts the taxonomy from the terms in the policy ex-
ploiting the dictionary and the lookup tables. We use WordNet [31] as a reference
dictionary. The second one, creates the relations between those terms exploiting
additional semantic information, such as ontologies and the relations implicitly
defined within the policy. If the policy exploits some ontologies them are merged
172 Chapter 9. EXAM-S: the Architecture
Figure 9.4: Architecture of the Policy Reference Ontology creation procedure.
and used in the extraction procedure.
9.4. Repositories Module
The repository module has been created for optimization purposes. Sometimes,
the operation performed over ontologies, can be expensive especially when deal-
ing with large knowledge bases or with complex policies that use several ontolo-
gies.
For this reason, whenever an ontology mapping or an ontology extraction is
performed, we maintain repositories in which the results of such procedures are
stored. Then, when it is necessary to perform again the same kind of operation,
we check in the repositories if we have already computed the result. If this is
the case then we obviously skip the execution of the operation returning to the
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following procedures (if any) or to the calling module the result of the operation.
Otherwise, the process is carried out as usual. For this reason we have created
two different repositories, the first one themaintain ontologies (both the imported
from external resources and the one generated by the internal modules) and the
second one that store the mapping between them.
Moreover, this is the module in which we maintain the dictionary and the
lookup tables. In Figure 9.1 they are depicted in the same repository for brevity.
As we have already introduced before, we use WordNet as our reference dictio-
nary. WordNet, comes as an autonomous database with its own interface so no
additional components are necessary.
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Chapter 10
Implementation and Experimental
Evaluation
In this chapter we discuss implementation and experimental evaluation of the
approaches developed in Chapters 6 and 7. The Sections are organized as follows:
in Section 10.1 we describe the details of the heterogeneity module. Sections 10.2
and 10.3 present the experiments for the filtering technique, the policy similarity
analyzer is discussed in Sections 10.5 and 10.5.
10.1. Experimental Results: Heterogeneity Module
We have implemented a JAVA prototype of the heterogeneity module. In the
prototype we have exploited the Sun implementation of XACML, the OWL API
for loading, updating and creating ontologies, the Falcon-AO library for ontol-
ogy matching, and the MIT Java WordNet Interface for managing queries on the
WordNet database.
For the experimental evaluation, we generated a set of policies in a XACML
format which serves as input for the creation of the unified vocabulary. At-
tributes were randomly selected by a predefined list while semantic data was
obtained by randomly selecting entities by a set of ontologies retrieved by using
the SWOOGLE ontology search engine.
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Figure 10.1: Comparison between the times of the Ontology Merging algorithm
applied to original referenced ontologies and the Ontology Merging applied to
their policy views.
Figure 10.1 shows the comparison between the merge algorithm applied to
original referenced ontologies and the merge algorithm applied only to their pol-
icy views for increasing values in the number of the ontologies involved. The
use of the policy views of an ontology significantly improves the performance
of the merging algorithm. Moreover, the accuracy in the policy analysis results
is not affected by the adoption of the policy view optimization. The reason is
that during the creation of the view, we prune all entities that are not considered
by the structural techniques adopted by state of the art ontology matching tools.
Figure 10.2 shows the total execution time of our process for increasing values in
the number of attributes. We plotted the execution time of the approach for vary-
ing values in the number of total attributes1 between 10 and 50. Each column
shows the time for: (i) the merge algorithm, (ii) the extract algorithm and (iii) the
1Since in our approach we consider attribute-value pairs, it makes more sense to analyze the
times with respect to the number of attributes instead of the number policies.
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Figure 10.2: Total execution times for increasing values in the number of at-
tributes.
combination of their result. As expected, most of the execution time is spent in
merging ontologies. Conversely, the extraction is very quick and even for high
number of attributes (not reported in the Figure) e.g. ≈ 100, the execution time is
≈ 150msec.
In Table 10.1 we report data concerning the accuracy of our model. We eval-
uate the number of similar concepts detected and the correctness of the related
mappings when varying the value of the threshold τ between 0.65 and 0.95. Mod-
ifying the value of τmeans changing the acceptance threshold during the merge
algorithm. The results show that it is important to find a good trade-off between
the number of mappings retrieved and their correctness. For this experiment, we
run our prototype on a set of policies with an average number of 50 attributes.
Attributes have been then randomly associated to concepts belonging to a set of
ontologies related to the faculty domain. The results show that for values of τ
between 0.75 and 0.80 our model provides a good balance between the correct-
ness of the mappings and the increase in similarities detected. For values of τ
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greater or equal than 0.80 we obtain a higher accuracy but the number of map-
pings seems to be too low for being adopted in practice. Conversely, with values
of τ lower or equal than 0.70we obtain more hits but the correctness is too low to
be considered acceptable.
Table 10.1: The accuracy of the model.
τ Similarities Detected Correctness
[0.65, 0.70] 86,458% 58,823%
[0.70, 0.75] 85,416% 64,705%
[0.75, 0.80] 80,208% 80,411%
[0.80, 0.85] 58,333% 85,294%
[0.85, 0, 90] 52,083% 91,176%
[0.90, 0.95] 46,875% 94,117%
> 0.95 42,708% 97,059%
10.2. Implementation: Filtering
We have implemented a prototype of the proposed similarity measure techniques
using Java. We have performed extensive testing of the implementation on ran-
domly generated access control policies. We evaluated both the effectiveness and
efficiency of our lightweight policy similarity measure in contrast to exhaustive
policy comparison techniques which involve Boolean expression analysis.
All experiments were conducted on 3Gz Pentium III processor machine with
500MB RAM.
10.3. Experimental Results: Filtering
We first evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy similarity mea-
sure. This set of experiments were conducted without considering the ontology
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matching and dictionary lookup. We then measured the scalability of the imple-
mentation for both the variations with and without ontology. Finally we looked
in detail the differences obtained with respect to the similarity scores when using
the ontology matching and dictionary lookup.
10.3.1 Effectiveness
Since our policy similarity measure is an approximation of the similarity between
two policies, in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the similarity measure,
we compared our results with those obtained by the exact policy similarity ana-
lyzer proposed in [57] .The output of the exact policy similarity analyzer is a list of
requests and effects of the two policies for these requests. Based on this informa-
tion, we can quantify the differences between two policies using the percentage
of the requests for which the two policies have different effects. The higher the
percentage of such requests the less similar the policies are.
Each policy pair in set-4 and set-8was input to both the policy similarity mea-
sure and the exact policy similarity analyzer. For each policy pair a policy similar-
ity score and a policy difference percentage was recorded. The test sets set-4 and
set-8 each contained 100 pairs of policies. In set-4 each policy had 4 rules each and
in set-8 each policy had 8 rules each. The maximum number of attribute predi-
cates in any given policy was 68 for set-4 and 124 for set-8. Considering that for
typical policies we have encountered in real world applications the average num-
ber of atomic Boolean expressions lies between 10 and 50, our test sets covered a
much bigger range.
Figure 10.4(a) shows the policy similarity score and policy difference percent-
age for policy pairs in set-4 and set-8 with the threshold ǫ set to 0.5. We can
observe that policy similarity scores decrease when the differences between two
policies increase. This indicates that our policy similarity measure provides a
good approximation of the similarity between policies. We also explore the effect
of the threshold ǫ by varying ǫ from 0.2 to 0.8 for test set set-8. The result is shown
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Figure 10.3: Policy Similarity Scores
in Figure 10.4(b). Observe that higher values of ǫ tend to provide a better approx-
imation. This is mainly because that the overall similarity score is the average of
the rule similarity scores above ǫ and using higher values of ǫ prunes more rules
which are less similar to one another.
10.3.2 Efficiency
The previous set of experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the policy sim-
ilarity measure. In order for our technique to be useful as a filter technique that
can quickly pruning dissimilar policies, it must also be efficient. We compared
the execution time of the policy similarity measure with that of the exact policy
similarity analyzer. The same data sets set-4 and set-8were used.
The results for set-4 and set-8 are shown in Figure 10.4. Each point in the
graphs corresponds to the average execution time for 10 different policy pairs.
The value of was set to 0.5. From the figures, we can observe that the policy simi-
laritymeasure almost remains constant for both set-4 and set-8. This is because the
time taken by the policy similarity measure depends on the number of rules and
predicates in the policies being compared which is constant for policies in both
sets. While for the exact policy similarity analyzer, the more difference between
two policies, the more analysis needs to be carried out and hence it requires much
more time. Moreover, the average execution time taken by the policy similarity
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Figure 10.4: Execution time
measure is two to three orders of magnitude less than the time taken by the exact
similarity analyzer. Such considerable gain is attributed to the quick comparison
techniques which avoids complicated Boolean expression analysis. This also in-
dicates that the similarity measure can well serve as a filter phase before invoking
the computationally expensive similarity analysis.
10.3.3 Scalability
In this set of experiments, we evaluated the scalability of the policy similarity
measure implementation varying the number of attribute predicates across the
policies and plotted the average time taken to compute the similarity score. For
these experiments the value of the threshold ǫ was set at 0.5. Figure 10.5 reports
the average time taken to compute the similarity scores for 10 policy pairs in set-
4 and set-8, when varying the number of predicates in each policy from 25 to
400. We can observe that our approach scale reasonably well as the number of
predicates per policy increases.
10.4. Implementation: Policy Analyzer
We have developed a prototype of PSA in Java. An implementation of the modi-
fied simplex algorithm [2] has been used for processing Boolean expressions with
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Figure 10.5: Scalability as number of attribute predicates per policy is increased
real value linear constraints. The modified CUDD library developed in [35] has
been used for the MTBDD module. In order to test our implementation, we gen-
erated XACML policies with a random number of rules. For each policy rule,
we first randomly generated atomic Boolean expressions, and then concatenated
them with the operator “and” or “or”. The atomic Boolean expression (ABE for
short) usually contains a pair of attribute name and value except for the atomic
linear inequality function which has multiple attributes. The attributes in each
atomic Boolean expression were randomly selected from a predefined attribute
set. We performed policy similarity analysis between pairs of generated XACML
policies with varying number of rules and attributes. The experiments were con-
ducted on a Intel Pentium4 CPU 3.00GHz machine with 512 MB RAM.
10.5. Experimental Results: Policy Analyzer
In the first experiment, we analyzed the total time taken by our policy similarity
analyzer as we increase the number of atomic Boolean expressions associated
with a pair of policies. The average number of atomic Boolean expressions was
varied between 50 and 150 for each policy. The number of rules in each policy
was varied between 8 and 32. The results of this experiment are summarized in
Figure 10.6. Each policy similarity experiment was repeated 10 times. For visual
clarity, we have plotted the time in log scale. The actual minimum andmaximum
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Figure 10.6: Total Response Time for Varying Number of Atomic Boolean Expres-
sions
response time obtained were 0.1s and 50.4s respectively. We observe a clear trend
here: increasing the number of atomic Boolean expressions results in an increase
in the time needed for similarity analysis. Considering that the number of the
attribute value pairs in policies tend to lie in the range of 20 to 100 as reported
in [35], we believe that our results indicate a positive trend.
In order to study the characteristics of our proposed preprocessing technique,
we examined the average number of average number of MTBDD variables cre-
ated and the time consumed by the preprocessormodule for the same policy pairs
used in the first experiment. As shown in Figure 10.7, we can see that the num-
ber of variables introduced due to the creation of disjoint intervals and auxiliary
rules is less than 1.5 times the average number of atomic Boolean expressions
in a policy pair. Next, we plotted the time taken by the preprocessor module
in Figure 10.8 for the policy pairs in the previous experiment. We can see that
the preprocessor scales well with the increase in the number of rules and atomic
Boolean expressions. Specifically, in the case where each policy has 32 rules and
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Figure 10.7: Average number of variables generated for policy pairs
Figure 10.8: Response Time Taken for Preprocessing a Pair of Policies
150 atomic Boolean expressions, the preprocessing time is about 0.5% percent
of the overall response time. We can conclude that the overall response time is
mainly dominated by the MTBDD module.
In another experiment, results of which are reported in Figure 10.9, we fixed
the number of atomic Boolean expressions in each policy and varied the number
of pairs of policies to be analyzed for similarity. We considered policies with an
average of 100 atomic Boolean expressions, and ran the experiments for policies
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Figure 10.9: Total Response Time for Varying Number of Policy Pairs
with 8 and 16 rules. Each of these experiments were conducted 10 times. The
time axis in Figure 10.9 is in log scale. The minimum and maximum response
time obtained for these experiments were 0.44s and 63s respectively. From this
result, we observe that the current approach can scale reasonably well when de-
ployed in policy integration systems where the number of policies that need to
be integrated in a single point in time ranges in a few hundreds.
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Chapter 11
Conclusions and Future Work
The use of policy based security management in distributed collaborative appli-
cations and architectures has led to the proliferation of policies. A direct conse-
quence of this is the need for tools and techniques to manage and consolidate
the large set of policies. In this thesis we have proposed EXAM-S, a comprehen-
sive environment for the analysis and management of access control policies. We
consider policies expressed using XACML (Extensible Access Control Markup
Language) [72] because XACML is a rich language which can represent many
policies of interest to real world applications and is gaining widespread adoption
in the industry. We identified and defined three types of basic policy analysis
queries which can be combined to perform different advanced analyses.
We have faced the policy analysis problems both theoretically and practically.
Concerning theoretical issues, we have compared state of the art approaches in
policy analysis trying to find the best trade-off between expressivity and com-
plexity. The result of this study has been taken as input for the definition of our
services:
• We have addressed the issues arising in policy heterogeneity analysis. Our
approach represents the terminology of a policy through the use of ontolo-
gies and consists of a set of functions that allows one to create a unified
vocabulary for a multidomain policy set. This vocabulary can be then ex-
ploited by policy analysis tools for analyzing and comparing policies. We
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have implemented a prototype of the proposed approach and demonstrated
its effectiveness and applicability in real case scenarios.
• We have proposed a novel policy similarity measure which can be used as
a filter approach in policy comparison. The policy similarity measure rep-
resents a lightweight approach to quickly analyze similarity of two policies.
Detailed algorithms of computation of similarity scores are presented. To
the best of our knowledge this is the first work to introduce the notion of a
similarity score for access control policies. We have implemented a proto-
type of the similarity filter and reported experimental results that demon-
strate the efficiency and effectiveness of this approach.
• We have proposed a policy similarity analyzer that combines the advan-
tages of MTBDD based model checking and SAT-solver based techniques to
provide a precise characterization of the set of requests permitted, denied
or not-applicable to the policies being analyzed. The experimental results
obtained from the prototype implementation of the analyzer demonstrate
the efficiency and scalability of the proposed approach.
• We have proposed and discussed three other projects that are not strictly
related to the development of EXAM-S but with which they share a num-
ber of common features. In Chapter 5 we have proposed an extension of
XACML for dealing with ontology-based access control models. In Chapter
8 we have applied the filtering technique introduced in Section 7.4 to the
analysis of P3P policies. Finally, in Appendix A we have proposed an ap-
proach for solving interoperability in Digital Identity Management. Even if
the main topic is different from the one addressed in this thesis the combi-
nation of ontology-based techniques for solving heterogeneity are based on
the same assumption and have similar algorithms and results.
Policy Analysis is a challenging task and we plan to improve EXAM-S adopt-
ing more powerful techniques. We have performed preliminary test for a tighter
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integration ofMTBDDs andDescription Logics in order to provide better analysis
services. Moreover, we have implemented a prototype of the extended XACML
architecture proposed in Chapter 5. Even if preliminary experimental results are
encouraging we plan to investigate this topic in more detail. Related to semantic
functions we plan to define new analysis services especially created for dealing
with the semantic functions we have proposed. Details about the future work of
this thesis are listed below:
• Semantic Functions: So far we have created a Java prototype of the extended
XACML architecture proposed in Chapter 5 exploiting the the XACML sun
libraries 1. We have then implemented the fsub function exploiting the OWL
API2 and theDL Pellet Reasoner [75]. The implementation of fsup and fsame
is still an ongoing work. However, since such functions can be defined in
terms of fsub we believe that their realization will be soon available. Open
issues in this topic are the variation in performance when modeling equiv-
alent policies by adopting different combination of functions.
• Improving the PSA: We will extend the policy similarity analyzer to compare
more than two policies at once. Preliminary experiments have indicated
that the order in which the policies are compared can result in an order of
magnitude difference in the time needed to perform the comparison. We
plan to study in detail the cause for such difference and then propose opti-
mization techniques to determine the optimum order in which to compare
the policies so as to minimize the comparison time. Moreover,
• New analysis services: We have already defined and realized a mapping be-
tween XACML and DL that extends the one proposed in [56]. Such exten-
sion is motivated by the need to deal with more information than the ones
taken into consideration in [56]. Based on this new mapping, we will de-
velop new powerful analysis services for XACML policies extended with
1http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/
2http://owlapi.sourceforge.net/
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semantic functions. Examples of such services are semantic policy redun-
dancy, semantic policy subsumption and semantic validation.
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Appendix A
Interoperability in Digital Identity
Management
In this chapter we provide an application of ontology mapping in solving nam-
ing heterogeneity in an Identity Management Scenario. The approach described
here has been proposed in [10]. The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows.
In Section A.1 we introduce the problem related to Identity Management in Busi-
ness Process. Section A.2 introduces a running example that is used throughout
the rest of the Sections to illustrate the discussion. Section A.3 discusses the main
issues related to digital identity management for business processes. Section A.4
introduces the notions on which our multi-factor identity attribute verification
protocol is based. Section A.5 presents the multi-factor identity attribute verifica-
tion protocol. Section A.6 discusses the system architecture. Section A.7 reports
experimental results. Finally, Section A.8 concludes the Chapter and outlines
some future work.
A.1. Introduction
Business processes have gained a lot of attention because of the pressing need
for integrating existing resources and services to better fulfill customer needs. A
key feature of business processes is that they are built from composable services,
referred to as component services, that may belong to different domains. In such
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a context, flexible multi-domain identity management solutions are crucial for
increased security and user-convenience. In particular, it is important that dur-
ing the execution of a business process the component services be able to verify
the identity of the client to check that it has the required permissions for access-
ing the services. Clients identity consists of data, referred to identity attributes,
that encode relevant-security properties of the clients. The management of iden-
tity attributes in business processes raises however a number of challenges. On
one hand, to enable authentication, the propagation of client’s identity attributes
across the component services should be facilitated. On the other hand, identity
attributes need to be protected as they may convey sensitive information about a
client and can be target of attacks. Moreover, because business processes orches-
trate the functions of services belonging to different domains, interoperability
issues may arise in client authentication processes. Such issues range from the
use of different identity tokens and different identity negotiation protocols, such
as the client-centric protocols and the identity-providers centric protocols, to the
use of different names for identity attributes. The use of different names for iden-
tity attributes, that we refer to as naming heterogeneity, typically occurs because
clients and component services use a different vocabulary to denote identity at-
tribute names. In this case, whenever a component service requests from a client
a set of identity attributes to verify its identity, the client may not understand
which identity attributes it has to provide.
To address the problem of multi-domain identity management, we propose
a multi-factor identity attribute verification protocol for business processes that
assures clients privacy and handles naming heterogeneity. The protocol uses an
identity attribute namesmatching technique based on look-up tables, dictionaries
and ontology mapping, to match component services and clients vocabularies
and aggregated zero knowledge proofs of knowledge (AgZKPK) cryptographic
protocol to allow clients to prove with a single interactive proof the knowledge
of multiple identity attributes without the need to provide them in clear.
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A.2. Running Example
Figure A.1: A loan approval process specification
In this section we introduce an example of business process that implements
a loan approval process (see Figure A.1). Customers of the service send loan re-
quests. Once a request is received, the loan service executes a simple process
resulting in either a “loan approved” message or a “loan rejected” message. The
decision is based on the amount requested and the risk associated with the cus-
tomer. For amounts lower than 10, 000$ a streamlined process is used. In the
streamlined process low-risk customers are automatically approved. For higher
amounts, or medium and high-risk customers, the credit request requires further
processing. For each request, the loan service uses the functiona provided by two
other services. In the streamlined process, used for low amount loans, a risk as-
sessment service is used to obtain a quick evaluation of the risk associated with
the customer. A full loan approval service (possibly requiring direct involvement
of a loan expert) is used to obtain an assessment about the customer when the
streamlined approval process is not applicable.
Four main activities are involved in the process:
• Loan Request allows a client to submit a loan request to the bank
202 Appendix A. Interoperability in Digital Identity Management
• Check Risk (provided by risk assessment service) computes the risk asso-
ciated with the loan request
• Approve Loan (provided by loan approval service) determines if the loan
request can be approved or rejected
• Loan Response sends to the client the result of the loan request evaluation
process
risk assessment and loan approval services require a set of identity attributes
from the client who has submitted the loan request. The risk assessment service
asks DrivingLicense, CarRegistration and EmployeeID, whereas the loan ap-
proval service requires EmployeeID and CreditCard.
A.3. Identity Management for Business Processes
Managing and verifying clients identity in a business processes raise a number
of challenging issues. A first issue is related to how the client’s identity attribute
have to be managed within the business process. The client of a business process
is not aware that the business process that implements the required service in-
vokes some component services. The client thus trusts the composite service but
not the component services. Therefore, every time the component services have
to verify the client’s identity, the composite service has to act as an intermediary
between the component services and the client. Moreover, since the client’s iden-
tity attributes may contain sensitive information and clients usually do not trust
the component services, the client’s identity attributes should be protected from
potential misuse by component services.
Another issue is related to how the identity verification process is performed.
Because component services belong to different domains, each with its own iden-
tity verification policies, the sets of identity attributes required to verify client’s
identity may partially or totally overlap. Therefore, the client has to prove several
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times the knowledge of the same subset of identity attributes. It is thus impor-
tant to take advantage of previous client identity verification processes that other
component services have performed.
Finally, another issue is the lack of interoperability because of naming het-
erogeneity. Naming heterogeneity occurs when component services define their
identity verification policies according to a vocabulary different from the one
adopted by clients. Therefore, component services and clients are not able to have
“meaningful” interactions because they do not understand each other. Thus, it is
also necessary that client identity verification process supports an approach to
match identity attribute names of component services and clients vocabularies.
In such respect, a first question to be addressed is which matching technique
to use, which in turn depends from the types of variation in identity attribute
names. A second question is related to the matching protocol to use, that is, by
which party the matching has to be performed and whether the fact that a client
has already performed a matching with a component service may help in a sub-
sequent matching.
To address such issues we propose a multi-factor identity attribute verifica-
tion protocol for business processes that supports a privacy usage of clients iden-
tity attributes and that guarantees interoperable interactions between clients and
component services. In what follows, we provide more details about our ap-
proach.
A.4. Preliminary concepts
To enable multi-factor identity attribute verification, clients have to register their
identity attributes to a registrar. The registrar is an additional component in dig-
ital identity management systems that stores and manage information related to
identity attributes. For each client’s identity attributem, the registrar records an
identity tuple (σi,Mi, tag, validity−assurance, ownership−assurance, {Wij}).
Each identity tuple consists of tag, an attribute descriptor, the Pedersen commit-
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ment ofm, denoted asMi, the signature of the registrar onM, denoted as σi, two
types of assurance, namely validity assurance and ownership assurance and a set of
weak identifiers {Wij}. Mi is computed as g
mhr, where g and h are generators in
a group G of prime order q. G and q are public parameters of the registrar and
r is chosen randomly from Zq. Validity assurance corresponds to the confidence
about the validity of the identity attribute based on the verification performed at
the identity attribute’s original issuer. Ownership assurance corresponds to the
confidence about the claim that the principal presenting an identity attribute is
its true owner.
Weak identifiers are used to denote identity attributes that can be aggregated
together to perform multi-factor authentication. The identity tuples of each reg-
istered client can be retrieved from the registrar by the component services or the
registrar can release to the client a certificate containing its identity record.
We assume that each of the component services define their identity verifi-
cation policies by specifying a set of identity attribute names that have to be
required from the client. Because of naming heterogeneity, clients may not un-
derstand component services identity verification policies. The type of variations
that can occur in clients and component services identity attribute names can be
classified in: syntactic, terminological and semantic variations.
• Syntactic variations arise because of the use of different character combina-
tions to denote the same term. An example is the use of ”CreditCard” and
”Credit Card” to denote a client’s credit card.
• Terminological variations refer to the use of different terms to denote the same
concept. An example of terminological variation is the use of the synonyms
“Credit Card” and “Charge Card” to refer a client’s credit card.
• Semantic variations are related to the use of two different concepts in differ-
ent knowledge domains to denote the same term.
Syntactic variations can be identified by using look up tables. A look up table
enumerates the possible ways in which the same term can be written by using
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different character combinations. In detecting terminological variations, dictio-
naries or thesaurus such as WordNet can be exploited. Finally, semantic varia-
tions can be determined by using ontology matching techniques. An ontology
is a formal representation of a domain in terms of concepts and properties with
which those concepts are related. Ontologies can be exploited to define a domain
of interest and for reasoning about its features. Ontology mapping is the process
whereby two ontologies are semantically related at conceptual level; source on-
tology concepts are mapped onto the target ontology concepts according to those
semantic relations [3, 7]. Typically an ontology matching algorithm takes in input
two ontologies Oi and Oj, and returns a set of triples of the form 〈ci, cj, s〉, where
ci is a concept belonging to ontology Oi, cj is a concept belonging to ontology Oj
that matches concept ci, and s is a confidence score, that is, a value between 0 and
1, indicating the similarity between the matched concepts.
To enable the matching of identity attributes by using the above techniques,
we make the following assumptions. Component services’ identity verification
policies are defined according to their domain vocabulary ontology. Moreover,
they track existing mappings with other component services’ ontologies. Such
mappings are formally represented by tuples of the following form:
〈OCS, CS ′, OCS′ , {〈c1, c2, s1,2〉, . . . , 〈cl, cm, sl,m〉}〉
whereOCS is the ontology of a component service CS, CS
′ is a component ser-
vicewhose ontologyOCS′ matches ontologyOCS and {〈c1, c2, s1,2〉, . . . , 〈cl, cm, sl,m〉}
is the set of concepts mappings 〈ci, cj, si,j〉where ci ∈ OCS and cj ∈ OCS′ .
Moreover, each component service keeps a look up table containing alterna-
tive character combinations and store a set of synonyms, denoted as Synset, for
each of the identity attribute names used for expressing its identity verification
policies. Finally, since we want to avoid that the client proves several times the
possession of a same set of identity attributes, we assume that component ser-
vices have a PKI infrastructure that allows them to issue certificates to clients.
These certificates (see Definition 1 below) assert that an identity attribute by a
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client matches an identity attribute by a component service and that the com-
ponent service has verified that the client owns the attribute. Clients can use
these certificates to prove that they own a set of identity attributes without go-
ing through the authentication process during the execution of the same business
process instance in which the certificates have been released. Instead, clients can
use the certificates in business processes different from the one in which the cer-
tificate have been issued to prove there is a mapping between a set of client’s
attributes and a service’s ontology. This distinction is motivated by the fact that
there is a trust relationship between the component services in the same business
process instance, that may not exist with services external to the process.
Definition A.1 (Proof-of-Identity Certificate) Let S be a component service partici-
pating to a business process BP and C be a client. Let OS be the ontology describing the
domain of S and AttrSet be the set of C’s identity attribute names. The proof of identity
certificate released by S toC upon a successful verification is a tuple 〈Issuer,Owner,OID,Mappings, IssuanceDate
where: Issuer is the identifier of S, Owner is the identifier of C, OID is OS ontology
identifier, Mappings is a set of tuples of the form 〈Attr, Concept〉 where Attr ∈
AttrSet and Concept ∈ OS, and IssuanceDate is the release date of the certificate.
Besides being stored by the clients, proof-of-identity certificates released dur-
ing the execution of a business process instance are stored in a local repository,
denoted as CertRep, by the composite service for the whole process execution.
A.5. Interoperable Multi-Factor Authentication
In this section, we present a multi-factor authentication protocol for business pro-
cesses. The protocol takes place between a client, the composite service and a
component service. Since the client is not aware of the component services, the
composite service has to mediate the interactions between them. The protocol
consists of two phases that make use of the notion of proof-of-identity certifi-
cate introduced in the previous section (see Figure A.2). In the first phase, the
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component service matches the identity attributes of clients vocabulary with its
own attributes to help the client understand its identity verification policy. In the
second phase, the client carries out an aggregate ZKPK protocol to prove to the
component service the knowledge of the matched identity attributes. Algorithm
1 summarizes the different phases of the protocol.
A.5.1 Identity attribute matching protocol
The technique that we have developed for matching identity attribute names
from different vocabularies is based on the combined use of look-up tables, dic-
tionaries, and ontology mapping.
As we have already mentioned, an important issue is which party has to ex-
ecute the matching. In our context, the matching can be executed by the client,
the composite service or the component services. Performing the matching at
the client has the obvious drawback that the client may lie and asserts that an
identity attribute referred to in the component services policy matches one of its
attribute, whereas this is not the case. The matching process cannot be performed
by the composite service because it should have access to information which are
local to the component services. Therefore, in our approach, the matching is per-
formed by the component services. Notice that because of the privacy-preserving
protocol that we use (see next section), the composite service and the component
services will not learn the values of the identity attributes of the client and there-
fore do not have incentives to lie.
A second issue is how to take advantage of previous interactions that the client
has performedwith other component services. It is also important to exploit map-
pings that can exist between ontologies by different component services. To ad-
dress such issue, the matching protocol relies on the use of the proof-of-identity
certificates andmatching techniques. We assume thatAttrProof is the set of iden-
tity attributes that a component service asks to a client to verify its identity. The
identity attribute name matching process is carried out between the client, the
component service and the composite service when some attributes inAttrProof
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do not match any of the attributes inAttrSet, the set of clients’ identity attributes.
We refer to the set of component service’s identity attributes that do not match a
client attribute name to as NoMatchingAttr.
Algorithm 7: Multi-factor verification protocol
Input: CertRep: proof-of-identity certificates repository
AttrProof: set of identity attributes requested from the client ci:
proof-of-identity certificate
Output:
(1) FOR EACH ai ∈ AttrProof
(2) IF ∃cj ∈ CertRep such that cj prove the knowledge of ai
(3) THEN ai is verified
(4) ELSE
(5) Match aiwith client’s proof-of-identity certificates
(6) Verify AgZKPK
(7) Release new proof-of-identity certificate ci
(8) Store ci in CertRep
The matching process consists of two main phases. The goal of the first phase
is to match the identity attributes that have syntactical and terminological varia-
tions. During this phase, the component service sends to the composite service,
for each identity attribute ai in the NoMatchingAttr, the set Synseti that con-
tains a set of alternative character combinations and a set of synonyms. Thus, the
composite service sends the sets Synseti to the client. The client verifies that for
each identity attribute ai, there is an intersection between Synseti and AttrSet.
If this is the case attribute ai is removed from NoMatchingAttr. Otherwise, if
NoMatchingAttr is not empty, the second phase is performed. During the sec-
ond phase the client sends CertSet, the set of its proof-of-identity certificates to
the composite service that forwards them to the component service. Thus, in the
second phase of the matching process the component service tries to match the
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Figure A.2: Approach schema
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concepts corresponding to the identity attributes the client is not able to provide
with concepts from the ontologies of the services which have issued the proof-of-
identity certificates. The mappings can be determined by mapping the ontology
of the component service with the ontologies of the services that have released
the certificates. Those other services are referred to as semantic neighbors of the
component service. Only matches that have a confidence score s greater than
a predefined threshold are selected. The acceptance threshold is set up by the
component service to assess the matches’ validity. The greater the threshold, the
greater is the similarity between the two concepts and thus higher is the proba-
bility that the match is correct. If the component service is able to find mappings
for its concepts, it then verifies by using the information in the proof-of-identity
certificates that each matching concept matches a client’s attribute Attr. If this
check fails, the component service notifies the composite service that terminates
the interaction with the client.
A.5.2 Multi-factor authentication
Once the client receives Match, the set of matched identity attributes from the
composite service, it retrieves from the registrar or from its RegCert the commit-
mentsMi satisfying the matches and the corresponding signatures σi. The client
aggregates the commitments by computingM =
∏n
i=1Mi = g
m1+m2+...+mihr1+r2+...+ri
and the signatures into σ =
∏n
i=1σi, where σi is the registrar ’s signature on the
committed value Mi = g
mihri . According to the ZPK protocol, the client ran-
domly picks y, s in [1, ..q], computes d = gyhs (mod p), and sends d, σ, M,
Mi , 1 6 i 6 t, to the composite service that on in turn sends these values to
the component service. The component service sends back a random challenge
e ∈ [1, ..., q] to the client. Then the client computes u = y + em (mod q) and
v = s+ er (mod q) wherem = m1+ . . . mt and r = r1+ . . . rt and sends u and
v to the composite service.
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Algorithm 8: Verification()
Input:
Output:
(1) C: Receive(Match)
(2) C: AttrMathces.Add(Match)
(3) C: FOR EACH 〈Attr, Idi〉 ∈ AttrMatches
(4) C: {Mi, σi} := Select(RegCert, Attr)
(5) C: M =
∏n
i=1Mi
(6) C: randomly picks y, s ∈ [1..q]
(7) C: d = gyhs (modp)
(8) C: Send({M1, . . . ,Mn}, {σ1, . . . , σn },M, σ, d)
(9) CS: Receive({M1, . . . ,Mn}, {σ1, . . . , σn },M, σ, d)
(10) CS: randomly picks e ∈ [1..q]
(11) CS: Send(e)
(12) C: Receive(e)
(13) C: u := y+ em (mod q) wherem = m1+m2+ +mn
(14) C: w := s+ er (mod q) where r = r1+ r2+ . . . + rn
(15) C: Send(u, w)
(16) CS: Receive(u, w)
(17) CS: IF (guhw= = dMk (mod p) ∧σ = =
∏t
i=1σi)
(18) CS: Execute(S);
(19) CS: IssueCertificate();
(20) CS: ELSE
(21) CS: Send(Service Denied)
The composite service forwards u and v to the component service. The com-
ponent service accepts the aggregated zero knowledge proof if guhv = dce. If this
is the case, the component service checks that σ =
∏n
i=1σi. If also the aggregate
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signature verification succeeds, the component service releases a proof of iden-
tity certificate to the client. The certificate states that client’s identity attributes
in the Match set are mapped onto concepts of the component service ontology
and that the client has successfully proved the knowledge of those attributes. The
composite service sends the proof-of-identity certificate to the client and stores a
copy of the certificate in its local repository CertRep. The proof-of-identity cer-
tificate can be used by the client to prove the knowledge of an attribute without
performing the aggregate ZKP protocol with another component service.
A.6. System architecture and Implementation
In this section we discuss the system architecture that supports our multi-factor
identity attributes authentication for business processes. We assume that our
processes are implemented as WS-BPEL business processes, that is, as business
processes in which each component service is implemented by a Web service.
The main components of the architecture are: the BPEL engine, the Identity
Attribute Requestermodule, the Client, the Registrar , the Identity
Verification Handler module, and the component Web services. The WS-
BPEL engine is responsible for scheduling and synchronizing the various activ-
ities within the business process according to the specified activity dependen-
cies, and for invoking Web services operations associated with activities. The
Identity Attribute Requestermodule extends theWS-BPEL engine’s func-
tions by carrying on the communication with the client asking for new identity
attributes whenever necessary. The Identity Attribute Requester keeps
in a local repository the mapping certificate associated with previous clients iden-
tity verifications. The Client supports the functions to trigger the execution
of the WS-BPEL business process, to select the identity attributes matching the
ones requested by the component services, and to generate the aggregate ZKP of
the matched attributes. The Registrar component provides functions for stor-
ing the clients’ identity records and retrieving the public parameters required in
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Figure A.3: System architecture
the AgZKPK protocol. The Identity Verification Handler intercepts the
components services invocation messages and provides functions for matching
client identity attribute names and performing the aggregate ZKP verification.
Finally, the component Web services support the operations that are orchestrated
by the business process.
The Identity Attribute Requester, the Identity Verification Handler
modules, and the component Web services have been implemented in JAVA. The
Identity Verification Handler implements the identity attribute name
matching protocol using the Falcon-AO v0.7 [1, 2] ontology mapping API and
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WordNet 2.1 English Lexical database [9]. The Client application has been im-
plemented in JSP while the Registrar has been implemented as a JAVA servlet.
As BPEL engine we have chosen ODE. Finally, we have used Oracle 10g DBMS to
store clients’ identity records, ontology mappings, set of synonyms, session data
and mapping certificates.
Moreover, we have adopted ODE as BPEL engine. Oracle 10g DBMS is used
to store clients’ identity records, ontology mappings, set of synonyms, session
data and mapping certificates. Among these components the most relevant one
is the BPEL Orchestrator in that it provides a number of operations to manage
both identity management and naming heterogeneity according to the protocol
presented in the above Sections. Such component is a logically independent com-
ponent, as shown in Figure A.3; it can however be physically instantiated on the
same hosts supporting the other components. For example, a host supporting a
Web service may also include one such instance. The BPEL Orchestrator provides
the following features:
• orchestrates the Web services that are involved into the process;
• carries on the communication with the client asking for new credentials
whenever necessary;
• implements the protocol for solving naming heterogeneity using the Falcon-
AO v0.7 [1, 2] ontology mapping tool and by exploiting the WordNet 2.1
English Lexical database [9];
All the mapping certificates regarding the client that has instantiated the ac-
tual process are maintained within the Session Cache. During the execution of
a process activity, all the certificates are retrieved and sent to the associated Web
service. When the execution of the activity terminates, the Web service sends
back the new mapping certificates, if any, released to the client and the Session
Cache is updated with the new data.
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(a) Heterogeneity evaluation (b) AgZKPK Verification versus Creation
Figure A.4: Experimental results
A.7. Experimental Evaluation
We have performed several experiments to evaluate the AgZKPK process that
characterize the proposed approach to multi-factor identity verification and the
identity attribute names matching process. To execute the tests we have devel-
oped a BPEL process composed by four component Web services and we have
created a set of ontologies with an average cardinality of 60 concepts. We have
carried out the following experimental evaluations:
• we have measured the time taken by a component Web service to perform
the two different phases of the identity attribute names matching process
by varying the number of identity attributes that have to be matched from
1 to 8. (Figure A.4(a));
• we have measured the time taken by a component Web service to gener-
ate the aggregate ZKP by varying the number of identity attributes being
aggregated from 1 to 50. (Figure A.4(b));
• we havemeasured the time taken by a componentWeb service for aggregate
ZKP verification execution time varying the number of identity attributes
being aggregated from 1 to 50. (Figure A.4(b));
The execution time has been measured in CPU time (milliseconds). Moreover,
for each test case we have executed twenty trials, and the average over all the
trial execution times has been computed.
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Figure A.4(a) shows the execution times of the two phases of the matching
protocol for varying values in the number of identity attributes verified by a
component service. The execution time of the first phase (green line) slightly
increases and is around 60 ms. Instead, the time of the second phase is constant
because even if the number of identity attributes to be match increases, this phase
performs always the same operation, that is, matching two ontologies. The ex-
ecution time for the ontology matching is constant with respect to the number
of identity attributes, while the execution time of the mapping path creation in-
creases. Regarding ontology matching, the increase in computational time due
to the larger number of attributes is negligible compared to the time required for
the matching process. On the contrary, the time for the mapping path computa-
tion increases, as expected, because the same basic operations are repeated for a
number of times equal to the number of identity attributes considered. This is the
reason why the computation of a mapping path is more efficient than ontology
mapping when considering a smaller number of attributes. Figure A.4(b) reports
the times to create an AgZKP and to verify it for varying values in the number of
identity attributes being aggregated. The execution time to generate the AgZKP
(represented by the blue line in the graph) is almost constant for increasing val-
ues in the number of identity attributes. The reason is that the creation of AgZKP
only requires a constant number of exponentiations. By contrast, the time that the
component Web service takes to perform identity attributes verification linearly
increases with the number of identity attributes to be verified. The reason is that
during the verification the component Web service is required to multiply all the
commitments to verify the resulting aggregate signature.
A.8. Concluding Remarks
In this Chapter we have proposed a digital identity management approach for
business processes. Our approach uses a combination of techniques from the area
of semantic web and security protocols. We plan to extend this work in several
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directions. One direction is related to deal with heterogeneous identity negotia-
tion protocols. The second direction is related to the definition of a language for
identity verification policies that would allow service providers to specify con-
ditions on identity attributes. We also plan to extend the AgZKPK protocol to
verify that identity attribute’s commitments satisfies such conditions.
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